Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexander-Universität zu Erlangen.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Greifswald.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Auburn University. / Abstract. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-103).

Thesis (MPhil)--AUT University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references. Also held in print (x, 221 leaves : ill. ; 30 cm.) in the Archive at the City Campus (T 381.1770993 ABD)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 126-129).

Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-13T13:27:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2015-06-01. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2016-01-13T13:32:25Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000846853.pdf: 1065532 bytes, checksum: e932fa62c126d6aed37b89616cdb8aca (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Os modelos de leilão tradicionalmente utilizados em mercados de energia de sistemas hidrotérmicos consistem em modelos monoperíodo. Estes modelos não consideram em sua formulação a representação detalhada das restrições associadas ao sistema de geração de termoelétrica e à rede de transmissão, bem como a coordenação com o médio prazo para a geração hidroelétrica. A representação destas características é entãof feita através de ajustes posteriores, ex. post, a fim de garantir que os limites técnico-operacionais dos sistemas de geração e transmissão sejam respeitados. Tais ajustes geram ineficiências econômicas e subsídios cruzados. Assim, o objetivo deste trabalho é propor um modelo de leilão multiperíodo com representação da transmissão para sistemas hidrotérmicos. Este modelo, além de incorporar em sua formulação a representação precisa das restrições intertemporais e da transmissão, também considera a coordenação das gerações hidro e termoelétricas com o médio prazo, a fim de assegurar a menor complementação termoelétrica no presente e no futuro. Três abordagens de coordenação entre o curto e o médio prazo são apresentadas: coordenação primal, dual e primal-dual. Para a validadção do modelo de leilão proposto neste trabalho, testes computacionais foram realizados com o sistema 24 barras IEEE RTS-1996 para um caso base, o qual desconsidera a coordenação entre o curto e o médio prazo, e, posteriormente, para os casos que incluem a coordenação com o médio prazo / The auction models traditionally used in energy markets for hydrothermal systems consist in single-period models. he formulation of these models usually does not represent the thermal constraints and network constraints, and it also does not consider the coordination between short and medium-term for hydrothermal generation. The representation of these features is made by ex post adjustments in order to ensure that the technical and operational limits of the generation and transmission systems are guaranteed. Such adjustments generate economic inefficiencies and cross-subsidies. The goal of this work is to propose a multiperiod auction for hydrothermal systems. This model incorporates the accurate representation of inter-temporal constraints and network constraints, and it also considers the coordination between short and medium-term schedulings in order to ensure the lower thermal complementation in the present and in the future. Three coordinating approaches between the short and medium term schedulings are presented: primal, dual and primal-dual coordination. For the validation of the auction model proposed in this work, computational tests are carried out with the IEEE 24 bus RTS-1996 system, for a base case, which does not consider the cordination between short and medium-term schedulings, and later for the cases that include the coordination in the medium-term scheduling

This dissertation contains two essays focusing on how Self and Competitor Expertise influence valuation both during and post-auction. The first essay, "Competitor Expertise: Influences on bidding behavior and post-auction values in ascending auctions," considers how a bidder's perception of competitors' expertise types and levels influences valuation both during (bid level), after (WTP/WTA), and over time (∆WTP/∆WTA). Generally, I find that despite normative predictions regarding bidding behavior in a competitive auction environment, bidders tend to bid higher and maintain higher post-auction valuations when competing against experts in the product domain, although not amateurs or experts in other domains (e.g., auction bidding strategies). Post-auction valuation patterns further depended on Auction Outcome. The second essay, "Assessed Self-Expertise: Influences on Bidding Behavior and Post-Auction Values Against Competitors of Varying Expertise Levels," extends our investigation to consider how a bidder's perception of their own expertise type and level also influences valuation both during and post-auction. Broadly, I find additional support that bidders post higher valuations both during and post-auction when competing against Experts vs. Amateurs, but that this behavior is primarily driven by bidders who assess themselves as Experts and further depends on Auction Outcome. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation contains two essays that consider the influence of how one's own type and level of expertise (Self-Expertise) as well as one's perception of their competitors' expertise (Competitor Expertise) influence bidding behavior and post-auction product valuation. In the first essay, "Competitor Expertise: Influences on bidding behavior and post-auction values in ascending auctions," the issue of how bidders perceive Competitor Expertise levels is considered. Generally, bidders tend to bid higher and maintain higher post-auction valuations when competing against experts with expertise in the product category. Post-auction valuations and their durability further depend on whether bidders win or lose the auction. In the second essay, "Assessed Self-Expertise: Influences on Bidding Behavior and Post-Auction Values Against Competitors of Varying Expertise Levels," the issue of how one's self-assessment of their own type and level of expertise is further considered. Broadly, bidders tend to post higher valuations when they assess themselves as experts in the product category. Interestingly, this effect is largely driven by experts competing against other experts, although this also further depends on whether bidders won or lost.

While there is an ever increasing adoption of e-sourcing, where a buyer auctions off procurement contracts to a small group of pre-qualified suppliers, there is a lack of understanding of the impact of dynamic bidding process on procurement outcomes and bidding behavior. To extend the knowledge of this important issue, in this thesis, we explore empirically the value of online procurement auction on cost reduction, quality management, and winner selection from the buyer's perspective. We also explore how incumbent status affects the procurement outcomes. From suppliers' perspective, we characterize their bidding behavior and examine the effect of incumbent status on bidding. First, we collect detailed auction and contract awarding data for manufacturing goods during 2002-2004 from a large buyer in the high-tech industry. The rich data set enables us to apply statistical model based cluster technique to uncover heterogeneous bidding behavior of industry participants. The distribution of the bidding patterns varies between incumbent and non-incumbent suppliers. We also find that the buyer bias towards the incumbent suppliers by awarding them procurement contracts more often and with a price premium. Next, focusing on recurring auctions, we find that suppliers bid adaptively. The adaptive bidding is affected by the rank of suppliers' final bids. Finally, with field data of procurement auction for legal services, we demonstrate that service prices are on average reduced after dynamic bidding events. Most interestingly, the cost savings are achieved without the sacrifice of quality. Incumbent winners' quality is higher, on average, than the quality of buyer's supplier base before the auctions, while non-incumbent winner's quality is lower. These findings imply that the main value of online procurement auctions for business services comes from incumbents in the form of reduced price and enhanced quality. We find that after adjusting for incumbents' higher quality, incumbent bias disappears. Our results also imply that the buyer might possess important information about the incumbents, through past experiences, that cannot be easily included in the buyer's scoring function due to uncodifiability.

Submitted by Daniella Santos (daniella.santos@fgv.br) on 2008-11-18T13:41:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Paulo_Braulio.pdf: 392367 bytes, checksum: 067e84b7d5a8fd9dee8613e456989efc (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Antoanne Pontes(antoanne.pontes@fgv.br) on 2008-11-18T13:56:54Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Paulo_Braulio.pdf: 392367 bytes, checksum: 067e84b7d5a8fd9dee8613e456989efc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2008-11-18T13:56:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Paulo_Braulio.pdf: 392367 bytes, checksum: 067e84b7d5a8fd9dee8613e456989efc (MD5) / O presente estudo é dividido em três partes: a primeira é um resumo dos principais resultados teóricos encontrados na literatura de Leilões Multiunidade que são úteis em leilões de geração de energia. Dentre eles, foram analisadas as características dos leilões Discriminatório, Uniforme, de Vickrey, Ascendente e Híbrido levando em consideração os critérios de eficiência e pagamento esperado. A segunda parte é uma tentativa de extensão de um modelo de leilão híbrido para o caso de uma unidade para o de multiunidade. Finalmente, a terceira parte explica como é feito o leilão de geração de energia no Brasil.