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Analysis of multi-attribute multi-unit procurement auctions and capacity-constrained sequential auctionsZhang, Zhuoxiu 08 August 2009 (has links)
This dissertation examines an iterative multi-attribute auction for multi-unit procurement in the first part. A multi-unit allocation problem that allows order split among suppliers is formulated to improve the market efficiency. Suppliers are allowed to provide discriminative prices over units based on their marginal costs. A mechanism called Iterative Multiple-attribute Multiple-unit Reverse Auction (IMMRA) is proposed based on the assumption of the modified myopic best-response strategies. Numerical experiment results show that the IMMRA achieves market efficiency in most instances. The inefficiency occurs occasionally on the special cases when cost structures are significantly different among suppliers. Numerical results also show that the IMMRA results in lower buyer payments than the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) payments in most cases. In the second part, two sequential auctions with the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism are proposed for two buyers to purchase multiple units of an identical item. The invited suppliers are assumed to have capacity constraints of providing the required demands. Three research problems are raised for the analysis of the sequential auctions: the suppliers' expected payoff functions, the suppliers' bidding strategies in the first auction, and the buyers' procurement costs. Because of the intrinsic complexity of the problems, we limit our study to a duopoly market environment with two suppliers. Both suppliers’ dominant bidding strategies are theoretically derived. With numerical experiments, suppliers’ expected profits and buyers’ expected procurement costs are empirically analyzed.
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Deregulation of railways : An analysis of the procurement auctions in Jönköpings LänAndersson, Peter January 2006 (has links)
Railways have played an important role for the Swedish economy throughout the 20th into the 21st century since it provides good connections between urban and rural regions and also within them. However, it has been very costly for the state to run this activity and a significant effort to reduce costs and to increase the efficiency for this sector was to introduce procurement auctions where also private firms are invited to lay bids. Four auctions have taken place in Jönköpings Län since its introduction in 1990. It has been a turbulent time economically for the winning bidders and the phenomena winner’s curse is evident where the bidder with highest over-estimate wins and therefore faces high costs or low returns. This study points at flaws in the auction design as the reason for the economical difficulties for the winning firms. If second-price sealed bid auctions or first-price sealed bid auctions were used instead of a combination of first-price sealed auction and English auction, the winner’s curse phenomena could be reduced or even eliminated.
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Deregulation of railways : An analysis of the procurement auctions in Jönköpings LänAndersson, Peter January 2006 (has links)
<p>Railways have played an important role for the Swedish economy throughout the 20th into the 21st century since it provides good connections between urban and rural regions and also within them. However, it has been very costly for the state to run this activity and a significant effort to reduce costs and to increase the efficiency for this sector was to introduce procurement auctions where also private firms are invited to lay bids.</p><p>Four auctions have taken place in Jönköpings Län since its introduction in 1990. It has been a turbulent time economically for the winning bidders and the phenomena winner’s curse is evident where the bidder with highest over-estimate wins and therefore faces high costs or low returns.</p><p>This study points at flaws in the auction design as the reason for the economical difficulties for the winning firms. If second-price sealed bid auctions or first-price sealed bid auctions were used instead of a combination of first-price sealed auction and English auction, the winner’s curse phenomena could be reduced or even eliminated.</p>
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Empirical analyses of online procurement auctions - business value, bidding behavior, learning and incumbent effectZhong, Fang. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D)--Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. / Committee Chair: Wu, D.J.; Committee Member: Keskinocak, Pinar; Committee Member: Narasimhan, Sridhar; Committee Member: Toktay, Beril; Committee Member: Zhang, Han.
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Models and Algorithms for Procurement Combinatorial AuctionsMansouri, Bahareh 11 1900 (has links)
A key problem in designing marketplaces is how to efficiently allocate a collection of goods among multiple people. Auctions have emerged as a powerful tool with the promise to increase market efficiency by allocating goods to those who value them the most. Nevertheless, traditional auctions are unable to handle real-world market complexities. Over the past decade, there has been a trend towards allowing for package bids and other types of multidimensional bidding techniques that enable suppliers to take advantage of their unique abilities and put forth their best offers. In particular the application of iterative combinatorial auctions in procurement saves negotiation costs and time. Conceptually these auctions show a potential for improving the overall market efficiency. However, in practice they host several new challenges and difficulties.
One challenge facing the auctioneer in an iterative combinatorial auction environment is to quickly find an acceptable solution for each round of the auction. Bidders require time to precisely evaluate, price, and communicate different possible combinations based on their current information of item prices. The auctioneer requires time to solve the underlying mathematical problem formulation based on the bids received, report back the feedback information and initiate a new round of the auction.
In Chapter 3, we propose a Lagrangian-based heuristic to solve the auctioneer's winner determination problem. After generating the Lagrange multipliers from the solution of a linear relaxation, the heuristic applies several procedures to fix any potentially infeasible optimal Lagrange solutions. In addition to providing an efficient way of solving the winner determination problem, as compared with the leading commercial solver CPLEX, our approach provides Lagrange multipliers. The latter are used as proxies for prices in the auction feedback mechanism.
In Chapter 4 we develop a model for the bidders pricing problem, an issue that has received much less attention in the literature. Using the auctioneer feedback, that includes the Lagrange multipliers, the pricing model maximizes the bidders' profit while at the same time keeping their bids competitive. We derive several optimality results for the underlying optimization problem. Interestingly, we analytically show that the auction converges to a point where no bidder is able to submit a bid that yields strictly better profit for him and is not less competitive than his previous bids submitted. We experimentally observe that this approach converges in an early stage. We also find that this iterative auction allows the bidders to improve their profit while providing lower and competitive prices to the auctioneer.
In Chapter 5, we introduce a flexible auction model that allows for partial bids. Rather than the regular all-or-nothing indivisible package bids, divisible bids provide flexibility for the auctioneer with the possibility to accept parts of the bids and yet allow the suppliers to capture synergies among the items and provide quantity discounts. We show numerically that this approach improves the overall efficiency of the auction by increasing the suppliers' profit while decreasing the auctioneer's total price of procurement. In addition, we find that computationally the flexible auction outperforms the regular auction. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
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Empirical and Theoretical Analysis of Public Procurement AuctionsNakabayashi, Jun 08 September 2009 (has links)
No description available.
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Empirical analyses of online procurement auctions - business value, bidding behavior, learning and incumbent effectZhong, Fang 24 August 2007 (has links)
While there is an ever increasing adoption of e-sourcing, where a buyer auctions off procurement contracts to a small group of pre-qualified suppliers, there is a lack of understanding of the impact of dynamic bidding process on procurement outcomes and bidding behavior. To extend the knowledge of this important issue, in this thesis, we explore empirically the value of online procurement auction on cost reduction, quality management, and winner selection from the buyer's perspective. We also explore how incumbent status affects the procurement outcomes. From suppliers' perspective, we characterize their bidding behavior and examine the effect of incumbent status on bidding. First, we collect detailed auction and contract awarding data for manufacturing goods during 2002-2004 from a large buyer in the high-tech industry. The rich data set enables us to apply statistical model based cluster technique to uncover heterogeneous bidding behavior of industry participants. The distribution of the bidding patterns varies between incumbent and non-incumbent suppliers. We also find that the buyer bias towards the incumbent suppliers by awarding them procurement contracts more often and with a price premium. Next, focusing on recurring auctions, we find that suppliers bid adaptively. The adaptive bidding is affected by the rank of suppliers' final bids. Finally, with field data of procurement auction for legal services, we demonstrate that service prices are on average reduced after dynamic bidding events. Most interestingly, the cost savings are achieved without the sacrifice of quality. Incumbent winners' quality is higher, on average, than the quality of buyer's supplier base before the auctions, while non-incumbent winner's quality is lower. These findings imply that the main value of online procurement auctions for business services comes from incumbents in the form of reduced price and enhanced quality. We find that after adjusting for incumbents' higher quality, incumbent bias disappears. Our results also imply that the buyer might possess important information about the incumbents, through past experiences, that cannot be easily included in the buyer's scoring function due to uncodifiability.
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FIRM BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN HIGHWAY PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF SINGLE-BID CONTRACTS, TACIT COLLUSION, AND THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON KENTUCKYBarrus, David R. 01 January 2011 (has links)
Recently, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) indicated lack of competition and single-bid contracts in asphalt paving as a major issue facing state transportation departments. Single-bid contracts indicate a lack of competition which increases costs to state and local governments. During the period from 2005-2007 in Kentucky, 42 percent of all bids were awarded with only one firm bidding on the project. Of the asphalt paving jobs, 63 percent of those jobs were awarded to a single bidder.
The analysis of this dissertation focuses on detecting tacit collusion in asphalt paving jobs in Kentucky. A focal point enables firms to coordinate bids and engage in a tit-for-tat strategy where they refuse to bid in each other’s counties. In this case the focal point is the county boundaries. Two factors contribute to the ability of firms to use county boundaries to coordinate bids. The first factor is that the political county boundaries form relatively small counties which allow a firm’s service area to cover multiple counties. The firms are able to claim counties and service the projects in those counties. The second factor is that a majority of asphalt projects which the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet puts up for bidding are exclusive to a specific county. This allows firms to know whether a project falls in a county within their bidding territory.
Each county and firm in each of the 12 Kentucky Transportation Cabinet geographic districts was analyzed to see if there was evidence of bid coordination. The result is that in 94 out of 120 counties there was evidence of bid coordination or tacit collusion with increases in bid levels. There is evidence that 25 of the 31 Kentucky asphalt paving firms refuse to bid against their rivals in their rival’s territories. This refusal by firms to bid against each other resulted in single-bid contracts that were $70,595,466.09 above the competitive level.
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The buyer-seller risk distribution and competition effects in procurement auctionsRidderstedt, Ivan January 2016 (has links)
This thesis investigates how competition effects in government procurement auction are affected by the risk distribution between the procurer and the winning bidder. The risk distribution is linked to the conditions of payment which is assumed to be largely determined by the procurer. Thus, by investigating whether competition effects are different dependent on the risk distribution, this thesis contributes to the previous literature which almost exclusively model competition effects to be determined exogenous sources of uncertainty and characteristics of the market. There is a previous literature on the effects of various payment conditions in auctions but it mostly considers ex post moral hazard issues, and not effects on the competitive behavior at the bidding stage. An econometric analysis is conducted on auctions of infrastructure construction contracts held by the Swedish Transport Administration between 2010 and 2013. The results suggest that the choice of risk distribution can shift an auction from having no competition effects in bidding to strong bid-reducing competition effects. Seemingly, the procurer appears to face a trade-off between avoiding risk and enjoying bid-reducing competition effects. The difference in competition effects between contracts with fixed and more flexible payment conditions is found to increase with the auctioned project’s expected duration. In terms of government procurement policy, the results suggest that it can be cost-efficient for the procuring entity to share the risk with the contractor in risky projects instead of avoiding risk with fixed price contracts. Whilst this may contradict some common notions regarding government procurement, it is in line with the wide use of flexible payment conditions in private-sector procurement. Arguably, the recent decade’s increased ambitions regarding innovation and sustainability in government procurement adds even further weight to these policy considerations for the risk management of procurers.
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Essays on Experimental Methods Applied to Different EnvironmentsDi Paolo, Roberto 16 July 2021 (has links)
El enfoque experimental es el corazón de algunos de los desarrollos más interesantes de la economía. Básicamente, los experimentos se utilizan para generar datos controlados. El término "datos controlados" se refiere al hecho de que la mayoría de los factores en los que influyen las conductas se mantienen constantes, y solo un factor de interés (el "tratamiento'') cambia a la vez. Este es el punto crítico para hacer una inferencia causal. A veces, este proceso de generación ocurre de forma natural (es decir, un "experimento natural''). Sin embargo, la mayoría de las veces, el investigador es el encargado de desarrollar y controlar el proceso de generación. Todas las áreas de la ciencia (incluida la economía) deben considerar todas las metodologías que se pueden aplicar. La teoría, los experimentos de laboratorio, los experimentos de campo, los experimentos online, la neuroeconomía, la investigación observacional y social, las encuestas y más, contribuyen a nuestra comprensión del mundo. En el primer capítulo de a tesis, se presentan resultados experimentales sobre subastas. Se consideran dos tratamientos experimentales: si el comprador prefiere más la calidad a la dimensión del precio, o si este último importa más que la calidad. Los participantes se asignan al azar a uno de estos dos tratamientos y se emparejan en grupos de cinco. Juegan una subasta de períodos múltiples, donde la calidad es exógena asignada en cada ronda y los sujetos presentan una rebaja al precio base anunciado. Las pujas se transforman en puntuaciones que combinan la calidad exógena y la rebaja. El vendedor con la puntuación más alta gana la subasta. Los resultados sugieren que, cuando el peso de la rebaja es mayor, los participantes pujan más cerca del equilibrio. Sin embargo, la probabilidad de obtener un resultado eficiente es mayor cuando se pone más peso en la calidad. En el segundo capítulo analizo los resultados de un experimento en línea en el que los sujetos juegan cuatro versiones del juego Stag-Hunt. Hay tres tratamientos: línea de base, retraso de tiempo y retraso motivado. En el segundo, los sujetos deben esperar 40 segundos antes de elegir una decisión. En el tercero, deben esperar 40 segundos y escribir un texto para motivar sus decisiones. Al final del juego, los participantes informan sobre creencias, preferencias de riesgo y una medida de confianza. El resultado principal es que los sujetos optan por colaborar menos cuando deliberan más. La explicación es que este tratamiento ayuda a los sujetos a comprender que esta es la opción más segura. En el tercer capítulo, los autores estiman el impacto de un programa educativo basado en juegos destinado a promover el uso sostenible del agua. Esto se hizo en la ciudad de Lucca, con miles de alumnos de 2º a 4º de primaria. Los hallazgos indican que los estudiantes del grupo de tratamiento (participantes del programa) mostraron una mayor conciencia sobre el consumo de agua respecto a aquellos estudiantes que no participaron en el programa. Además, encuentran que el efecto positivo aún se observa después de seis meses, lo que sugiere que los programas educativos basados en juegos pueden ser un instrumento eficaz para promover comportamientos prosociales en el consumo de agua.
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