abstract: Given that lobbying activity by audit firms constitutes a potential advocacy threat to auditor independence, this paper seeks to provide an economic rationale for audit firm lobbying behavior. Specifically, I examine whether federal lobbying activity by audit firms contributes to their ability to retain existing clients and attract new clients. Consequently, I predict and find that greater lobbying activity is associated with a lower probability of auditor switching behavior as well longer auditor tenure when the client is in an industry with high interest in lobbying. I also find that, when switching audit firms, clients tend to choose audit firms with greater lobbying activity and that companies in industries with high interest in lobbying are more likely to choose an audit firm with greater lobbying activity than their previous auditor. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Accountancy 2017

To gain insight into the impact that investors have on the firm's auditor choice decision, this study investigates the association between changes in investor monitoring and auditor turnovers. Hedge fund activism provides a unique setting to observe how highly motivated investors, willing to incur significant expense to effect changes in target firms, are able to influence a firm's decision to dismiss their external auditor. I find that activist hedge fund targets see an increase in auditor turnovers and dismissals during the years following hedge fund activism relative to both the two years' pre-activism and a propensity matched sample of firms. I document that the increase in auditor turnovers is primarily driven by target firms with a Big 4 auditor, and that hedge fund targets primarily seek a lateral change in auditors. Consistent with institutional concerns that excess compensation impairs auditor independence, I find that activist targets are more likely to dismiss their auditors when the auditor is earning high non-audit service fees and high abnormal audit fees. I then examine how the market interprets the lateral change in auditors. I find that financial statement reliability increases for lateral auditor changes associated with independence concerns. Finally, I examine the conditions under which the hedge funds are able to facilitate an auditor change. I find that hedge funds pursuing less aggressive activist campaigns, and hedge funds seeking less public forms of interventions are more likely to seek an auditor dismissal. This relation between non-confrontational campaigns and auditor dismissals is consistent with prior research suggesting that hedge funds seeking to work with management are better able to enact changes in a target firm.

近年來，女權意識逐漸抬頭，女性在商業所扮演的角色也漸受重視，根據《第三期中國婦女社會地位調查主要數據報告》，中國女性的就業率及教育程度已逐年提升，女性在工作上的表現也不亞於男性。由於獨立董事與外部審計同為重要的治理機制，且在中國，獨立董事就有權對會計師事務所的聘任及審計公費的決定程序發表意見，因此，為了解性別多元化對董事會決策之影響，本研究以中國2006年-2011年的A股上市公司為研究對象，來探討女性獨立董事對會計師選擇及審計定價之影響。在控制其他變數之後，本研究發現，當公司有女性獨立董事且女性獨立董事比例越高時，越不傾向選擇國際四大或中國國內十大會計師事務所進行審計；另外，本研究也發現，女性獨立董事比例越高之公司，其審計公費越低。 / Independent director and external audit are both important corporate governance mechanisms. In China, independent directors are authorized to provide suggestions on auditor choice and the decision process of audit fees. Considering gender diversity of the board may affect the monitoring role performed by independent directors and the decision made by independent directors, we conduct a study using a sample of China A-shares over the period 2006 to 2011 to realize the relationship between female independent director and external audit, including auditor choice and audit fees. After controlling other variables, we find that corporations with female independent directors are less likely to choose Big4 and China local 10 as their audit firm than those without female independent directors. Furthermore, there is a significant negative relationship between female independent director ratio and audit fees. This may indicate that female independent directors can partly substitute the governance function of external audit and thus reduce audit fees and the possibility of choosing bigger audit firms.

Revision är en systematisk process som innefattar en systematisk insamling av bevis för attslutligen lämna ett yttrande om ett klientföretags redovisning. Syftet med revision är attundersöka och utvärdera relevans och validitet i klientföretagets finansiella antaganden (Eilifsen et al, 2014, s. 12). Revision anses vara viktigt för klientföretaget och dess aktieägare,likaväl som för intressenter och andra utomstående parter (Eilifsen et al., 2014, s. 5). Revisorer och deras arbete är i sin helhet styrda av flertalet lagar och förordningar, där överträdelser eller åsidosatta skyldigheter kan leda till en sanktion. I denna studie har vi valt att fokusera på tillsynsärenden och revisorer som fått en sanktion utfärdad mot sig. I Sverige finns det en specifik myndighet som ansvarar för tillsynen av revisorer och som därmed även utreder disciplinära ärenden. Den myndigheten heter Revisorsinspektionen och ansvarar främst för tillsyn av revisorer och revisionsbolag men även för examination samt auktorisation av revisorer (Revisorsinspektionen, u.å. d). Revisorsinspektionens tillsynsmyndighet är myndighetens största verksamhetsområde. Förekommande ärendebeslut vid disciplinära ärenden hos Revisorsinspektionen är varning, erinran samt upphävande, vilka är de ärendebeslut som vi i denna studie benämner som sanktioner. Även ärendebeslut så som ingen åtgärd, avskrivning samt beslut i annat ärende är förekommande hos myndighetens tillsynsverksamhet men leder inte till någon sanktion.Denna studie syftar till att bidra med kunskap avseende disciplinära åtgärder mot revisorer med fokus på klientföretagen. Studien syftar även till att identifiera eventuella kännetecken hos de klientföretag som väljer att anlita en sanktionerad revisor och ifall dessa kännetecken skiljer sig från eventuella kännetecken hos företag som anlitar icke-sanktionerade revisorer. Studien bygger på studier av två olika tidsperioder som syftar till att kunna jämföra och dra slutsatser om dessa kännetecken förändras över tid. Denna studie har sin grund i tidigare forskning som utförts inom revision men även företagsekonomi. Denna studie har även ett tydligt fokus på valet av revisor där revisorn fått en disciplinär åtgärd – därmed sanktionerade revisorer ur ett klientföretagarperspektiv. Detta är något som differentierar denna studie från tidigare studier och därmed är ett givande teoretiskt bidrag. Den tidigare forskning som funnits i samband med litteratursökning, har ett större fokus på valet av revisor i form av auditor choice. Däremot återfinns inga tidigare studier med ett fokus på sanktionerade revisorer i relation till auditor choice. Vilket gör denna studie till den första studien som sammankopplar dessa områden i samma studie. Utifrån denna studie har vi kunnat dra slutsatsen att både kön på VD och styrelse har en inverkan på valet av sanktionerad revisor. En ytterligare slutsats som kunnat dras av denna studie är att tiden sedan utfärdad sanktion har en påverkan på de avgörande kännetecknen hos klientföretagen vid val av sanktionerad revisor.

Auditing has an important role in the corporate governance process and is essential in ensuring confidence in the reliability of financial information. It is important to understand the reasons why, given the costs involved, companies change their auditor and choose a particular level of audit assurance. To date, however, only a limited number of studies on auditor choice issues are available, especially in the UK setting. Further, since the downfall of Andersen, the audit market environment has changed significantly, creating a new audit environment to be researched. In light of these recent developments, the objectives of this thesis are to address both concentration and auditor choice issues. It is divided into two separate but interrelated parts. The first part of this thesis provides evidence on audit market concentration in the UK domestic listed company market from 1998 to 2003. The effect of Andersen’s demise on both audit market concentration and audit fees is examined. Using four different size measures (number of audits, audit fees, clients’ total assets and sales), three measures of concentration are calculated. Results show that the UK audit market has now clearly surpassed the tight oligopoly threshold and, despite auditing significantly fewer clients in 2003 than in 1998, the B5/4 managed to increase their fee dominance. In particular, the decline in B5/4 ‘number of clients’ market share was mainly due to their lower share of the newly-listed companies audit market. On the other hand, the slight increase in B5/4 audit fee market share was due to the net impact of leavers concentrating the B5/4 share and joiners diluting it. Voluntary switches to/from the B5/4 had a relatively small impact on B5/4 market share for both measures. Following Andersen’s acquisition by Deloitte & Touche, market levels of audit fee and audit fee rate (audit fee scaled by total assets) have increased markedly, suggesting that more audit effort is being expended as a way to restore confidence about audit quality after the damage caused by Andersen’s alleged misconduct. The acquisition has also contributed to a further increase in ‘audit fee’ market concentration for the 4-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and in the overall Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measure. Although, Deloitte & Touche gained significant market share in terms of both audit fees and number of audits through its acquisition of Andersen, it is PricewaterhouseCoopers that continues to hold the largest market share. Deloitte & Touche retained 93 former Andersen clients (74%), 21 (17%) moved to another B5/4 auditor and 11 (9%) chose a non-B5/4 firm. While former Andersen clients paid higher audit fees, in aggregate, the increase was, perhaps surprisingly, less than for the market as a whole. At the industry level, the B4 firms dominated all sectors, the highest non-B5/4 market share in any industry being just 8%. In 2003, PricewaterhouseCoopers was the leader in 18 out of 34 sectors. The second part of the thesis is divided into two separate studies – auditor change determinants and new auditor selection determinants. These studies use a sample of non financial auditor change companies to test logistic regression models of the determinants of auditor change and new auditor selection. The determinant variables include auditee, auditor and audit characteristics. This part also examines the sensitivity of results to alternative functional forms of the basic model specification. Two definitions of auditor quality – brand name auditor and specialism, are employed. Internal governance issues such as audit committee independence, the duality of chairman/CEO as well as the size/quality of the incumbent auditor were found to be significant determinants of auditor change. Expected future growth in the company, rather than past growth, and audit fee reduction were positively related to audit change probability. Result also suggests that companies changed auditor to improve the perception of auditor independence. By contrast, in the new auditor selection models, corporate governance variables did not appear to be important in determining a different quality (brand-name) auditor. Only the chairman/CEO duality variable was weakly and negatively significant, suggesting that duality is associated with a change to a lower quality auditor. Growing companies are more likely to change to a brand name auditor, consistent with the inability of smaller firms to provide services across an international market. Contrary to agency theory predictions, the results show that a company experiencing increased leverage is less likely to choose a B5/4 auditor, suggesting that B5/4 auditors are being selective in avoiding risky clients. Higher audit fees are paid to new auditors by companies that changed from non-B5/4 to B5/4, reflecting a B5/4 fee premium. However, the higher NAS fee result is contrary to initial expectations. Typically, far fewer variables were significant in the models with audit quality proxied by industry specialism. For the specialism models based on audit fee market share, there is counter-intuitive evidence that a company with a large number of subsidiaries is less likely to move to a specialist auditor from a non-specialist. New specialist auditors were more likely to be preferred when a company experienced an increase in current accruals or a reduction in leverage. In general, the results for these models were less strong and were dependent upon the specialist definition adopted. Finally, the thesis provides evidence that the choice of time variant model (ex-ante, contemporaneous or ex-post) made no significant difference to the overall results. The one exception concerns the ‘growth’ variable, where companies are found to change auditor in anticipation of future growth, rather than as a response to past growth. Further, the use of alternative proxy variables does not greatly influence the regression results. One important exception to this general observation concerns the brand name proxy. When brand name was defined as tier12 (to include Grant Thornton and BDO) the significance level was improved in all models. This suggests that, to some degree, Grant Thornton and BDO are viewed as quality service providers closer in quality to B5/4 than to other smaller audit firms.

本文主要研究支付給審計委員會較多的權益薪酬會不會影響到審計委員會的獨立性，從而支付較低的審計公費，選擇非產業專家的會計師。以2007至2015年間美國的上市公司為樣本，本研究發現審計委員會獲得的權益薪酬與審計公費，產業專家的會計師選擇呈負相關。此結果與預期一致，權益薪酬會誘導審計委員會妥協獨立性，從而買較少，品質較低的審計服務。