The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

RESUME La construction d un systeme financier sain et concurrentiel capable de mobiliser de facon substantielle des hauts niveaux d epargne et l amelioration des normes de supervision bancaire et financier pour assurer la stabilite du systeme sont deux des recommandations souvent faites par les institutions internationales pour permettre aux pays africains de participer pleinement a l expansion de la prosperite mondiale et a beneficier de la globalisation du commerce des services financiers.<p><p>Cette these essaie de trouver les voies et moyens susceptibles de contribuer a l amelioration et au renforcement de la supervision bancaire au Congo, et in fine [le secteur bancaire etant le plus important du systeme financier] permettre l eclosion d un systeme financier moderne et efficace qui rencontre les normes internationales.<p><p>Dans une premiere etape qui consiste en un etat des lieux du systeme financier congolais et en une analyse critique de la gestion bancaire ( chapitre 1 et chapitre 2 ); les analyses :<p>- ressortent les caracteristiques du systeme financier congolais ;<p>- soulignent les contraintes structurelles ayant entrave trois decennies de gestion bancaire ;<p>- evaluent les chances de succes des reformes mises en oeuvre par les autorites;<p>- proposent en des termes generaux, les ameliorations a porter au cadre reglementaire et de supervision du secteur bancaire afin de reduire les imperfections, de renforcer l efficacite et la stabilite du systeme dans son ensemble.<p><p>Dans une seconde etape, un menu plus restreint de propositions faites au terme de l etat des lieux du systeme financier et de l analyse critique de la gestion bancaire est passe en revue. Les contributions de la these dans cette etape consistent :<p>- en la proposition d outils concrets de supervision bancaire pour faire face a la carence d outils de gestion prudentielle preventive ;(chapitre 3)<p>- en recommandations pour ameliorer :la politique de provisionnement des creances et le fonctionnement des institutions de microfinance ;( chapitre 4)<p>- a degager dans une demarche d analyse strategique, les pistes susceptibles de contribuer a l amelioration de la sante et la solidite du systeme financier congolais apres evaluation prealable de sa competitivite (chapitre 5)<p> <p>SUMMARY<p>The construction of an healthy and competitive financial system able to mobilize high levels of saving and the improvement of the standards of banking and financial supervision to ensure the stability of the system are two of the recommendations often made by international institutions to help African countries to take part in the expansion of world prosperity and to profit from the globalization of financial services. <p><p>This thesis tries to find the ways to contribute to the improvement and the reinforcement of the banking supervision in Congo, and in fine [ the banking environment being most significant of the financial system ] to allow the blossoming of a modern and effective financial system which meets international standards. <p><p>In a first stage which consists in an overview of the Congolese financial system and in a critical analysis of the banking management ( chapter 1 & chapter 2) ;our analyses :<p>- release the characteristics of the Congolese financial system ;<p>- underline the structural constraints having blocked three decades of banking management ;<p>- evaluate the chances of success of the reforms implemented by the authorities ;<p>- propose in general terms, the improvements to be carried in order to reduce the imperfections of the banking supervision, to reinforce the effectiveness and the stability of the banking system. <p><p>In the second stage, a more restricted menu of proposals made at the end of the first stage is reviewed. The contributions of the thesis in this stage consist:<p>- in the proposal of concrete tools for banking supervision to face the deficiency of preventive prudential management tools; ( chapter 3)<p>- in recommendations to improve :the policy of provisioning bad debts and the management of Microfinance institutions; (chapter 4)<p>- in an evaluation of the competitiveness of the Congolese financial system and in the identification of ways which can contribute to the improvement of its safety and solidity by using a strategic analysis approach. ( chapter 5)<p><p><p><p><p> / Doctorat en sciences de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished