Thesis (Ph. D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 42-45). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

In Chapter 1 I study the iterative strategy elimination mechanisms for normal form games. The literature is mostly clustered around the order of elimination. The conventional elimination also requires more strict knowledge assumptions if the elimination is iterative. I define an elimination process which requires weaker rationality. I establish some preliminary results suggesting that my mechanism is order independent whenever iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) is so. I also specify conditions under which the \undercutting problem" occurs. Comparison of other elimination mechanisms in the literature (Iterated Weak Strategy Elimination, Iterated Strict Strategy Elimination, Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion, RBEU, Dekel-Fudenberg Procedure, Asheim- Dufwenberg Procedure) and mine is also studied to some extent. In Chapter 2 I study the axiomatic characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule: Proportional Division (PROP). The rule allocates shares proportional to agents' claims and hence, is intuitive according to many authors. I give supporting evidence to this opinion by first defining a new type of consistency requirement, i.e. union-consistency and showing that PROP is the only rule that satisfies anonymity, continuity and union-consistency. Note that anonymity and continuity are very general requirements and satisfied by almost all the rules that have been studied in this literature. Thus, I prove that we can choose a unique rule among them by only requiring union-consistency. Then, I define a bankruptcy operator and give some intuition on it. A bankruptcy operator is a mapping from the set of bankruptcy operators to itself. I prove that any rule will converge to PROP under this operator as the claims increase. I show nice characteristics of the operator some of which are related to PROP. I also give a definition for continuity of an operator. In Chapter 3 investigate risk-averse investors' behaviour towards a risky firm. In order to find Pareto Optimal allocations regarding a joint venture, I employ a 2-stage game, first stage of which involves a social-planner committing to an ex-post bankruptcy rule. A bankruptcy rule is a set of suggestions for solving each possible bankruptcy problem. A bankruptcy problem occurs when there is not enough endowment to allocate to the agents each of whom has a claim on it. I devise the game-theoretic approach posed in K1br1s and K1br1s (2013) and extend it further. In fact, that paper considers a comparison among 4 renowned bankruptcy rules whereas mine do not restrict attention to any particular rule but rather aim to find a Pareto Optimal(PO) one. I start with 2 agent case in order to give some insight to the reader and then, generalise the results to an arbitrary number of investors. I find socially desirable (PO) allocations and show that the same can be achieved through financial markets by the help of some well-known results.

Основной целью магистерской диссертации является совершенствование инструментов оценки финансовой безопасности российских компаний на основе существующих методов. Выпускная квалификационная работа состоит из введения, трех глав, заключения и списка использованных источников. В первой главе рассмотрены теоретические основы финансовой безопасности предприятия, выделены и описаны методики определения уровня финансовой безопасности. Во второй главе проведён анализ современного состояния российских компаний в сфере финансовой безопасности. В третьей главе сформулированы направления совершенствования оценки финансовой безопасности российских компаний, приведена авторская модель оценки уровня финансовой безопасности. / The main purpose of the master's thesis is to improve the tools for assessing the financial security of Russian companies based on existing methods. The final qualifying work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a list of sources used. In the first chapter, the theoretical foundations of the financial security of an enterprise are considered, methods for determining the level of financial security are identified and described. The second chapter analyzes the current state of Russian companies in the field of financial security. In the third chapter, the directions for improving the assessment of financial security of Russian companies are formulated, the author's model for assessing the level of financial security is given.

規模效應是資本資產定價模型所無法解釋的報酬異常現象中，最常被討論的一個。本文首先將探討台灣股市是否具有規模效應情形，若有，再進一步檢視其型態為何。接下來，本文試圖了解是否公司發生財務危機的機率高低會與規模溢酬有所關連，亦即，小公司因為較容易發生財務危機事件，因此平均而言，較大公司有更高的報酬率。本研究將採用Shumway(2001)的羅吉斯迴歸模型來估算公司發生財務危機事件之機率，並且比較不同變數之預測能力如何。 經由實證結果，發現1986年至2009年的台灣股市具有規模效應情形，此結果與之前幾位研究者之研究結果相符。而在財務危機事件機率的部份，亦可看出發生財務危機機率較高的投資組合享有較高的報酬率，此情形在小市值規模的公司身上尤其明顯。從以上發現，我們可以推論財務危機風險確實為構成規模效應的因素之一。 / Size effect is one of wildly-discussed pricing anomalies that cannot be explained by capital assets pricing model, we would like to exam whether it exists in Taiwan stock markets and how its pattern is. Furthermore, we assume the higher financial distress risk a company has, the higher expected return it will earn. That is, there is positive correlation between financial distress risk and return. Following the logistic model developed by Shumway(2001), we explore the list of variables which have greater explanatory power in prediction. Through empirical data with stocks listed and ever listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange and GreTai Securities Market, we find size effect does exist. The result is consistent with previous study. We also see firms with higher distress risk tend to have higher returns, this condition is especially obvious in small companies. So we can infer that having higher distress risk is one of the reasons why small companies can earn higher returns, they are consistent with our conjecture.