絕對多數候選人的票源並不是很均勻地分散在各地，反而都有一些表現在水準之上。本論文的焦點放在這些最強的地區。 首先正式定義候選人的「選舉地盤」以及兩個衡量地盤規模指標「強度」與「重要度」。以這些概念描述地盤與選區許多人文區位以及候選人個人特質的關係如何。結果發現最健全的地盤是由當選的男性國民黨籍候選人所建立的，且在農民偏多、教育程度偏低的地區。 接者，本論文探索地盤對政黨票源的影響如何。透過迴歸分析，可發現新黨候選人的地盤可說是強制配票策略的一個副產物。另外，本論文使用一個個案研究來討論國民黨責任區配票制度對地盤的影響力，發現地緣因素可能比配票制度還重要。再者，針對地盤是否增加政黨票源的問題，發現如果先控制所有黨籍候選人在全選區的表現後，候選人在其地盤確實會增加政黨的票源。 最後，本論文探討地盤在多次選舉的穩定性。首先建立兩個指標，即「守住值」與「增長值」，衡量兩次選舉地盤之間的穩定程度。以這兩個指標，發現一般候選人從一次選舉地盤到下次選舉地盤其實相當不穩定，兩次票源有頗大差異。接者，就再進一步探索何種地盤較穩定。一般地盤是由三部分所構成，即「盤心」、「盤邊」與「碎盤」。其中，盤心包含候選人故鄉，是地盤最穩定的一部分，最穩定的地盤都是大盤心型。最後，討論票源移轉的問題，許多政治力量，如家族、派系、黃復興黨部等等有無共享同一個票源。結果，可發現這些政治力量都有一個或大或小的「穩定地盤」，穩定地盤的票源都可以轉來轉去。 第一章 緒論 壹 研究動機與目的 貳 文獻檢閱 參 研究性質與方法 第二章 地盤及其特徵 壹 分析方法 貳 各種自變數對地盤單獨的影響 參 交互作用 肆 「一般」地盤的例子 伍 小結 第三章 政黨與地盤 壹 分析方法 貳 地盤為配票的副產物 參 國民黨候選人地盤為責任區 肆 政黨票源的增減與地盤的關係 伍 1995年高雄縣立法委員選舉 陸 小結 第四章 地盤的穩定性 壹 分析方法 貳 地盤的穩定程度：以尋求連任的候選人為例 參 地盤的結構 肆 地盤的分類 伍 票源的移轉 陸 小結 第五章 結論 壹 研究發現 貳 檢討與建議 / The support of the overwhelming candidates is not evenly spread over all areas. Instead, most candidates have certain areas in which they reap a number of votes well above the average for the whole district. These strongest areas are the focus of this thesis. We start by defining an "electoral base" as well as two indices to measure the scope of the base, "strength" and "importance." These concepts are used to describe the relationships between bases and several independent variables, including the demographic features of the electoral district and the particular attributes of the candidate. We find that bases are largest and most intense for winning, male, KMT candidates running in districts with high numbers of farmers and low overall education levels. The next section of the thesis deals with the relations between bases and political parties. Through regression analysis, we find that the bases of New Party candidates are actually just a by-product of the New Party's vote rationing system. We consider the possibility that KMT bases also result from the KMT's responsibility zone vote rationing system. However, a case study shows that localism seems to be more directly related to the bases that eventually take shape than the responsibility zone system. Next, we look into the question of whether bases increase a party's votes. We find that if the overall performance of the party's candidates in the entire electoral district is controlled, parties do get increased amounts of votes inside the bases of their candidates. In effect, bases do increase the number of votes the party gets. The final section of the thesis addresses the question of stability of bases over time. First, two indices, "defense" and "growth" are introduced to measure the stability of bases from one election to the next. We find that from the base of a candidate in one election to the base of the same candidate in the next election, there is a surprisingly large amount of instability; candidates' strongest areas in one election may not be their strongest areas in the next election. Faced with this finding, we look for the keys to stability. One key lies in the structure of the base. Most bases can be divided into three parts: "central areas," "adjacent areas," and "scattered areas." The central areas include the candidate's home town and are the most stable part of the base. The candidate's with the most stable bases tend to be those with large central areas. Finally, we look at the question of whether votes are transferable. Many different political forces are considered, including political families, local factions, and the KMT's military party branch. These forces all have a "core" of support which is stable and can be transferred among different candidates from the group.