Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-10-18T17:02:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciana Saab.pdf: 1431454 bytes, checksum: 91d3dd276795e9f3636f53ff43c68b3e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-18T17:02:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciana Saab.pdf: 1431454 bytes, checksum: 91d3dd276795e9f3636f53ff43c68b3e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-26 / This paper refers to the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 from the understanding that the necessary terms in order to solve the historical conflict are not discussed in the peace process. The reading of the first document to be signed, the Declaration of Principles (DOP), reveals that the contents of the peace proposal and the bilateral negotiations formula do not alter the existing asymmetry of power between Palestinians from the PLO and the State of Israel, which makes the uneven process extremely favorable to the continuation of the Israeli military occupation over the territories of Gaza and the West Bank. The paper therefore focuses its analysis on the negotiation process previous to the signing of the DOP and the political and economic context of those responsible for Oslo, in order to establish what were the interests involved and how they influenced the drafting of the terms of the Declaration. During the research, it becomes clear that the Oslo agreements only benefited the actors involved in secret negotiations in Norway, namely the PLO and Israeli Labor Party, which allows us to state that the peace process was not representative of the various Palestinian and Israeli political sectors. The study also reveals that the peace proposal made to the Palestinians in Oslo is an Israeli formulation, that refers back to the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East in 1978, whose main goal was the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab neighboring states . Thus, the conditions discussed in Oslo were based on an old assumption that regional peace does not imply in the creation of a Palestinian state, but only the right to self-representation of the Palestinian residents in the occupied territories. These conditions were accepted by Yasser Arafat as a strategy to gain political prestige and return to the territory of Palestine. We conclude therefore that the Oslo peace process was not a legitimate initiative to establish a fair and equal peace in the region, as claimed by Israel and the United States, but an agreement made between the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO, drafted to enabled the Israeli territorial expansion over the West Bank and Gaza, to dismiss the question of refugees and not recognize the Palestinian’s right to national self-determination / Este trabalho retoma a assinatura dos Acordos de Oslo entre israelenses e palestinos em setembro de 1993 a partir do entendimento de que os termos necessários para a resolução do conflito histórico não são discutidos no processo de paz. No decorrer da análise do texto do primeiro documento a ser assinado, a Declaração de Princípios (DOP), percebe-se que o conteúdo da proposta de paz e a fórmula de negociações bilaterais adotada não propõem uma alteração da assimetria de poder existente entre palestinos da OLP e o Estado de Israel, o que torna o processo desigual e extremamente favorável à continuação da ocupação militar israelense sobre os territórios da Faixa de Gaza e da Cisjordânia. O trabalho, portanto, foca sua análise no processo de negociação anterior à assinatura da DOP e no contexto político e econômico dos responsáveis por Oslo para estabelecer quais foram os interesses envolvidos em fechar um acordo e de que maneira eles influenciaram a redação dos termos da declaração. Durante a pesquisa, notamos que os Acordos de Oslo beneficiaram exclusivamente os atores envolvidos nas negociações secretas na Noruega, a OLP e israelenses do partido trabalhista, o que nos permite afirmar que o processo de paz não foi representativo dos diversos setores políticos palestinos e israelenses. O estudo também revela que a proposta de paz oferecida aos palestinos em Oslo é uma formulação israelense que remete ao início do processo de paz no Oriente Médio no ano de 1978, cujo principal objetivo foi a normalização das relações diplomáticas entre israelenses e os Estados árabes vizinhos. Assim, as condições negociadas na ocasião de Oslo partiram de um antigo pressuposto de que a paz regional não pressupõe a criação do Estado palestino, mas apenas o direito de autorrepresentação dos residentes dos territórios ocupados. Essas condições foram aceitas pela liderança de Yasser Arafat como estratégia para obter prestígio político e retornar ao território da Palestina. Concluímos, portanto, que o processo de paz de Oslo não se tratou de uma legítima iniciativa para estabelecer a paz de maneira justa e igualitária na região, conforme divulgado por Israel e pelos Estados Unidos, mas de um acordo entre o partido trabalhista e os palestinos da OLP, elaborado de uma maneira que possibilitou a expansão territorial israelense sobre Gaza e Cisjordânia, desconsiderou a questão dos refugiados e não reconheceu o direito à autodeterminação nacional palestina

The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of the social field as described by Pierre Bourdieu as well as to explore the possibility of creating a more focused and tailored set of conditions in the form of a model to repurpose the field theory to more clearly be applicable to bilateral negotiations. The methodological approach is conceptual analysis based on the epistemology of critical realism. The supporting theories for the approach are a combination of systemic, chaos and complexity theory while the fundaments for the implementation of the methodological approach are the four main concepts in Bourdieu’s theory of the social field:  the field, habitus, illusio and symbolic capital. One of the main points of repurposing this specific dynamic is to explicitly allow for deliberate human agency within the field. Analytical data consists purely of the secondary type. This essay is not empirically based but rather theoretical and abstract. The paper is founded on the basic principles of macrosociology and presumes social agency where appropriate. This paper focuses on creating a tentative framework model based on repurposed concepts derived from Bourdieu. The results are arguably interesting but are mostly limited to affecting further development of this tentative model and prefacing application of it through attempting to implement it in an analytical manner on empirical data.

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the place of Syria in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Middle East peace process in the period between the 1948 war and 2000. In this context, the aim is to find out an answer to the question of how Syria acquired its central place in the conflict and a critical role in the peace process. Accordingly, the thesis consists of three main parts. In the first part of the study, the central place of Syria in the wars against Israel is examined. In the second part of the study, the challenges Syria faced during the 1980s and 1990s, and how these challenges affected the Syrian position in its relations with Israel are discussed. In the third part, the critical role of Syria in the bilateral negotiations between Syria and Israel is scrutinized. Finally, this thesis is concluded in with the developments occured in the Middle East in the period between 2000 and today.