In this essential guide to the past, present and future of bio-warfare, international security expert Malcolm Dando draws a wealth of ecperience and research to uncover the truth about the alarming failure of international community to place effective curbs on the use of this deadly weapon.

Yes / Negotiations to find a legally binding way to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 [1]are in danger of failing. The crisis was precipitated during the current round of talks, now in its final week in Geneva, when the US, alone amongst the negotiating States, rejected the text of a protocol that has taken six and a half years to negotiate.

yes / The outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2014 has underlined the risks posed by outbreaks of highly virulent and deadly diseases, whether caused naturally, accidentally or deliberately. It also emphasised the responsibility of all those engaged in the life sciences, whether in government, industry or academia, to ensure that research is done safely and securely. This book, Preventing Biological Threats, is intended to raise awareness and knowledge of biological security of everyone active in the life sciences, ranging from those engaged in research to those engaged in management and policy-making, both nationally and internationally. The advances in biotechnology over the past decades and in the future have brought and will bring significant benefits to humankind, animals and plants -- however, these advances also bring risks that we need to be aware of and ensure that they cause no harm. The continuing debate about the potential danger of carrying out ‘Gain-of-Function’ experiments with highly pathogenic viruses such as avian influenza has brought the problem of biological security to the attention of many within but also beyond the life science community. It also has left some of them wondering what biological security is and how it can be incorporated into the life sciences. What steps should be taken to ensure that these and other dual use research activities are not misused? It is being increasingly recognised that biosecurity and biosafety are not only relevant to activities within a laboratory, but also extend to the effects that these activities can have outside the laboratory if they result in accidental outbreaks of diseases in humans, animals or plants. The international basis for the prevention of the hostile misuse of life sciences is the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which this year, on 26 March 2015, has been in force for forty years. The Convention was the first treaty to prohibit the development and possession of an entire category of weapons. At this moment 173 States Parties have ratified the Convention (and the Convention has a further 9 Signatories). At the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 2011, of which I was President, the States Parties agreed on the need for all those engaged in the life sciences to be involved as key stakeholders in the protection of their work from hostile misuse, and therefore on the importance of broad biosecurity education. This book with its 21 chapters addresses the need for biosecurity education, in six sections on the history of threats and responses; scientists, organisations and biosecurity; biosecurity and law enforcement; states and biosecurity; and biosecurity and active learning. It is a significant and welcome step forward both in its integrated content and the active learning focus in the associated Team Based Learning exercises. I am convinced that this approach will help all those engaged in the life sciences - in government, industry or academia – to become more aware of biosecurity and of their responsibilities for it. It is therefore a great pleasure to commend the authors and editors for their work and the Governments of Canada, Jordan and the United Kingdom for their funding and involvement in the production of this book under the Global Partnership. Ambassador Paul van den IJssel

No / The COVID-19 virus pandemic has again demonstrated the devastating impact that a microbial pathogen can have on our health, society and economic systems. It necessitates a fundamental rethink of how the security of our societies can be better sustained. This rethinking will require many aspects of our security systems to be re-examined, but we concentrate here on the consequences of the rapid advances being made in the life and associated sciences. In this chapter, we will describe and analyse one of the most likely means by which the BTWC could be strengthened at the 9th Review Conference, namely: agreement of an International Aspirational Code of Conduct supported by mandatory biological security education for life and associated scientists. We conclude that a vigorous effort by civil society will be needed to assist the achievement of an agreement on this issue at the 9th Review Conference.

This thesis provides a capabilities-based approach to assessing the bioterrorism threat from non-state actors. Through comparative case study, prior bioterrorism attacks are analyzed to assess capability in the three areas necessary to complete a biological weapons attack: obtaining or isolating a pathogen, weaponizing the agent, and employing or disseminating the weapon. The three cases are the Rajneeshee cult in 1984, the Aum Shinrikyo cult in the early 1990's, and the United States Postal System anthrax attacks of 2001. In contrast to current wisdom that employing biological weapons is too difficult for non-state actors, this thesis reveals a broad spectrum of capability in all studies in the areas necessary to culminate an attack. Applications of these findings must be used to assess risk generally rather than against specific groups because capability is deemed to be exptremely difficult to track. The these finds that a significant threat exists but not large enough to be over-hyped above other national security concerns. In light of this, recommendations are provided for U.S. biodefense policy emphasis in the areas of the nonproliferation regime, attribution capabilities, and defending against the changing nature of future attacks with a particular emphasis on the public health system.

Biological weapons have the ability to inflict mass casualties while keeping existing infrastructure intact. They are inexpensive to manufacture, difficult to detect, and have a low signature for attribution. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union began amassing the largest stockpile of biological weapons worldwide. The U.S. Intelligence community repeatedly failed to detect the scope and character of this large-scale Soviet development effort despite implausible explanations for outbreaks of unexplained disease, credible ground reports from informants, and strange behavior patterns viewed through reconnaissance efforts. Toward the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Intelligence realized its grave error. Unfortunately, the majority of these weapons are unaccounted for today. By examining the reasons the Soviet Unionâ s biological weapons program went undetected, the United States may gain a better advantage for future assessments and prevent the large-scale stockpiling and development of biological weapons.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The defense response to a Chemical and Biological attack would be importantly based on predicting the dispersion of a toxic cloud. Considering that an Unmanned Air Vehicle would provide the capability for embedding and positioning inertial and air data sensors geographically as required, real-time wind estimation can be performed for every actual position of the flying device in order to predict the plume moving direction. The efforts in this thesis concentrate on the demonstration and validation of procedures for obtaining Wind Estimation close to real-time and its instantaneous display. The presented work is based on a particular UAV platform available at the NPS Aeronautical Department and it aims to establish a general methodology, which may be used on other flying devices with similar available sensors. An accurate estimation of real wind for a particular combat scenario will enable operational units to have a near real-time decision aid. This final result could be integrated into a Command and Control net, to assist in a focused way the response to a Chemical and Biological attack and to map the source or the region to be affected. / Lieutenant Commander, Chilean Navy

Thesis (M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Isaac Kaminer, Vladimir Dobrokhodov. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67). Also available online.

This thesis is an examination of the relationship between the institutional and practical workings of the late Apartheid state's Chemical and Biological Weapons Research Programme, code-named Project Coast. It is written against the background of the changing nature of the South African state in that period, and presents a partial picture of that change. The greatest part of the thesis, however, is a history of the Research Programme itself. The Programme's institutional structure was developed around the charismatic figure of Dr Wouter Basson: following Weberian arguments, it is clear that his charisma was used, within the bureaucratic structure of the Programme, to legitimate the scientific research projects undertaken. Two of these projects are examined in the body of this thesis: the first of these is an attempt to develop a new form of tear gas, the second is the attempt to develop a new form of contraceptive. The animating ideologies of these research projects are compared to each other, and to the supposedly hegemonic ideologies of the changing state, revealing discrepancies between these grand structures and their local workings. The importance of Basson's charismatic authority is emphasised by the rapid dissolution of Project Coast following his withdrawal from his leadership position at the end of the 1980s. By the end of the thesis, then, it seems clear that, within the legitimating aura of Basson's authority, the scientists at Project Coast developed a set of racial and political ideologies that more little to no substantive relationship to the seemingly hegemonic ideologies of the late Apartheid state, of which Project Coast was an organ. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

Thesis (doctoral)--Technische Universität, Darmstadt, 2003.