No / A Web of Prevention provides a timely contribution to the current debate about life science research and its implications for security. It is an informative guide for both experts and the public¿ It is a forward-looking contribution covering both ends of the equation and creates momentum for the current discussion on effective preventive measures and effective control measures¿ While there are no guarantees for preventing misuse, there are nonetheless crucial steps the world community can take towards the overarching goal of a global network for the life sciences. This book sheds light on concrete steps toward the achievement of this worthy goal.¿ This book with its collection of essays provides an in-depth analysis of the various mutually reinforcing elements that together create and strengthen a web of prevention - or of assurance - that is vital to ensure that the advances in the life sciences are not misused to cause harm. All those engaged in the life sciences and in policy making in governments around the world should read this book so they can take steps to strengthen the web preventing biological weapons.¿ Since September 11, 2001 in many countries renewed attention has been given to how research in the life sciences might inadvertently or intentionally facilitate the development of biological or chemical weapons. This state-of-the-art volume examines the full extent of the issues and debates. Coverage includes an overview of recent scientific achievements in virology, microbiology, immunology and genetic engineering with a view to asking how they might facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction by state, sub-state or terrorist organizations. Consideration is given to what we have and haven¿t learned from the past. Employing both academic analysis and reflections by practitioners, the book examines the security-inspired governance regimes for the life sciences that are under development. Ultimately the authors examine what is required to form a comprehensive and workable `web of prevention¿ and highlight the importance of encouraging discussions between scientists, policy makers and others regarding the governance of vital but potentially dangerous research.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The defense response against chemical and biological (Chem/bio) weapons has gained a renewed focus in light of the 11 Sept 2001 terrorist attack. A successful response to a Chem/bio attack would involve measuring and predicting the dispersion of a toxic cloud in the atmosphere. TheNPS Aeronautics and Astronautics Department is working together with the Meteorology Department on a technique to make toxic cloud measurements using an Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV). In support of this mission, the UAV will require precise and accurate air data (airspeed, angle of attack ["alpha"], and sideslip angle ["beta"]) so that wind data extraction can be carried out from air and inertial data for use in plume dispersion modeling. The efforts in this thesis concentrate on the air data system to produce precise and accurate air data for the support of the Chem/bio response UAV flights. The primary concerns are the choice and design of the air data system; the calibration of the system using the flow fields from computer simulation; and the processing of air data. The air data extracted will be used for wind determination so that the movement of the Chem/bio dispersed agent in the atmosphere can be predicted. / Captain, Republic of Singapore Air Force

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Richard Doyle, Raymond E. Franck, Jr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-50). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Richard M. Howard, Vladimir N. Dobrokhodov. Includes bibliographical references (p. 99-100). Also available online.

Current revolutions in biotechnology and neuroscience are changing military technologies, necessitating dramatic re-evaluations in arms regulatory regimes. This study assesses how these new technologies can be used in weapons systems - by governments and terrorists alike - and whether this frightening development can be brought under effective international control. Malcolm Dando begins by surveying the existing (and arguably inadequate) control mechanisms for chemical and biological weapons. He then discusses how earlier generations of toxin and bioregulatory weapons have been used by such states as Iraq, the Soviet Union and the USA, and explains, in non-technical terms, the implications for new weapons technology. Considering how international law might be applied to constrain undesirable military developments without restricting technological developments for peaceful purposes, Dando concludes with a proposal for an integrated control regime that would link international agreements, national legislation, and trade regulations.

Thesis (M.A.A.S.) -- Air University, 2004. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on April 24, 2009). "June 2004." Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-86).

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Maria Rasmussen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-71). Also available online.

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In this essential guide to the past, present and future of bio-warfare, international security expert Malcolm Dando draws a wealth of ecperience and research to uncover the truth about the alarming failure of international community to place effective curbs on the use of this deadly weapon.

Yes / Negotiations to find a legally binding way to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 [1]are in danger of failing. The crisis was precipitated during the current round of talks, now in its final week in Geneva, when the US, alone amongst the negotiating States, rejected the text of a protocol that has taken six and a half years to negotiate.