This thesis examines the influence of the Boer War 1899 – 1902 upon tactics and training in the regular British Army 1902 – 1914. The work argues that several key lessons drawn from South Africa became the tactical cornerstones for infantry, artillery and cavalry throughout the pre-First World War period and shaped the performance of the B.E.F. during the early battles of 1914. The experience of combat against well armed opposition in the Boer War prompted the British Army to develop improved tactics in each of the three major service arms. For example, infantry placed new emphasis on dispersion and marksmanship; cavalry improved their dismounted work and reconnaissance skills; and artillery adopted methods of concealment and strove to improve accuracy and co-ordination. Across the army as a whole, the experience of combat lead to an overall downgrading of the importance of drill and obedience, replacing it instead with tactical skill and individual initiative. In addition, the thesis also examines the impact of the Boer War upon overall British Army doctrine and ethos. The process of reform prior to the First World War was marked by wide ranging debates upon the value of the South African experience, and not all lessons drawn from the conflict endured, with tactical restructuring being further complicated by changes of government and financial restrictions. Nevertheless, key lessons such as dispersion, marksmanship, concealment and firepower were ultimately retained and proved to be of great value during initial clashes against the Germans in 1914. Additionally, the Boer War caused the British to place new emphasis upon overall training of the individual, allowing advanced tactical skills to be inculcated more easily than had been possible in earlier years. However, the short duration of the conventional period of the Boer War meant that there was less opportunity to derive operational lessons for future employment. Furthermore, the colonial policing role of the British Army and the likelihood of small scale deployments meant that developing an operational doctrine was of less immediate value than ensuring flexibility and tactical skill. This meant that the British Army took a somewhat skewed developmental path in the 1902 – 1914. The process of reform ultimately produced a highly adaptable force that was tactically skilled, but which was ill-prepared for the operational complications posed by large scale deployment. While the Boer War was the principal factor in driving reform during the 1902 – 1914 period, there were additional influences at work, including examples from the Russo-Japanese War 1904 – 1905 and various ideas drawn from the armies of the continent. However, this thesis argues that while these outside influences contributed to ongoing debate, they did not offer any particular fresh ideas and were therefore of less importance than the Boer War in shaping British Army development.

During the Great War many European armies (most notably the Russian) collapsed due to major disciplinary problems. However, the British Expeditionary Force avoided these problems up until the Armistice of November 1918. This thesis examines how the discipline and morale of the RE.F. survived the war, by using a case-study of the Irish regiments. In 1914 with Ireland on the brink of a civil war, serious questions had been raised relating to the loyalty of the Irish regiments, particularly in the aftermath of the Curragh Incident. Indeed, intelligence reports prepared for Irish Command suggested that some reserve units would defect en masse to the U.V.F. if hostilities broke out in Ireland. As the Great War progressed, the rise of Sinn Fein produced further concern about the loyalty of Irish troops, seen most vividly in the decisions not to reform the 16th. (Irish) Division following the German Spring Offensive of 1918 and to remove Irish reserve units from Ireland in 1917-18. Nevertheless, a detailed study of courts martial (studied comprehensively in a database project) recently released by the P.R.O., demonstrates that many of the fears relating to Irish troops were groundless. Certainly Irish courts martial rates tended to be high, however, these figures were inflated by cases of drunkenness and absence, not disobedience. Likewise, while a number of mutinies did occur in Irish regiments during the war, this study has revealed that mutinies were much more common in the B.E.F. as a whole, than has been previously believed. This study has also considered the discipline and morale problems caused by the rapid expansion of the British army in 1914 and the appointment of many officers, especially in the 36th. (Ulster) Division, on the basis of their political allegiances rather than professional knowledge. Nevertheless, in general it appears that the discipline and morale of the Irish units in the B.E.F. was very good. Incidents of indiscipline appear to have been caused by the practical problems facing units during training and on active service rather than by the growth of the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland.

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