Dissertation--University St. Gallen, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [439]-457).

Thesis (doctoral) - Univesität, Sankt Gallen, 2005.

Dissertation--Univesität St. Gallen, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [439]-457.

He, Zheng. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-54). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / CONTENT --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.2 / Chapter CHAPTER II. --- LITERATURES REVIEWS --- p.5 / Chapter CHAPTER III. --- FEATURES OF MBO IN CHINA --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1 --- Dichotomy of stock structure --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2 --- Pre-buyout Ownership structure --- p.14 / Chapter 3.3 --- Buyout styles --- p.15 / Chapter 3.4 --- MBO CONSEQUENCES --- p.16 / Chapter CHAPTER IV. --- DATA DESCRIPTION --- p.17 / Chapter CHAPTER V. --- EMPIRICAL RESULTS --- p.22 / Chapter 5.1 --- Underbidding Analysis --- p.22 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Transaction Variables --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Corporate Governance Variables --- p.32 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- Regional Variables --- p.35 / Chapter 5.1.4 --- Multivariate Regressions: --- p.36 / Chapter 5.2 --- Performance Analysis --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Control Group Matching --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- DID Estimation --- p.43 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Longer Performance Comparison --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- Comparison with other M&A --- p.48 / Chapter CHAPTER VI. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.50 / REFERENCE --- p.53 / TABLES AND CHARTS --- p.55

No description available.

The private equity market has been a hot topic of debate since it first started to emerge. As it has become more frequently apparent in the Swedish economic and financial market, the debate regarding its impact in Sweden has also risen. The debate contains various opinions whether the private equity firms, through buyouts uses tax breaks or arbitrage opportuni-ties to "quick flip" the investments on the expense of workers and wages or if the PE firms create operational and economic value. Previous studies regarding this topic have mostly been conducted in the U.S, Canada or to some extent in the U.K. This paper aims to, through a quantitative method, investigate and present whether the buyouts have an impact on Swedish portfolio companies or not, and if they do, what kind of impact the buyouts have. This will be done through an event study, based on data collection from portfolio companies that have experienced a buyout made by a private equity firm. The data will then be compared with data from peer groups and ana-lyzed through statistical methods in SPSS. The main findings in this thesis suggest that buyouts do not have, neither a positive nor negative impact on the performance of portfolio companies in Sweden. The tests allow us to conclude that PE firms do not have market timing skills. Neither can we conclude that PE firms cause layoffs of workers or lowering of wages.

No description available.

The private equity industry has become a progressively more critical source of capital and effective governance for companies. The majority of capital raised by private equity funds is used for leveraged buyouts, with total funds under management amounting to R109 billion in 2009 for the South African industry. These funds are typically enhanced with additional deal level debt financing for each buyout thus representing, ex-ante, an active capital structure decision. The objective of this study was to understand the determinants of decisions on the extent and type of leverage used in LBOs, and attempts to explain why the observed financing choices were made by the individual private equity firms. Buyouts totalling over R 26 billion and spanning the period 1998 to 2010 are analysed. The findings are consistent with the predictions of the agency costs, trade-off and market timing theories of capital structure decisions; while little support is found for the pecking order and signalling theories. The results indicate clear patterns that lead to the supposition of an underlying model in which LBO sponsors seek to balance potential leverage related benefits with leverage related costs. The study also finds suggestive evidence indicating that the LBO financing package is designed methodically to respond to differences across firms in their size and maturity, growth prospects, in the variability of their earnings, and to a lesser extent the tangibility of their assets. Copyright / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Huang, Fang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-39). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.7 / Chapter 2. --- Review of literatures and regulations --- p.12 / Chapter 2.1. --- MBO in the US --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2. --- MBO in China --- p.14 / Chapter 3. --- Data selection and sources --- p.16 / Chapter 4. --- Announcement effect of MBO --- p.17 / Chapter 4.1. --- Research method --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2. --- Group division of MBO companies --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2.1. --- Division rules --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2.2. --- Apparent MBO: significant negative --- p.19 / Chapter 4.2.3. --- Founder buyouts: significant positive --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2.4. --- Other groups: insignificant positive but not representative for MBO effect --- p.20 / Chapter 4.3. --- Factor analysis --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3.1. --- Year: before 2003/ after 2003 (include 2003) --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3.2. --- Underlying asset: parent company / the listing company itself --- p.22 / Chapter 4.3.3. --- ESOP participation: Yes/No --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3.4. --- Competitive purchaser: Yes/No --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3.5. --- Results: Success / Failure --- p.24 / Chapter 4.4. --- Summary of announcement effect --- p.25 / Chapter 5. --- Evidence on profitability and pricing --- p.25 / Chapter 5.1. --- Data and methodology --- p.26 / Chapter 5.2. --- Profitability of MBO companies --- p.28 / Chapter 5.3. --- DuPont analysis of companies with successful MBO --- p.29 / Chapter 5.4. --- Dividend payment --- p.31 / Chapter 5.5. --- Shareholder´ةs returns --- p.32 / Chapter 5.6. --- MBO pricing and pre-MBO behavior of NAV --- p.33 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.33

Management Buy-Outs occur when the managers of a company buy the company from its owners, namely the shareholders. Where such a company is a listed public company, the transaction is known as "going private. 11 The critics allege that this type of buy-out leads to irreconcilable conflicts of interests, a breach of fiduciary duties and to insider trading by the directors. For this reason Management Buy-Outs should be prohibited or alternatively, regulated to such an extent as to make them virtually unworkable. It is submitted that these conflicts are not irreconcilable and that they are no different to the myriad of other conflicts which arise out of the promotion, incorporation and the operation of a company. Both statute and the common law effectively deal with most of the critics' apprehensions without necessarily prohibiting the transactions giving rise to them. / Private Law / LL.M