Cette thèse prend la forme de quatre essais. Elle présente une analyse de la performance ex-post des entreprises européennes qui ont fermé leur capital en le privatisant. Le sujet de la « trajectoire ex-post des Buyouts européennes » est assez vaste, c’est pour cela que nous avons essayé de l’étudier et de l’analyser à travers des perspectives différentes et en utilisant différentes méthodes quantitatives.Au cours de notre étude nous utilisons à la fois des mesures objectifves et perceptuelles pour établir les performances de ces entreprises et pour trouver les raisons pour lesquelles elles ont une meilleure performance. Ce recueil d’essais aborde ces problématiques, assez reliées les unes avec les autres, qui concernent la performance ex-post des sociétés européennes qui ont subi un procès de privatisation de leur capital avec des transactions qui les font passer du domaine publique au domaine privé (PTP). Les trois premiers essais concernent leurs performances économiques ; et les relations de leurs performances financières avec : l'évaluation de l'innovation ; l'application des techniques de gestion comme l’organisation apprenante (LO) ; et la mise en œuvre de la Responsabilité Social des Entreprises (RSE). Le comportement du marché dans quatre pays européens pendant le même période est également étudié dans le quatrième essai. Un comportement grégaire de ces marchés pendant la crise a été observé.Les résultats présentés sont soutenus par des preuves descriptives et quantitatives importantes et substantielles. L'hypothèse sous-jacente commune testée qui est celle que établient les entreprises ayant subi un procès PTP ont de meilleurs résultats dans la période ex-post, et qu’elles obtiennent une meilleure performance dans les champs de l'innovation, des LO et de la RSE, est bien prouvé / This dissertation, takes the form of four essays. It presents an analysis of the ex-post performance of the European companies that have gone private. “Ex-post journey of the European Buyouts” is a broad topic, which we tried to investigate and analyze through different perspectives using different quantitative methods.We have used both objective and perception based measures to dig out the performance and reach out the possible reasons behind their better performance. This collection of essays addresses the research questions, which are much related to each other, concerning the ex-post performance of European companies after public-to-private (PTP) transactions. The first three essays concern their economic performance, and linkage of their financial performance with: the assessment of innovation and application of management techniques like Learning Organization (LO), implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The market behaviour in the Four European countries during the similar period is also investigated in the fourth essay. We found the herd behavior in these markets during crisis.The results presented are supported by large and substantial descriptive and quantitative evidence. The common underlying hypothesis which we wished to test, that PTP firms perform better in the ex-post period and show better on the scales of innovation, LO and CSR, is well

Examensarbete i foretagsekonomi, Ekonomihögskolan vid Linnéuniversitetet, 2FE93E, VT 2017 Författare Johan Asplund, Henrik Norrman och Therese Rodger Handledare Andreas Stephan Titel Hur investmentbolag paverkar kapitalstrukturen i sina innehav - En fallstudie av Ratos Bakgrund Bolags kapitalstruktur, fördelningen mellan bolagets tillgångar och skulder, visar hur bolaget finansierar sin verksamhet. Private Equity bolag lånar kapital för att kunna investera i nya uppköp av onoterade bolag och har ofta en begränsad planerad ägarhorisont. Kapitalstruktur har undersökts under lång tid men inte hur en majoritetsägare påverkar kapitalstrukturen i sina andelsbolag. Tidigare studier fokuserar pa exempelvis kapitalstrukturer i industriföretag eller kapitalstrukturer i småforetag. Syfte Syftet med studien ar att analysera om ett investmentbolag påverkar kapitalstrukturen i sina innehavsbolag nar de genom uppköp har gått in som en majoritetsägare i dessa bolag och vilka effekter förändringen kan leda till. Metod Studien utgår från en kvantitativ ansats där finansiella nyckeltal av Ratos innehavsbolag undersöks före och efter det att Ratos gått in som majoritetsagare i bolaget. Dessa nyckeltal jämförs sedan med branschspecifika nyckeltal genererade från SCB. Resultat I studien återfinns inget entydigt bevis på att vårt valda Private Equity bolag, Ratos, ändrar kapitalstrukturen väsentligt på något sätt efter att ha gått in som majoritetsägare i ett bolag. / A company’s choice of capital structure is a well documented field in financial research but no unambiguous results are available regarding how the company is best financed or what actually defines the optimal capital structure for a company. The purpose of this study is to examine the possible changes on a company’s capital structure once a Private Equity company has become the majority owner. In this study a deductive approach has been used and a quantitative survey has been applied. Financial ratios from yearly reports of companies before and after the Swedish Private Equity company Ratos became the majority owner have been analysed and compared with the hypothesis that a Private Equity majority owner would significantly change the capital structure of the acquired company. The selection criteria for the companies was that Ratos should own more than 50 % of the company in order to actually have an impact on how the company is financed, in addition the selected companies needed to have data available in the form of yearly reports both prior to Ratos becoming the majority owner and at least two years afterwards in order to study the eventual changes of the take over. Financial ratios such as debt to equity ratio, leverage and return on equity were then calculated and results analysed. Theories of capital structure such as the Trade off theory, Pecking order theory, Miller and Modigliani and the Agency theory have also been applied to analyse the outcome. The method of comparison used was the differencein-difference method with data from Statistics Sweden (SCB) from similar relevant companies. The results of this study do not indicate that the capital structure of the company changes significantly within the first two years after acquisition by the majority owner Ratos. Suggestions for further studies would be to analyse a wider group of Private Equity companies as majority owners and observe eventual changes in capital structure in takeovers.

Bakgrund: I slutet av åttiotalet blev leveraged buyouts, högt belånade företagsuppköp, ett frekvent förekommande företeelse i Amerikanskt näringsliv. Det gigantiska uppköpet av RJR Nabisco är fortfarande omtalat bland världens investerare. Det senaste årtiondet har mängden kapital i private equity fonderna ökat till att idag motsvara ett kapital på runt 7% av Stockholmsbörsens värde. Samtidigt som dessa fonder kontrollerar en stor mängd kapital är det relativt okänt hur de sköter och tillför värde till sina portföljbolag. Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att analysera hur private equity bolag tillför värde till sina svenska portföljbolag. Metod: Denna uppsats har utgått från en kvalitativ studie för en mer genomgående och djup analys av private equity marknaden. Författarna har valt att genomföra intervjuer med personer i ledande positioner hos portfölj bolagen. Totalt deltog sex stycken företag i studien. Eftersom vissa delar av informationen som insamlats kan anses vara av känslig karaktär så är alla företag anonyma. Slutsatser: Författarna kunde urskilja tre områden där private equity bolagen skapade värde i sina portföljbolag, genom förbättrade marginaler, ökad försäljning och minskade skulder. Private equity bolagen använde olika metoder för att skapa värde inom dessa områden, ett sätt är att ge ledningen i portföljbolagen ökade incitament, ett annat är att skapa strikta återbetalningsplaner för portföljbolagen vilket tvingar dem att effektivisera verksamheten. Private equity bolagen fungerar även som bollplank och assisterar vid förvärv. / Background: Through the late eighties leveraged buyouts were frequent in America and the giant buyout of RJR Nabisco became world renowned among investors. In the last decade the capital committed to private equity and leveraged buyouts have risen and in Sweden an amount equal to 7% of the market capitalization on the Stockholm stock exchange is placed in private equity funds. Although Private Equity firms control large amounts of capital it is relatively unclear how the private equity firms manage and add value to their portfolio companies. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how private equity firms contribute to their portfolio companies in Sweden. Methodology: This thesis has taken a qualitative approach for more in depth analysis of the private equity market. The authors have chosen to interview man-agers at portfolio companies acquired by private equity firms to gather data. Six portfolio companies participated in this study and the interviews were performed in a semi structured manner. As some of the information gathered could be of sensitive nature all respondents are anonymous. Conclusion: The authors identified three areas in which the private equity firms added value; improving the margins, increasing the turnover and reducing the debt. The private equity firms used different techniques to accomplish the value improvements, both by giving the executives at the portfolio companies incentives and by forcing them to increase the efficiency in the organisation in order to be able to repay debts. The private equity firms also supports their portfolio companies by giving assistance and support in i.e. acquisitions.

<p>Bakgrund: I slutet av åttiotalet blev leveraged buyouts, högt belånade företagsuppköp, ett frekvent förekommande företeelse i Amerikanskt näringsliv. Det gigantiska uppköpet av RJR Nabisco är fortfarande omtalat bland världens investerare. Det senaste årtiondet har mängden kapital i private equity fonderna ökat till att idag motsvara ett kapital på runt 7% av Stockholmsbörsens värde. Samtidigt som dessa fonder kontrollerar en stor mängd kapital är det relativt okänt hur de sköter och tillför värde till sina portföljbolag.</p><p>Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att analysera hur private equity bolag tillför värde till sina svenska portföljbolag.</p><p>Metod: Denna uppsats har utgått från en kvalitativ studie för en mer genomgående och djup analys av private equity marknaden. Författarna har valt att genomföra intervjuer med personer i ledande positioner hos portfölj bolagen. Totalt deltog sex stycken företag i studien. Eftersom vissa delar av informationen som insamlats kan anses vara av känslig karaktär så är alla företag anonyma.</p><p>Slutsatser: Författarna kunde urskilja tre områden där private equity bolagen skapade värde i sina portföljbolag, genom förbättrade marginaler, ökad försäljning och minskade skulder. Private equity bolagen använde olika metoder för att skapa värde inom dessa områden, ett sätt är att ge ledningen i portföljbolagen ökade incitament, ett annat är att skapa strikta återbetalningsplaner för portföljbolagen vilket tvingar dem att effektivisera verksamheten. Private equity bolagen fungerar även som bollplank och assisterar vid förvärv.</p> / <p>Background: Through the late eighties leveraged buyouts were frequent in America and the giant buyout of RJR Nabisco became world renowned among investors. In the last decade the capital committed to private equity and leveraged buyouts have risen and in Sweden an amount equal to 7% of the market capitalization on the Stockholm stock exchange is placed in private equity funds. Although Private Equity firms control large amounts of capital it is relatively unclear how the private equity firms manage and add value to their portfolio companies.</p><p>Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how private equity firms contribute to their portfolio companies in Sweden.</p><p>Methodology: This thesis has taken a qualitative approach for more in depth analysis of the private equity market. The authors have chosen to interview man-agers at portfolio companies acquired by private equity firms to gather data. Six portfolio companies participated in this study and the interviews were performed in a semi structured manner. As some of the information gathered could be of sensitive nature all respondents are anonymous.</p><p>Conclusion: The authors identified three areas in which the private equity firms added value; improving the margins, increasing the turnover and reducing the debt. The private equity firms used different techniques to accomplish the value improvements, both by giving the executives at the portfolio companies incentives and by forcing them to increase the efficiency in the organisation in order to be able to repay debts. The private equity firms also supports their portfolio companies by giving assistance and support in i.e. acquisitions.</p>

China's different economic environment, government infrastructure, and legal system might cause different management buyout procedures and results from management buyout procedures in the United States. Management buyout was originally created to increase efficiency and reduce agency cost in the United States in the 1960s; but management buyout in China is merely a tool to provide incentive programs for current management teams and reduce state-owned corporate shares.

In this thesis we examine the shared characteristics of companies that undergo leveraged buyouts from public markets in Europe between 2005-2015 and whether credit markets have an impact on these characteristics. This is done by conducting logistical regressions on public data and through interviews with industry professionals. Our results indicate that companies that undergo leveraged buyouts from public markets have low financial liquidity and are undervalued, while high free cash flow, potential tax savings and pre-acquisition debt levels were found to be insignificant. Credit markets are found to have a profound effect on the characteristics that are sought after by private equity firms, as the statistical analysis give different significant variables depending on the state of the credit market, which is in line with the interview results. In good credit markets, potential financial distress costs are higher for bought out companies than the control group, while in bad credit markets a strong growth potential and undervaluation are the significant characteristics. The interviews also showed that investment professionals focus more on qualitative aspects, e.g. competitive advantage, when evaluating an investment opportunity, while the financial characteristics play a subdued role / I denna uppsats undersöker vi de delade karaktäristika hos företag som genomgår leveraged buyouts från de publika marknaderna i Europa mellan år 2005 och 2015, och huruvida dessa gemensamma drag skiljer sig åt beroende på tillståndet på kreditmarknaden. För att göra detta genomförs logistiska regressioner på publik data och intervjuer med industrierfarna. Våra resultat indikerar att företag som genomgår leveraged buyouts från publika marknader har låg finansiell likviditet och är undervärderade, medan höga kassaflöden, potentiella skattebesparingar och skuldnivåer inte särskiljer dem. Kreditmarknader visar sig ha en stor effekt på de karaktäristika som sökes av riskkapitalbolag, då den statistiska analysen ger olika signifikanta variabler beroende på tillståndet på kreditmarknader. Detta styrks också av intervjusvar. I goda kreditmarknader är potentiella kostnader av finansiella problem (financial distress) högre för de företag som köps upp än för kontrollgruppen. I dåliga kreditmarknader är en god tillväxtpotential och undervärdering särskiljande för de bolag som blir uppköpta. Intervjuerna visade också att investerare fokuserar mer på kvalitativa aspekter, såsom konkurrensfördelar, när de utvärderar en investeringsmöjlighet, medan finansiella karaktäristika är faktorer de utvärderar i andra hand.

Thesis advisor: Thomas J. Chemmanur / My Ph.D. dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines the effect of hedge funds on target shareholder gains in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). I find that the initial buyout premium is increasing in the preannouncement presence of hedge funds, measured as the fraction of target equity held by hedge funds before the announcement. Using a geographic instrument for the presence of hedge fund, I find that this relationship persists even after controlling for endogeneity. I further show that this effect holds only for active hedge funds and long-term hedge funds, and is stronger for management-led LBOs than for third-party LBOs. Overall, the findings suggest that hedge funds protect target shareholder interests in LBOs by using their hold-out power. The second essay examines the relation between expected market volatility and the demand for liquidity in open-end mutual funds. The empirical results are consistent with precautionary motives for holding liquid assets, i.e., fund managers tilt their holdings more heavily toward liquid stocks when the market is expected to be more volatile. This dynamic preference for liquid stocks is more pronounced among small fund families, low-load funds, funds whose past performance has been unfavorable, funds with high return volatility, growth-oriented funds, and high-turnover funds. I further show that this type of behavior is valuable for fund investors during high volatility periods because it has led to significantly (both statistically and economically) higher subsequent abnormal returns. The third essay, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur and Gang Hu, directly tests Brennan and Hughes' (1991) information production theory of stock splits by making use of a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data. We compare brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors before and after a split, and relate the informativeness of institutional trading to brokerage commissions paid. We also compute realized institutional trading profitability net of brokerage commissions and other trading costs. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, both commissions paid and trading volume by institutional investors increase after a stock split. Second, institutional trading immediately after a split has predictive power for the firm's subsequent long-term stock return performance; this predictive power is concentrated in stocks which generate higher commission revenues for brokerage firms and is greater for institutions that pay higher brokerage commissions. Third, institutions make positive abnormal profits during the post-split period even after taking brokerage commissions and other trading costs into account; institutions paying higher commissions significantly outperform those paying lower commissions. Fourth, the information asymmetry faced by firms decreases after a split; the greater the increase in brokerage commissions after a split, the greater the reduction in information asymmetry. Overall, our results are broadly consistent with the implications of the information production theory. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Finance.

This dissertation consists of three separate essays which address questions in the field of banking. The first two essays are motivated by the Great Recession, and study key aspects of the experience of commercial banks during this period. One is the impact of liquidity risk on credit supply, and the second is the effect of portfolio choices on the probability of bank failure. The third essay shifts the focus from commercial banks to M & A transactions, and studies the impact of a key provision in merger agreements on the initial offer premium and target firm value. In the first essay, titled "Liquidity Risk and the Credit Crunch of 2007-2009", I document the connection between liquidity risk and the credit crunch experienced during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Using extensive micro-level data on mortgage loan applications, I construct a measure of the supply of credit that is free from demand-side bias. I then use this measure of credit supply to estimate the effect of cross-sectional differences in unused lines of credit and core-deposit funding on the supply of mortgage credit moving through the crisis. I find that lenders with higher liquidity risk contracted their supply of mortgage credit more. The channel of contraction was significantly stronger for larger lenders, which had the largest exposure to liquidity risk. The first phase of the contraction was due to liquidity risk arising from high exposure to lines of credit and was immediately followed by further tightening due to the collapse of the markets for wholesale funding. I estimate that the total contraction of mortgage lending due to liquidity stresses experienced by lenders during 2007-2009 was $41.5 billion - $61.9 billion, or 5.2%-7.8% of total mortgage originations during that period. In the second essay, titled "Commercial Bank Failures During The Great Recession: The Real (Estate) Story" I identify the channels through which shocks to the real estate sector contributed to the wave of commercial bank failures during the Great Recession. I focus on the banks' loan, marketable securities and credit line portfolios, and consider how choices which shifted the composition of each portfolio towards real estate products impacted the probability of bank failure. I find that augmenting a baseline model of failure with variables that capture the composition of these three portfolios improves the fit of the model by approximately 70% for small banks and 230% for large banks. I find no evidence that banks which held more of their loans in traditional closed-end mortgages suffered a higher probability of failure. Rather, it was investments in loans for multifamily properties and other non-household real estate loans, as well as off-balance sheet exposures to credit lines issued to non-household real estate borrowers, that are robustly identified as precursors of bank failure for both small and large banks. Exposure to open-end residential real estate loans contributed to the failure rates of small banks only. Exposure to private-label MBS is strongly associated with a higher probability of failure for large banks, but not for small ones. On the other hand, high holdings of agency MBS are associated with a higher probability of failure only for smaller banks, but this result is less robust. The third essay, titled "No Free Shop: Why Target Companies in MBOs and Private Equity Transactions Sometimes Choose Not to Buy 'Go Shop' Options" is joint work with Charles W. Calomiris and Donna M. Hitscherich. In this essay, we study the decisions by targets in private equity and MBO transactions whether to actively "shop" their initial acquisition agreements prior to the shareholders' approval of those contracts. Specifically, targets can insert a "go-shop" clause into their contracts, which permits them to use the agreement to solicit offers from other would-be acquirors during the "go-shop" window, during which the termination fee paid by the target is temporarily lowered. We consider the "go-shop" decision from the theoretical perspective of value maximization under asymmetric information, and also consider conflicts of interest on the parts of management, bankers, and attorneys that might affect the decision. Empirically, we find that the decision to retain the option to shop an offer is predicted by various firm attributes, including larger size, more fragmented ownership, and various characteristics of the firms' legal advisory team and procedures. These can be interpreted as reflecting a combination of informational characteristics, litigation risk, and attorney conflicts of interest. We employ legal advisor characteristics as instruments when analyzing the effects of go-shop decisions on target acquisition premia and value. We find, as predicted in our theoretical framework, that go-shops are not a free option; they result in lower initial acquisition premia, ceteris paribus. Our theoretical framework has an ambiguous prediction about the effects of go-shop choice on target firm valuation. Consistent with theory, we find no significant effect on abnormal returns from choosing a "go-shop" option.

This paper utilizes a hazard model to predict the probability of leveraged buyout transactions for public firms. Rather than testing specific hypotheses, this paper incorporates all plausible predictors identified in existing literature to better delineate the effects of different characteristics. Largely confirming past results, I find that LBO transactions are more likely to occur for companies with more stable cash flows, less market visibility, lower market valuation, lower ownership concentration and lower costs of financial distress. By including LBO transactions from 1980 to September 2018, I find preliminary evidence that since the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, private equity firms have modified their selection criteria when sourcing LBO deal targets.

<p>The number of LBOs in Sweden has increased during the last years and the current market trend is positive. MostLBOs involves private companies, but a few concerns public corporations on the national share market. In this thesis we will examine the conditions of a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB. The purpose is to study existing conditions of Cloetta Fazer AB and to examine pros and cons with the deal. Based upon information presented in the frame of reference and in the empirical part, two cash flow valuations have been carried out. The first valuation is a regular discounted cash flow valuation while the other is a specific LBO valuation. In a LBO valuation the debt terms and the changed capital structure is taken into consideration. The valuations are followed by an analysis where LBO conditions as well as pros and cons are examined.</p><p>Positive conditions for Cloetta Fazer AB are insensitiveness of market fluctuations, a strong market position, stable cash flows, low risk and strong product trademarks. There is also a possibility of increasing the expected rate of return with more leverage since the current financial structure can take on more debt. We argue that a LBO of a public corporation is surrounded by limited information due to legal restrictions such as insider rules. Limited information makes it difficult to motivate value creation. Other factors that obstruct a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB is increased market competition, indistinct possibility of rationalising the business and a high EV/EBITDA multiple. We have also found that the IRR value is too low. Due to the fact that a LBO requires a premium of at least 20 % over market value, it is difficult to argue for a LBO of Cloetta Fazer AB.</p>