This thesis consists of four independent chapters on bank capital regulation and the issue of unsolicited ratings.<p><p>The first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.<p><p>The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e. just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.<p><p>The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardized approach to credit risk is limited.<p><p>The fourth and final chapter analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.<p> / Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The diploma thesis focuses on the regulatory framework of the BASEL III in coherence with risk management and measurement of market and credit risks. The accent is focused upon methodology of calculation and determination of the capital requirements of above mentioned risks. In the introductory part of the thesis are mentioned basic procedures regarding risk management as well as theoretical methodology and development of calculation of the capital requirements in coherence with current standard BASEL III. In the practical part of the thesis are presented capital management policies with regards to BASEL III in Deutsche Bank AG, globally presented institution and Komerční banka, a.s., operating on the Czech market. Accented are mainly the expositions of the institutions and the size of the capital required by the regulatory framework.

The aim of the thesis "Banking union" is to analyze and describe the concept of banking union, with respect to development and harmonization of rules before crisis. In addition to description of 4 pillars of Banking union the thesis tries to reveal the risks connected with rules harmonization and power centralization in hands of ECB. The obligatory membership is conditioned by common currency Euro, therefore there is an opportunity to analyze the potential benefits for states with own currency. This will be done in separate chapter 4th using Czech Republic as example. Thesis will be also enriched with opinion of politics and economist to which own authors comment will be added.

1 Abstract This work deals with the performance of supervision over the financial market and the entities operating in the financial market. Part of the work is devoted to consumer protection in the financial market and compensation systems. Because of the fact that the Czech Republic became a member of the European Union in 2004, this work includes also legislation of regulation and supervision of this level, as this treatment significantly predetermines Czech adjustment. Following questions were examined as an example of protecting the interests of clients of supervised entities: - whether there are any tools to protect the client's interests at the level of supervised entities, - what kind of role the supervisory authority has or may have in relation between a supervised entity and its client, - how are the client's financial interests protected in the event of failure of the supervised entity and whether this protection is de lege lata sufficient. The theoretical part of the work briefly describes the institute of supervision, its assorting and forms. The authority of supervisor is discussed in the next part together with the regulations under which the supervision is conducted. Owing to the fact that the scope of supervisory activity of the Czech National Bank is quite extensive, and the objective of...