This thesis consists of four independent chapters on bank capital regulation and the issue of unsolicited ratings.<p> The first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.<p> The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e., just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.<p> The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardized approach to credit risk is limited.<p> The fourth and final chapter analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.

O sistema de fundos de pensão possui papel fundamental na constituição de poupança e desenvolvimento do mercado financeiro e de capitais de um país. As incertezas de sustentabilidade do equilíbrio financeiro no longo prazo direcionam a exigência de uma supervisão robusta sobre os diversos riscos incorridos, não se restringindo apenas ao seu estado de solvência. A presente dissertação procura apresentar modelos baseados na avaliação dos riscos de um fundo de pensão, passando pela situação atuarial, as características dos planos, bem como pelos parâmetros relacionados ao mercado de capitais e formas de gestão dos investimentos. Os modelos propostos nos ajudam a visualizar o risco atuarial justificado pelo aumento da expectativa de vida, o risco de mercado através do reinvestimento e o risco de mercado em função do nível das taxas de juros. Ainda, tendo em conta estes riscos quantificáveis, é efetuada uma aplicação prática com o objetivo de determinação do requisito de capital de um determinado fundo de pensão para a cobertura destes riscos, tendo por base o modelo do projeto europeu de Solvência II, desenvolvido no âmbito da atividade seguradora. / The system of pension funds has a primary role in the formation of savings and financial market development and capital of a country. The uncertainties of financial balance sustainability in the long term drive the requirement for a robust supervision on the various risks involved, not restricted only to its state of solvency. This dissertation seeks to present models based on risk assessment of a pension fund, through the actuarial situation, the characteristics of the plans, as well as the parameters related to capital markets and ways of managing investments. The proposed models help us to see the actuarial risk justified by the increase in life expectancy, market risk through reinvestment and market risk based on the level of interest rates. Still, considering these risks quantifiable, a practical application is made for the purpose of determining the capital requirement of a particular pension fund to cover these risks, based on the model of the European Solvency II project, developed within the ambit of insurance activity.

The aim of this thesis is to take a closer look on how the stricter capital requirements defined in Basel III framework will influence European banks from a complex point of view - lending rates and volumes of provided loans, profitability, risk taking and market value of banks. Our analysis employing simultaneous equations and panel data models on exp post data on almost 600 banks operating in the EU in period 2005-2011 reports following results: (1) Those banks that will be forced to effectively increase their common equity ratio (CE/RWA) will reflect a one percentage point increase in this ratio into higher lending rates by 18.8 basis points. (2) This should, in turn, lead to a modest impact on the volume of provided loans, i.e. as a result of an increase of CE/RWA to 9.5 % (the case of the strictest scenario), the loan volumes are expected to be lowered by 2% from the current volume. (3) Our study further reports that higher capital requirements will cause a decrease in banks' profitability accompanied by a drop in risk taking. Banks increasing their CE/RWA by one percentage point are expected to experience a decrease in their profitability (measured by ROAA) by 0.122 percentage points. (4) The above mentioned effects were identified as rather negative signals for equity owners, which should be...

O sistema de fundos de pensão possui papel fundamental na constituição de poupança e desenvolvimento do mercado financeiro e de capitais de um país. As incertezas de sustentabilidade do equilíbrio financeiro no longo prazo direcionam a exigência de uma supervisão robusta sobre os diversos riscos incorridos, não se restringindo apenas ao seu estado de solvência. A presente dissertação procura apresentar modelos baseados na avaliação dos riscos de um fundo de pensão, passando pela situação atuarial, as características dos planos, bem como pelos parâmetros relacionados ao mercado de capitais e formas de gestão dos investimentos. Os modelos propostos nos ajudam a visualizar o risco atuarial justificado pelo aumento da expectativa de vida, o risco de mercado através do reinvestimento e o risco de mercado em função do nível das taxas de juros. Ainda, tendo em conta estes riscos quantificáveis, é efetuada uma aplicação prática com o objetivo de determinação do requisito de capital de um determinado fundo de pensão para a cobertura destes riscos, tendo por base o modelo do projeto europeu de Solvência II, desenvolvido no âmbito da atividade seguradora. / The system of pension funds has a primary role in the formation of savings and financial market development and capital of a country. The uncertainties of financial balance sustainability in the long term drive the requirement for a robust supervision on the various risks involved, not restricted only to its state of solvency. This dissertation seeks to present models based on risk assessment of a pension fund, through the actuarial situation, the characteristics of the plans, as well as the parameters related to capital markets and ways of managing investments. The proposed models help us to see the actuarial risk justified by the increase in life expectancy, market risk through reinvestment and market risk based on the level of interest rates. Still, considering these risks quantifiable, a practical application is made for the purpose of determining the capital requirement of a particular pension fund to cover these risks, based on the model of the European Solvency II project, developed within the ambit of insurance activity.

<p>ABSTRACT</p><p>Title: Basel II – The New Basel Capital Accord and its influence on small Swedish banks and their retail banking and risk management.</p><p>Seminar: May 24th, 2007</p><p>Course: FEK318 Bachelor thesis in Business Administration, 10 Swedish credits</p><p>Authors: Mattias Kjellberg, David Uhlmann & Ivana Zubac</p><p>Advisor: Joakim Winborg</p><p>Keywords: Capital cover, capital requirements, Basel II, credit giving, credit risk, risk management, retail banking, small banks, pillar 2</p><p>Problem: What influence does Basel II and the new updated management of credit risks in pillar 1 and the active risk control in pillar 2 have on small Swedish banks retail banking?</p><p>Purpose: Our essay seeks to explore what influence pillar 1 and the new updated management of credit risks in the new capital accord Basel II have on small Swedish banks and what influence pillar 2 have. We also want to explain if Basel II has influences on small Swedish banks credit analysis and possible effects in their risk management and pricing.</p><p>Methodology: In our essay we use an inductive approach and our chosen research method is the qualitative one. We have chosen to look into four small Swedish banks, and the empirical data is obtained from telephone interviews with selected respondents from Länsförsäkringar Bank, SkandiaBanken, GE Money Bank and ICA Banken.</p><p>Conclusions:</p><p>• The work with credit scoring does not get influenced by Basel II if the Standardised Approach is chosen.</p><p>• Banks that’ve early implemented high technological systems in the organization, that small banks normally do, have gotten an easier transition to Basel II.</p><p>• Basel II will result in a risk adjusted pricing and a more fair credit market.</p><p>• Internal Ratings-based Approaches is very demanding to develop, but at the same time it’s a more risk sensitive approach.</p><p>• Pillar 2 results in a more sophisticated work for the small banks.</p><p>• Basel II results in a further price press on residential loans in Sweden.</p>

ABSTRACT Title: Basel II – The New Basel Capital Accord and its influence on small Swedish banks and their retail banking and risk management. Seminar: May 24th, 2007 Course:FEK318 Bachelor thesis in Business Administration, 10 Swedish credits Authors: Mattias Kjellberg, David Uhlmann & Ivana Zubac Advisor: Joakim Winborg Keywords: Capital cover, capital requirements, Basel II, credit giving, credit risk, risk management, retail banking, small banks, pillar 2 Problem: What influence does Basel II and the new updated management of credit risks in pillar 1 and the active risk control in pillar 2 have on small Swedish banks retail banking? Purpose: Our essay seeks to explore what influence pillar 1 and the new updated management of credit risks in the new capital accord Basel II have on small Swedish banks and what influence pillar 2 have. We also want to explain if Basel II has influences on small Swedish banks credit analysis and possible effects in their risk management and pricing. Methodology: In our essay we use an inductive approach and our chosen research method is the qualitative one. We have chosen to look into four small Swedish banks, and the empirical data is obtained from telephone interviews with selected respondents from Länsförsäkringar Bank, SkandiaBanken, GE Money Bank and ICA Banken. Conclusions: • The work with credit scoring does not get influenced by Basel II if the Standardised Approach is chosen. • Banks that’ve early implemented high technological systems in the organization, that small banks normally do, have gotten an easier transition to Basel II. • Basel II will result in a risk adjusted pricing and a more fair credit market. • Internal Ratings-based Approaches is very demanding to develop, but at the same time it’s a more risk sensitive approach. • Pillar 2 results in a more sophisticated work for the small banks. • Basel II results in a further price press on residential loans in Sweden.

When banks lend capital to counterparties they take on a risk, known as credit risk which traditionally has been the largest risk exposure for banks. To be protected against potential default losses when lending capital, banks must hold a regulatory capital that is based on a regulatory formula for calculating risk weighted assets (RWA). This formula is part of the Basel Accords and it is implemented in the legal system of all European Union member states. The key parameters of the RWA formula are probability of default, loss given default and asset correlation. Banks today have the option to estimate the probability of default and loss given default by internal models however the asset correlation must be determined by a formula provided by the legal framework. This project is a first approach for Handelsbanken to study what would happen if banks were allowed to estimate asset correlation by internal models. We assess two models for estimating the asset correlation of a portfolio of Small and Medium Enterprices (SME). The estimates are compared with the asset correlation given by the regulatory formula and with estimates for another parameter called default correlation. The models are validated using predicted historical data and Monte-Carlo Simulations. For the studied SME portfolio, the models give similar estimates for the asset correlations and the estimates are lower than those given by the regulatory formula. This would imply a lower capital requirement if banks were allowed to use internal models to estimate the asset correlation used in the RWA formula. Default correlation, if not used synonymously with asset correlation, is shown to be another measure and should not be used in the RWA formula. / När banker lånar ut kapital till motparter tar de en risk, mer känt som kreditrisk som traditionellt har varit den största risken för banker. För att skydda sig mot potentiella förluster vid utlåning måste banker ha ett reglerat kapital som bygger på en formel för beräkning av riskvägda tillgångar (RWA). Denna formel ingår i Basels regelverk och är implementerad i rättssystemet i alla EU-länder. De viktigaste parametrarna för RWA-formeln är sannolikheten att fallera, förlustgivet fallissemang och tillgångskorrelation. Bankerna har idag möjlighet att beräkna de två variablerna sannolikheten att fallera och förlustgivet fallissemang med interna modeller men tillgångskorrelation måste bestämmas med hjälp av en standardformel givet från regelverket. Detta projekt är ett första tillvägagångssätt för Handelsbanken att studera vad som skulle hända om banker fick beräkna tillgångskorrelation med interna modeller. Vi analyserar två modeller för att skatta tillgångskorrelation i en portfölj av Små och Medelstora Företag (SME). Uppskattningarna jämförs sedan med den tillgångskorrelation som ges av regelverket och jämförs även mot en parameter som kallas fallissemangskorrelation. Modellerna som används för att beräkna korrelationerna valideras med hjälp av estimerat data och Monte-Carlo Simuleringar. För den studerade SME portföljen ges liknande uppskattningar för de båda tillgångskorrelationsmodellerna, samt visar det sig att de är lägre än den korrelationen som ges av regelverket. Detta skulle innebära ett lägre kapitalkrav om bankerna fick använda sig av interna modeller för att estimera tillgångskorrelation som används i RWA-formeln. Om fallissemangskorrelation inte används synonymt till tillgångskorrelation, visar det sig att fallisemangskorrelation är en annan mätning än tillgångskorrelation och bör inte användas i RWA-formeln.

This dissertation explored the efficacy of the new Basel III banking standards in SACU, grounded on the conjecture that they are not reflective of economies of SACU, but are merely an intensification of Basel II, rather than a substantial break with it. Firstly, loans and assets were tested for causality, since Basel III believes growth in these variables led to securitization. The leverage ratio has been introduced in Basel III as an anti-cyclical buffer. The OLS technique was employed to test for its significance in determining growth in bank assets. SACU feels the impact of debt, with credit is marginally treated in Basel III and is not introspective of the realities of its economies. ANOVA tests using debt, credit and GDP were done to determine a better method of addressing cyclicality. The leverage ratio was insignificant in Namibia, with debt and credit having momentous impacts on GDP in SACU. / Economics / M. Com. (Economics)

Submitted by Mauricio Barbosa Alves (mauricio.alves.b@gmail.com) on 2018-06-14T15:35:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_ABNT.pdf: 680246 bytes, checksum: 3006f82e898ec471fed50308aacb286a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Katia Menezes de Souza (katia.menezes@fgv.br) on 2018-06-14T15:46:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_ABNT.pdf: 680246 bytes, checksum: 3006f82e898ec471fed50308aacb286a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Isabele Garcia (isabele.garcia@fgv.br) on 2018-06-15T18:00:51Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_ABNT.pdf: 680246 bytes, checksum: 3006f82e898ec471fed50308aacb286a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-15T18:00:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_ABNT.pdf: 680246 bytes, checksum: 3006f82e898ec471fed50308aacb286a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-29 / We study the long-run impact of the adoption of macroprudential tools. We derive a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring endogenous TFP change and allowing banks to choose their balance sheet structure endogenously. Banks choose vulnerable balance sheet structure depending on perceptions about fundamental risk. The design of prudential tools matters because it changes the riskiness of assets in a particular way, possibly increasing banking ability to fund projects. This introduces a novel channel to explain economic growth: risk mitigation.We then use the model to show numerically that there is a non-linear relationship between long-run growth and macroprudential policy intensity for several prudential rules considered in the related literature. We derive a welfare function and show that a welfare-maximizing regulator faces a growth-risk trade-off: welfare is maximized when growth is below its maximum value for each policy design we consider. / Estudamos os impactos de longo prazo da adoção de ferramentas macroprudenciais. Derivamos um modelo de equilíbrio geral dinamico no qual há mudança endógena da PTF e permitindo que os bancos escolham sua estrutura de balanço endogenamente. Os bancos escolhem uma estrutura de balanço vulnerável dependendo das percepções sobre risco fundamental. O desenho de ferramentas prudenciais é importante porque altera o grau de risco dos ativos de uma determinada maneira, possivelmente aumentando a capacidade bancária de financiar projetos. Isso introduz um novo canal para explicar o crescimento econômico: a mitigação de riscos. Em seguida, usamos o modelo para mostrar numericamente que existe uma relação não linear entre o crescimento de longo prazo e a intensidade da política macroprudencial para várias regras prudenciais consideradas na literatura relacionada. Obtemos uma função de bem-estar e mostramos que um regulador que maximiza o bem-estar enfrenta um tradeoff de risco de crescimento: o bem-estar é maximizado quando o crescimento está abaixo de seu valor máximo para cada desenho de política que consideramos.

Den europeiska marknaden för värdepapperisering punkterades av den senaste finanskrisen och har fortfarande inte återhämtat sig trots att ett decennium har passerat. För att få igång marknaden igen har EU tagit fram den nya värdepapperiseringsförordningen som gäller sedan årsskiftet 2019/2020. Värdepapperiseringsförordningen har sin amerikanska motsvarighet i Dodd Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act. Sakinnehållet i de respektive regleringarna är mycket likt men den största skillnaden ligger i motivet till att regleringarna instiftades. Värdepapperiseringsförordningen instiftades med syftet att harmonisera reglerna kring värdepapperisering och på så sätt skapa bättre förutsättningar för de bolag som vill bidra till marknadens återuppbyggnad. Dodd-Frank instiftades redan 2010 som en helreformation av finansmarknaderna som under finanskrisen 2007-2008 visats vara i stort behov av återreglering. Finanskrisens påverkan på finansmarknaderna visade att den avreglering som löpande gjorts av marknaderna sedan 1980-talet hade skapat en ohållbar situation där finansmarknadsaktörerna kunde verka relativt ostört av myndigheter och lagstiftning.  En annan aspekt som finanskrisen synliggjorde var riskerna kopplade till det globala finansiella systemet. Finanskrisen innebar konkurser för europeiska banker och insolvens för europeiska stater, trots att krisen hade sin början i en amerikansk investmentbank. Den systemrisk som uppdagades har lagstiftare både i USA och EU försökt reglera. Delvis genom förbud mot vissa verksamheter, investeringar och avtal, men även genom krav på bland annat transparens och due diligence. Inom EU återfinns dessa förbud och regler främst i kapitaltäckningsförordningen och kapitaltäckningsdirektivet som båda syftar till att säkerställa att bankerna har kapitalbuffertar. I och med det nya Baselregelverket som också genomgick en omarbetning efter finanskrisen kan kapitaltyperna lätt identifieras.  Kapitaltäckningsregleringarna och värdepapperiseringsförordningen är de viktigaste verktygen för EU:s arbete med att återställa värdepapperiseringsmarknaden inom unionen. Uppsatsens komparativa analys av värdepapperiseringsförordningen och Dodd-Frank Act visar på att just motivet till värdepapperiseringsförordningen, att den ska möjliggöra för marknaden att växa men också reglera marknaden så att en finanskris kan undvikas, skulle kunna hindra tillämpningen från att bli sådan som lagstiftaren åsyftat.