Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Philosophy, March, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis advisor: James Keenan / This dissertation argues that humility is a cardinal virtue that governs our ecological relationality. I define humility as the virtue of knowing and valuing the truth of our place in the world as interdependent beings. Humility is acquired via the practice of other-centeredness and other-acceptance and enabled by the “graces" of self-doubt and self-affirmation. A global survey of recent Christian scholarship on environmental issues and magisterial Roman Catholic teaching supports three conclusions: 1) interconnectedness characterizes human relationships with creation; 2) current ecological crises indicate the presence of sin and 3) we need to understand our place within creation and appreciate other-centered ways of knowing. Utilizing these three themes, I expand upon James Keenan's framework of rethinking cardinal virtues in terms of human relationality in order to account for an underdeveloped aspect of human relationality, that is, ecological relationality. I propose a more robust account of humility as a mean between two equally problematic extremes: pride and self-deprecation. Furthermore, humility helps us better identify sin both by recognizing how pride and self-deprecation can lead to indifference, understood as a failure to bother to love, that stems from our strength, and by rejecting the isolation that enables the sin of indifference so understood. The final chapter addresses how humility can be understood and cultivated in the United States today. In particular, I argue that the adoption of a plant-based diet generally fosters humility in individuals living in wealthy nations with high rates of meat consumption. In conclusion, I suggest that Catholics reinvigorate the Lenten penitential practice of Friday abstinence from meat by seeing it also as an opportunity to foster the virtue of humility. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Diss. / Half title page title: Observationes ad locum de partibus animi humani et quatuor virtutibus primariis a Platone in Politeia expositum. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / This dissertation aims to give a theoretical account of the cardinal virtue of temperance that portrays it as an attractive (albeit demanding) virtue, and provides the justification and method for applying it to multiple spheres of life today. To this end, it offers a critical interpretation and retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas' account of the four causes of <italic>temperantia<italic> in the <italic>Summa Theologiae<italic>. I claim that, for Thomas, the four causes of a moral virtue are its mode (formal cause), matter and subject (material cause), proper end (final cause) and agent (efficient cause). Less technically, they can be expressed in terms of five guiding questions to be used in understanding any given virtue: What is the practical wisdom actualized by that virtue? What is the sphere of life with which the virtue is concerned? What aspect of the human heart and mind does the virtue modify? What is the virtue for? What causes the virtue to exist and increase? To answer to these five questions is to give an account of a moral virtue. This dissertation develops and applies this causal method for analyzing a moral virtue, both as a means of interpreting Thomas' account of temperance, and as a tool for constructing a theory of temperance for today. Temperance, I claim, can be defined as the modulation of attraction for the sake of right relationship. It is developed through both discipline and grace. Temperance does not repress desire, but forms and channels its positively, placing it at the service of right relationship to oneself, others, the earth and God. It does limit and restrain desire, but always for the sake of deeper and more meaningful goods. Temperance therefore modulates harmoniously between the restraint and the redirection of desire, the fast and the feast. Temperance is often misunderstood as proposing a purely negative ideal of repression and constraint. The dissertation claims that, on the contrary, temperance is a positive and attractive virtue, and one that is urgently needed in consumer society. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alvaro Luiz Travassos de Azevedo Gonzaga.pdf: 590552 bytes, checksum: bfde2e6cc655a3269b496b5fa892bc03 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-03 / This thesis will study the platonic thinking under the Natural Law perspective, especially in The Republic, and its following concretization and integration in Laws. We aim to observe how the platonic doctrine does not change radically, but rather completes itself with the combination of the two mentioned works, for which we shall weave our analysis setting out from the logical temporal proposition in the platonic thinking, considering also the research of his conception of Justice in order to verify the maturity of its posture as it relates to the organization of the polis / A presente tese predispõe-se a estudar o pensamento platônico na perspectiva do Direito Natural, em especial na República, e sua consequente positivação e integração na obra As Leis. Visamos apresentar como a doutrina platônica de justiça não muda radicalmente, mas se completa com a conjugação das obras mencionadas. Para isso, partiremos da proposta temporal lógica do pensamento platônico, bem como da pesquisa de sua concepção de Justiça a fim de verificarmos a maturidade de sua postura com relação à organização da pólis

Virtue can be seen as a core construct of pastoral theology when it is understood as a relational dynamic which includes the experience of suffering and the pastoral response of compassion. This thesis probes the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards, who proposed that virtue is a form of beauty defined as "consent to being." Edwards' construct of virtue is examined from its inception in his pastoral work at Northampton parish. Although it was offered in the context of the 18th century debates in moral philosophy, it is argued that Edwards' idea of virtue is a unique theological contribution to our understanding of the nature of virtue. The implications of this conception of virtue are weighed against current discussions in ethics and moral philosophy on the theme of virtue. Edwards' idea of "consent to being" is expanded from a pastoral theological perspective to include the notion of compassion as an integrative motif. The structure of experience and how we speak about our experiences are explored in relation to this aesthetic understanding of virtue as a form of beauty. This leads to the notion of compassion as ontological consent. Since language is the vehicle by which our experiences are conveyed, the thesis probes the issue of how moral vision is expressed in "experience-near" language through parable, poem, and lament. Moral vision is articulated most adequately through such language, the formulation of which takes the form of a necessary quest. The thesis concludes with a constructive proposal concerning a mature pastoral theology of virtue. This may be seen as an expansion of Edwards' concept of "consent to being" from the vantage point of pastoral theology. It is argued that a dynamic vision of virtue requires some connection between the experience of suffering and the inward striving toward the greatest good. The essence of virtue can be best understood, from a pastoral theological perspective, as the relational dynamic of "suffering with" another human being. / Practical Theology / D.Th. (Practical Theology)

Virtue can be seen as a core construct of pastoral theology when it is understood as a relational dynamic which includes the experience of suffering and the pastoral response of compassion. This thesis probes the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards, who proposed that virtue is a form of beauty defined as "consent to being." Edwards' construct of virtue is examined from its inception in his pastoral work at Northampton parish. Although it was offered in the context of the 18th century debates in moral philosophy, it is argued that Edwards' idea of virtue is a unique theological contribution to our understanding of the nature of virtue. The implications of this conception of virtue are weighed against current discussions in ethics and moral philosophy on the theme of virtue. Edwards' idea of "consent to being" is expanded from a pastoral theological perspective to include the notion of compassion as an integrative motif. The structure of experience and how we speak about our experiences are explored in relation to this aesthetic understanding of virtue as a form of beauty. This leads to the notion of compassion as ontological consent. Since language is the vehicle by which our experiences are conveyed, the thesis probes the issue of how moral vision is expressed in "experience-near" language through parable, poem, and lament. Moral vision is articulated most adequately through such language, the formulation of which takes the form of a necessary quest. The thesis concludes with a constructive proposal concerning a mature pastoral theology of virtue. This may be seen as an expansion of Edwards' concept of "consent to being" from the vantage point of pastoral theology. It is argued that a dynamic vision of virtue requires some connection between the experience of suffering and the inward striving toward the greatest good. The essence of virtue can be best understood, from a pastoral theological perspective, as the relational dynamic of "suffering with" another human being. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D.Th. (Practical Theology)

The first part deals with the concept of virtue ethics in the view of Summa theologica. Its basis is acquired from classical philosophy of ancient scholars. Firstly, it is necessary to describe Plato's and Aristoteles systematical approach to virtues. Plato's approach is parallel with the concept of the state. Aristotle's has a system divided into rational and moral virtues, which is a small entanglement of this topic. The last systematical approach in ancient times takes Stoic's way with dualistic conception of realty and human inside, which is an approach with no ground. Thomas Aquinas continues the system of Plato's and Aristotle's and adds the theory of cardinal and supernatural virtues. The cardinal virtues are rooted in humans, through their habits, so the key question then being human's habits, disposition, and adequacy in connection with their nature. Subsequently, the virtues are an essential part of human nature or personality. The psychology deals with the topic of virtues in the context of personality psychology, especially, in the background of inner quality or traits. Recently, virtues in the psychology are still open to question and are a huge challenge.