The thesis examines the formation and development of post-World War II international collaboration in the economic regulation of the commercial aspects (i.e., market entry; market shares and prices) of civil aviation. Specifically, it studies the formation and operation of one type of international regime: a cartel. The thesis seeks to answer two questions: why do states cooperate to support an international cartel? And why do states cease to support a cartel? The study proposes three reasons why states will support a cartel: (1) to promote consumer welfare and the growth of the industry; (2) to ensure the development and protection of their national carriers; and (3) in response to hegemonic activity. It then considers why states cease to participate in the cartel arrangements. This occurs: if states no longer believe that the cartel is promoting consumer welfare and industrial growth; if they conclude that their industry no longer benefits from cartel protection; or if the hegemon is unable or unwilling, or both, to support the regime. All three give valuable insights. Nevertheless, the author proposes that it is possible to establish a hierarchy of usefulness according to the depth and scope of understanding offered by each explanation. It is argued that hegemonic stability theory provides the most useful insights. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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This thesis examines the competitive impact of a trade or industry association. It focuses on the role of such associations in coordinating or orchestrating members to engage in cartel or collusive behaviour, and the effectiveness of such acts. More importantly, it seeks to provide empirical evidence of the presence of coordination and compliance between the association and its members. Providing empirical evidence for the presence of such actions has been a central and difficult issue in uncovering cartel or collusive behaviour by antitrust agencies around the world. / The thesis uses the Indonesian cement industry as a case study, because there have been many assertions that the Indonesian Cement Association has been involved in cartel-like behaviour (market sharing and quota distribution arrangements among members) for some time. Such behaviour was recognised and even sponsored by the Indonesian Government. However, following the change in the regulatory regime as a response to the Indonesian financial crisis of 1997, those assertions largely disappeared. Many Indonesians believed that since such arrangements were prohibited, the cartel-like behaviour of the Association had disappeared. / The general findings suggest that there exist some variations in the behaviour of the Association and its members between the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period. During the pre-crisis period, when such arrangements were still in place, evidence of co-ordinated effort carried out by the Association in relation to most of its members was found. It was also suggested that in the long run, all members of the Association complied with the scheme. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the Association was behaving as an effective cartel. In contrast, during the post-crisis period, when such arrangements were allegedly no longer present, mixed results were found regarding the evidence of a coordinated and compliance relationship with the members. For that reason, it is plausible to suggest that the Association, even if it still carried out cartel-like behaviour, was not an effective cartel. / The structured analysis in this thesis offers a complementary framework for antitrust agencies to enhance their efforts to detect the presence of cartel practices, particularly those conducted by trade associations and when direct evidence is not available. In addition, the framework will also increase the capacity of antitrust agencies to adopt a more proactive role rather than waiting for whistleblowers. The framework can potentially also be used to indicate the existence of other forms of collusive behaviour such as tacit collusion, whereby conspirator firms may act in concert without any formal agreement. / Thesis (PhD)--University of South Australia, 2006.

Thesis (doctoral)--Georg-August-Universität zu Göttingen.

Drug war has become a global issue that is affecting the whole population. One country that has been especially affected is Mexico. There are more than 120 million people living in Mexico and only in 2007 and 2008 more than eight thousand were assassinated in relation to drug conflicts, including over 500 police officers. Kidnapping has also increased enormously.  Since The Human Security aspect is taking more and more space on the international agenda, it has been chosen as a theoretical framework for this study.   In order to answer the research question, which is to what extent the Mexican government has taken human security principles into account in the war against the drug cartels, a case study method has been used. Focus of the study is the aspect of human security and antidrug policies in Mexico, between 2004 and 2010.   The results of this study show that there is a lack of Human Security Principles in the Mexican strategy to fight the drug cartels. During Felipe’s Calderon president mandate the power has been given to the military forces, excluding the police from the governmental actions. Civilians rights and threats to their personal security has been forgotten and that had led to many violations of human rights.

This thesis examines the role of endogenous size processes in the stability and price setting decisions of cartels. Chapter One analyses how the stability of cartels de- pends on the level of horizontal product differentiation and on costs of collusion under the premise that a cartel can consist of less than all firms in an industry. It is shown that when the size of the cartel is determined endogenously, it is possible that increased costs of collusion make a cartel more stable. Chapter Two analyses how the price setting of firms in collusive industries is affected by three different penalty regimes: i) profits, ii) overcharge, and iii) revenue based penalties. It is found that penalties influence price setting in two ways: directly, by affecting the industry price for a given cartel size and indirectly by affecting cartel size and thereby the price charged. When the penalties are equally tough, in the sense that they deter cartels over the same group of products, over- charge based penalties always lead to the lowest prices, followed by prices computed under profits based penalties and then revenue based penalties. For very few combinations of product differentiation and market size, revenue based penalties lead to lower prices than profits based penalties. Finally, Chapter Three presents a model in which collusive stability is analysed in a dynamic setting of free entry, exit and mergers. Contrary to the previous literature it shows that stable and profitable collusion is possible under free entry, without the need for cartels to play entry deterring strategies. Furthermore, the empirical evidence that a breakdown of collusion can lead to increased merger activity is replicated. An additional contribution of this model is that it defines a new notion of a long run sustainable competitive market size under merger and entry.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Köln.

Diss.--Marburg--Universität.