L’application des règles de concurrence de l’Union européenne au secteur de l’aviation présente un caractère spécial. Les rapprochements des compagnies aériennes sous formes d’alliances ou concentrations sont à première vue indispensables, afin de garantir leur viabilité et mieux desservir les besoins des voyageurs. La pression concurrentielle exercée par les différents moyens de transports et la globalisation des échanges conduisent vers cette voie. Or, la consolidation du marché aérien peut avoir des conséquences néfastes au détriment des consommateurs. Structure oligopolistique, organisation des gros opérateurs en réseaux (hub-and-spoke system), insuffisance des infrastructures, coûts énormes d’exploitation ainsi que protectionnisme au niveau international, constituent des barrières considérables à l’entrée de nouveaux concurrents et peuvent conduire à des pratiques abusives. La transparence tarifaire et les accords de coopération peuvent favoriser les cartels entre transporteurs aériens. La Commission évalue la position des parties et les risques à la concurrence sur des liaisons déterminées (paires de villes). Cette méthode de délimitation du marché pertinent au transport aérien suscite une polémique de la part notamment des compagnies aériennes qui soutiennent une approche fondée sur la concurrence entre réseaux. Ce débat, montre l’évolution du secteur de l’aviation et la nécessité de prendre toujours en compte les nouvelles données. Le maintien d’une concurrence efficace au secteur de l’aviation n’est pas un objectif en soi, mais un instrument de la politique européenne pour la création du « ciel unique européen ». L’intervention des autorités de l’Union européenne au secteur de l’aviation ne se limite pas à une application rigoureuse des règles de concurrence mais vise à éliminer préalablement les phénomènes anticoncurrentiels par l’adoption d’un cadre législatif. / The application of European Union’s competition rules to the aviation sector presents a special character. The rapprochement of air companies either by the formation of alliances or mergers seem to be necessary. Indeed, it can guarantee the existence of a company as well as it serves the needs of travellers. The competitive pressure exercised by the different existing means of transportation and the globalisation of exchanges lead to this behaviour. But this consolidation of the air market can have harmful consequences for consumers. Oligopolistic structures, the hub-and-spoke system, insufficiency of infrastructures, enormous costs of exploitation along with protectionism at an international level, constitute considerable barriers for new competitors and could lead to abusive practices. Tariff transparency and cooperative agreements can furtherer cartels in between air transporters. The Commission assesses the position of the parties and competitive risks on specific routes (city pairs). This method of delimitation of the market for air transport has created a polemic, especially from the airline companies supporting an approach based on competition between networks. This debate shows the evolution of the aviation sector and the necessity of always taking into consideration new data. The upholding of an efficient competition system within the aviation sector is not an objective in itself, but means of European politic for the creation of a “Single European Sky”. The intervention of European authorities within the aviation sector is not limited to a rigorous application of competition rules but aims first at eliminating anticompetitive phenomenon by adopting a legislative framework.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit des affaires" / Il nous appartiendra au fin de ce mémoire, d'observer comment les autorités de la concurrence communautaires, américaines et canadiennes assurent la régulation des pratiques anticoncurrentielles prenant leur source ou produisant leur effets au sein de leur marché. Il conviendra donc à cet égard de se pencher sur les spécificités de chacun de ces régimes juridiques, afin d'étudier les similitudes et différences existantes quant à la définition de la notion de marché du marché pertinent, la qualification juridique des différentes infractions (ententes ou cartels - abus de position dominantes ou monopolisation concentration d'entreprise ou fusionnement ou même mergers) ainsi que la procédure permettant à ces différentes autorités d'autoriser, d'amender ou d'interdire ces différentes pratiques. Il conviendra par la suite de démontrer comment et sur quel fondement chacun de ces systèmes peuvent avoir une interaction entre eux en élargissant notamment leur champ de compétence respectif par le recours à une application extraterritoriale de leurs lois antitrust. Ce mémoire aura également pour objectif de se pencher sur les tentatives des différents législations étudiées pour arriver à une harmonisation de leurs normes et pour favoriser une plus ample coopération internationale. Pour conclure il conviendra de faire le point sur les travaux visant à la mise en place d'un droit antitrust international qui pourrait selon les cas reposer soit sur un traité international, soit un code multilatérale ayant trait aux pratiques restrictives à la concurrence. / The purpose of this memoir is to observe how the antitrust authorities of the European Union, the United States of America and the Canada are controlling and enforcing cartels, monopolizations or attempts of monopolizations and mergers and acquisitions which have sometimes the effect of restricting the competition in a specifie market. In order to do so, the differences and similarities between this three different antitrust legislation will be highlight especially those concerning the definition of the relevant market, the qualification and the nature of aIl this practices and the process by which, each authority permit, amend or fordid the supposed infringement. In a second time this memoir will have to demonstrate the basis of the extraterritorial application of their nationallegislation by national antitrust authorities, on foreign market or foreign company. Finally the last goal of this memoir is to take stock on evolution of an international antitrust legislation inspired by a treaty or a multilateral guide, which be bounding for each actor of the economic process.

This thesis deals with a legal framework of leniency programme. The program provides imunity or fine reduction from government penalties to the first member of a cartel in exchange for cooperation. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate effectiveness and functioning of the Czech and European leniency program, effects in practice and current challenges the program is facing. In introduction thesis deals with general requirements for an effective leniency program, further with development of the program in the EU and the Czech Republic with focus on progress towards more efficient, transparent and attractive system and application practice of the Commission, and. Office for Protection of Competition. It briefly introduces the European Competition Network and Model Leniency programme. Another part deals with the private enforcement of competition law in context of the current case law concerning access to the file and protection of leniency materials.

- cz Tato práce se zabývá analýzou antimonopolní politiky se zaměřením na kartelové dohody v Evropské unii. Cox·v model proporcionálních rizik je v rámci této práce použit pro predikci proměnných, které ovlivňují trvání a stabilitu kartel·. Tyto proměnné jsou rozděleny do následujících skupin. Velikost a vnitřní struk- tura kartelu, charakteristika účastník· kartelové dohody, ukazatele vnějšího prostředí na trhu, vnitřní kontrolní mechanismy a proměnné, určující účin- nost antimonopolní politiky. Pro účely této práce byl sestaven data set, který zahrnuje kartely soudně stíhané Evropskou komisí v období mezi lety 1990 a 2004. Tato práce navíc obsahuje přehled detekčních metod. Zahrnuje jak metody, které jsou v současnosti aktivně využívány Evropskou komisí za účelem detekce kartel·, tak i nové metody, tzv. screeningové metody trh·, které mohou do budoucna přispět k efektivnějšímu procesu detekce. Screeningové metody se zabývají zkoumáním reálných tržních proces· a hledají znaky koluzního chování. Součásti této práce je mimo jiné i analýza politiky shovívavosti a její dopad na životnost kartel· a na délku administrativních proces·. Očekávaným přínosem této práce je poskytnutí uceleného přehledu detekčních metod a proměnných, které ovlivňují životnost a stabilitu kartel·. 1

O Direito Antitruste experimenta hoje uma verdadeira era dourada na qual a cooperação internacional entre os órgãos de defesa da concorrência e a aplicação de suas leis alcançaram níveis jamais vistos. Como efeito colateral do fenômeno globalização, o qual marcou as últimas décadas pela expansão da economia de mercado, veio a internacionalização dos acordos entre concorrentes com vistas a limitar a concorrência. Os chamados cartéis, antes nacionais, passam a ter a dimensão dessa nova dinâmica da economia, a mundial. E os danos ao mercado, antes limitados a um território, passam a poder atingir dezenas de jurisdições. A partir desse introito, o objetivo dessa dissertação é oferecer ao leitor um quadro compreensivo da evolução da atuação das autoridades antitruste brasileiras na cooperação internacional de combate aos cartéis transnacionais, em termos normativos e na utilização na prática, considerando, sobretudo, o contexto do recente recrudescimento do instrumental persecutório das autoridades brasileiras de defesa da concorrência no combate às práticas anticompetitivas. Por meio de uma análise comparativa entre os acordos internacionais de cooperação mais sofisticados e os instrumentos cooperacionais existentes no Brasil à luz da sua florescente experiência, a dissertação procura identificar os elementos necessários para o aprofundamento da técnica cooperativa brasileira de combate aos cartéis transnacionais. Ou seja, intenta trazer elementos para a reflexão dos mecanismos cooperativos brasileiros para um combate mais efetivo à mais danosa infração à livre concorrência. Para tal análise comparativa, o centenário direito antitruste estadunidense é paradigma de direito estrangeiro, em especial porque alia a longa experiência jurídica nessa matéria a mecanismos bastante inovadores em relação ao sistema jurídico nacional. O presente trabalho tem também por escopo tratar dos principais temas que permeiam a discussão da cooperação internacional entre as agências de defesa da concorrência, passando pelo estudo dos conceitos de cooperação jurídica internacional; princípios do direito internacional público que regem a competência internacional dos Estados, incluindo a delimitação do escopo da cooperação em sede da aplicação extraterritorial do direito antitruste, noções de direito concorrencial, os instrumentos e mecanismos de cooperação internacional existentes, as melhores práticas, entre outros. Os desdobramentos das questões analisadas nesta reflexão se expressam em problemas jurídicos tanto de caráter geral quanto de ordem específica. De forma geral, impõe-se uma avaliação recapitulativa e analítica da natureza jurídica dos acordos de cooperação assinados pelo Brasil, de suas características e de sua utilização. Também se pretende avaliar o tratamento normativo dado aos cartéis e à questão da incidência extraterritorial da legislação antitruste brasileira e da legislação comparada, bem como do entendimento da jurisprudência (especialmente do CADE) sobre os principais temas que permeiam a pesquisa. No âmbito dos objetivos específicos, é necessário responder às seguintes perguntas: como a cooperação entre as agências de defesa da concorrência pode efetivamente auxiliar na aplicação de suas leis?; quais os limites e obstáculos dessa cooperação?; quais os tipos de cooperação disponíveis e quais deles fariam sentido para o Brasil na persecução de cartéis internacionais?; como o Brasil pode aperfeiçoar seu modelo jurídico-institucional de cooperação? / The Antitrust Law faces today a true golden age in which international cooperation among antitrust authorities and its enforcement have reached levels never seen before. As a side effect of the \"globalization\", the phenomenon that marked the past few decades by the world expansion of the economy, it came along the internationalization of agreements among competitors to restrain competition. Prior to that, the so-called cartels had then a national dimension, but along with the globalization, they now operate at a worldwide scale in this new dynamic of the world economy. And, the damages to the market, which was before limited to a single territory, now, reach dozens of jurisdictions. With that preamble into consideration, the goal of the present dissertation is offering the reader a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the Brazilian antitrust authorities on international cooperation in the fight of transnational cartels, both, in normative terms and in practice. That picture is especially important in light of the context of the recently enhanced Brazilian authorities instrumental competition in combating anti-competitive practices. Through a comparative assessment between the more sophisticated cooperation international agreements and the Brazilian cooperational instruments, the dissertation attempts to identify the essentials for the improvement of the Brazilian cooperative techniques in combating transnational cartels. That is, it brings elements to the reflection of the Brazilian cooperative mechanisms for a more effective combat of such damaging infringement to free competition. For the elaboration of said comparative assessment, the centennial USA antitrust law is the foreign law paradigm chosen, in particular because it combines the long legal experience in the matter and fairly innovative mechanisms in relation to the Brazilian legal system. The present work also deals with the most relevant themes that permeate the discussion of international cooperation among antitrust agencies, such as, the study of concepts of international legal cooperation; the public international law principles which govern the international jurisdiction of the States, including the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, relevant notions of competition law, international instruments and existing mechanisms for cooperation, best practices, among others. The unfolding of these relevant matters which are examined in the herewith reflection are expressed in legal problems of both general and specific orders. Generally, the work presents a summary and an analytical assessment of the legal nature of the cooperation agreements signed by Brazil, its characteristics, and its use. The work also aims at evaluating the regulatory treatment given to cartels and at addressing the question of the extraterritorial application of the Brazilian antitrust legislation and of comparative law, as well as at understanding the national case law (especially of CADE) on the main matters. With the specific objectives in mind, the present work deems necessary to respond to the following questions: How cooperation among the antitrust agencies can effectively enforce competition laws? What are the limits and obstacles of this cooperation? What types of cooperation are available and which ones make sense for Brazil in the prosecution of international cartels? How can Brazil enhance its legal and institutional model of cooperation?

L’industrie de l’aluminium a été durablement et profondément caractérisée par la constitution de cartels internationaux. Cette industrie a été gérée par cette forme d’organisation industrielle de manière quasi continuelle entre les années 1890, quand les premières entreprises se sont constituées, et 1945, quand la société holding qui gérait le dernier cartel a été placée sous liquidation. Durant cette période de presque soixante ans, les entreprises ont expérimenté une forme de collaboration internationale et de gestion coopérative qui n’a pratiquement pas d’égaux dans les autres industries : des formes de plus en plus élaborées de cartel ont été progressivement mises en place afin de garantir à cette industrie le développement et la stabilité en même temps. Cette recherche a pour but de reconstruire les causes et les effets de la cartellisation dans l’industrie de l’aluminium dans cette période, en analysant en même temps soit la forme que les cartels ont pris, soit les stratégies d’entreprise qui étaient liées à la formation et la consolidation de ces accords. De plus, cette recherche donne une analyse micro et macro-économique de l’industrie de l’aluminium et une image à la fois « interne » et « contextuelle » des cartels, en les analysant comme insérés dans un réseau complexe d’acteurs dont les entreprises privés, les États et les institutions internationales ont fait partie. De plus, cette thèse donne des idées sur les motifs et les dynamiques qui ont déterminé la décartellisation dans la période suivant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, en décrivant un chemin qui a conduit cette branche d’une anarchie initiale, à une auto réglementation privée, pour aboutir enfin à un contrôle institutionnel après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. / The institution of international cartels has deeply and intensively affected the global aluminium industryon the long run. This industry was managed with this form of industrial organisation almost with nointerruption from the 1890s, when the first movers in aluminium industry were formed, to 1945, whenthe holding company that controlled the last international cartel was liquidated. During this period ofalmost sixty years, firms have experimented an international form of cooperation and collaboration inthe management as no other industry has done: a more and more perfected and refined form of cartelswere elaborated with the aim of assuring to this industry both development and stability. This researchwants to describe causes and consequences of the international cartelisation on the aluminiumindustry, through the analysis of both the form taken by cartels and the firms strategies toward theformation and the consolidation of these agreements. Moreover, this research deals with both microand marco-economic analysis of the aluminium industry and provides a description of “internal” and“contextual” side of cartels, analysing them as placed in a complex relationships network in whichfirms, governments and international agencies were involved. Furthermore, this thesis provides someinsights about aims and dynamic that have pushed toward the decartelisation of the post World War IIeconomy. It is described a sort of path, not always coherent and linear, that drive aluminium industryfrom an initial situation of anarchy toward a first stage of self-regulation achieved by private cartels andthen toward an institutional control after the Second Word War, in a context of security strategy andeconomic development of the western world.

<p>According to the Leniency programme that was implemented in Sweden in 2002, a company participating in a cartel can escape administrative fines if it exposes the cartel to the Swedish Competition Authority and cooperates with the Authority during its investigation. Whether cartels should be criminalized, or not, has been debated in the Swedish Parliament in recent years. If cartels are turned into a felony, the leaders of the companies involved risk being held personally responsible.</p><p>This essay discusses how the incitements for unveiling cartels take form, drawing on game-theoretical models. The essay, in addition, analyses how the incitement-structure would change if cartels would become a felony, compared to the current legislation, in the form of the Leniency programme.</p><p>The conclusions that the author arrives at are that the incitements to expose cartels would increase if fines were to increase. The incitements would furthermore increase if the company feared that someone within the organization could expose the cartel to the Competition Authority. Turning cartels into a felony would on the contrary decrease the incitements for unveiling the cartel. The key task for the Competition Authority, as regards to cartels, should hence be to create uncertainty for firms participating in cartels and increase the security of employees if and when exposing their employer as a participant in a cartel.</p> / <p>År 2002 skrevs Leniencyprogrammen in i svensk konkurrenslagstiftning. Ett företag som ingår i ett kartellsamarbete kan i enlighet med programmen undslippa konkurrensskadeavgift ifall företaget avslöjar kartellen och samarbetar med konkurrensverket. Under senare år har en debatt kring huruvida karteller bör kriminaliseras eller inte förts i Riksdagen. En kriminalisering skulle innebära personligt straffansvar för bland annat företagsledare.</p><p>Uppsatsens syfte är att med spelteoretiska modeller och resonemang kartlägga och analysera hur incitamentsstrukturen för avslöjandet av karteller kan tänkas se ut. Vidare syftar uppsatsen till att föra en diskussion kring hur incitamentsstrukturen kan tänkas förändras om nuvarande lagstiftning ändras till att medföra en kriminalisering av karteller.</p><p>Slutsatser som kan dras av uppsatsens analys är att incitamenten för avslöjande med nuvarande lagstiftning skulle öka om konkurrensskadeavgifterna höjs. En kriminalisering skulle minska incitamenten för avslöjande, jämfört med nuvarande lagstiftning. Incitamenten för företagen att avslöja karteller ökar om företagen befarar att någon inom organisationen har för avsikt att avslöja kartellen till konkurrensverket. Konkurrensverkets viktigaste uppgift vad gäller kartellbekämpning torde därmed bli att skapa osäkerheter för företagen på flera områden för att öka misstron mellan aktörerna samt att arbeta för att öka anställdas incitament att avslöja sin arbetsgivares inblandning i kartellsamarbeten.</p>

According to the Leniency programme that was implemented in Sweden in 2002, a company participating in a cartel can escape administrative fines if it exposes the cartel to the Swedish Competition Authority and cooperates with the Authority during its investigation. Whether cartels should be criminalized, or not, has been debated in the Swedish Parliament in recent years. If cartels are turned into a felony, the leaders of the companies involved risk being held personally responsible. This essay discusses how the incitements for unveiling cartels take form, drawing on game-theoretical models. The essay, in addition, analyses how the incitement-structure would change if cartels would become a felony, compared to the current legislation, in the form of the Leniency programme. The conclusions that the author arrives at are that the incitements to expose cartels would increase if fines were to increase. The incitements would furthermore increase if the company feared that someone within the organization could expose the cartel to the Competition Authority. Turning cartels into a felony would on the contrary decrease the incitements for unveiling the cartel. The key task for the Competition Authority, as regards to cartels, should hence be to create uncertainty for firms participating in cartels and increase the security of employees if and when exposing their employer as a participant in a cartel. / År 2002 skrevs Leniencyprogrammen in i svensk konkurrenslagstiftning. Ett företag som ingår i ett kartellsamarbete kan i enlighet med programmen undslippa konkurrensskadeavgift ifall företaget avslöjar kartellen och samarbetar med konkurrensverket. Under senare år har en debatt kring huruvida karteller bör kriminaliseras eller inte förts i Riksdagen. En kriminalisering skulle innebära personligt straffansvar för bland annat företagsledare. Uppsatsens syfte är att med spelteoretiska modeller och resonemang kartlägga och analysera hur incitamentsstrukturen för avslöjandet av karteller kan tänkas se ut. Vidare syftar uppsatsen till att föra en diskussion kring hur incitamentsstrukturen kan tänkas förändras om nuvarande lagstiftning ändras till att medföra en kriminalisering av karteller. Slutsatser som kan dras av uppsatsens analys är att incitamenten för avslöjande med nuvarande lagstiftning skulle öka om konkurrensskadeavgifterna höjs. En kriminalisering skulle minska incitamenten för avslöjande, jämfört med nuvarande lagstiftning. Incitamenten för företagen att avslöja karteller ökar om företagen befarar att någon inom organisationen har för avsikt att avslöja kartellen till konkurrensverket. Konkurrensverkets viktigaste uppgift vad gäller kartellbekämpning torde därmed bli att skapa osäkerheter för företagen på flera områden för att öka misstron mellan aktörerna samt att arbeta för att öka anställdas incitament att avslöja sin arbetsgivares inblandning i kartellsamarbeten.

The study investigates the extent, development and nature of foreign direct investments in Sweden during the years 1895-1945. The work also has a qualitative aspect, which may be summarized as a question: Why do foreign companies undertake direct investments in Sweden? The basic premise has been that the companies' decisions are based on their own calculations regarding profit interests and structural conditions on the market, but these decisions are also influenced by various power relations. The aim is to discover partly the motives behind a company's readiness to enter the Swedish market, and partly the national and international power relations that furnished the institutional conditions favouring or hindering the making of direct investments in Sweden. The study shows that direct investments were much more extensive before 1945, above all before World War One, than has previously been assumed. Slightly more than half the direct investments were made by Denmark and Norway, and the greatest contribution from the major industrial nations was made by Germany. American direct investments increased in importance during the interwar years, and represented the greatest volume of activity in the foreign sector by the end of the 1930's. Manufacturing companies were the most important before World War One, as a result of direct investments in Swedish natural resources and the consumer goods industry. During the interwar years direct investments inclined more to forward linkage, and the majority were made in the chemical and engineering industries. Conditions in Sweden exerted most influence on direct investments before World War One - for example, Swedish tariff policy. Sweden's attempts to protect itself against the imperialism of the large industrial nations resulted moreover in 1916 in legislation which severely restricted the possibilities of making direct investments in the raw materials industry. After World War One, motives connected with specific countries and owneers were more important. At this time conflicts between American and European, primarily German, interests also entered the picture. One of the circumstances affecting direct investments was the increasing importance of the Scandinavian countries in the world market. This led to altered conditions between the Scandinavian countries, and partly to the realization by international business that Sweden must be seen as a market in its own right and not just as a sub-market in the Scandinavian region. / digitalisering@umu

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lehigh University, 2000. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-152).