This dissertation investigates how actors without the means of state power can affect the behavior of warring parties in order to end civil conflicts. Drawing on the intervention and mediation literature, I propose a theoretical framework that presents causal mechanisms for various forms of non-state conflict management to contribute to conflict resolution. The research distinguishes between direct mediation, capacity-building, and problem-solving approaches, and analyzes the approaches’ potential contributions to shorter wars and more sustainable peace. On the one hand, non-state actors can be substitutes for governmental or inter-governmental mediators. They derive legitimacy from long-standing relations with the conflict parties, and their claims to neutrality are more believable than those of powerful states with strong national interests. Further, a confidential and deliberate process can lead to more stable agreements. On the other hand, NGOs and others can prepare or enhance ongoing high-level negotiations by giving parties the tools they need to engage with each other constructively, and by improving attitudes and changing perceptions. The data collected for this dissertation allows me to test hypotheses for the sample of African internal conflicts (1990-2010) with econometric means. Results confirm that non-state conflict management is a significant precursor to high-level mediation. I find further that conflict dyads that experience non-state conflict management in one year are significantly more likely to end in the following year. Unofficial diplomacy is significantly related to lower conflict severity, as well as to a more stable post-conflict peace. The findings challenge the common assumption that governments are the only actors in international relations that matter. In fact, non-state actors make important contributions to conflict resolution, and conflict parties as well as governmental mediators should consider cooperating with them in their search for peace.

Previous research has not specified the circumstances under which foreign aid may increase the probability of armed conflict. The purpose of this dissertation is to address this gap by employing a theoretical framework in which foreign aid produces incentives for a rent-seeking scramble among elites. A set of conditions affecting the likelihood of armed conflict are identified and tested on global data in a series of statistical analyses. Paper I argues and finds that foreign aid increases the probability of armed conflict in states where there are few constraints on executive power, allowing for a scramble for rents. Paper II proposes and finds a threshold effect of aid, such that the likelihood of armed conflict increases only when aid has reached a certain level. Paper III suggests and demonstrates that sudden negative changes in aid flows enhance the risk of armed conflict as well as coup attempts, as aid shortfalls accelerate distributional conflict over aid rents. Paper IV claims and shows that civil wars are less likely to be terminated by settlement in the form of elections when conflict parties are dependent on rents. In sum, this dissertation contributes by theoretically specifying and empirically identifying conditions under which foreign aid increases the probability of armed conflict.

Catastrophes such as floods, droughts and earthquakes have caused significant human and infrastructural losses throughout history. Nevertheless, researchers struggle to quantify macroeconomic impacts, and the existing literature is ambiguous in its findings. In this study I use econometric methods on panel data from Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), and find that hydrometeorological, climatological and geophysical events all affect economic growth negatively in the short run. Second, while events typically linked to climate change tend to cause negative growth shocks the same year they occur, geophysical disasters do not alter overall economic performance before the next year. With respect to future global warming, these dynamic differences give important insights for the understanding of how economies might be affected by climate change. However, by means of two stage least square methods, I do not find that negative economic shocks caused by weather related disasters increase the likelihood of armed civil conflicts. This latter result is in contrast to conclusions in much of the seminal conflict literature, but similar to findings in other recent cross-country studies that use the instrument variable approach.

This study explores the power of ethnonationalist conflict-generated diasporas (CGD) as external actors in homeland conflict by exploring the nature of their political engagement on a transnational level using Internet Communication technologies (ICTs), with Rwanda as a case study. Virtual ethnography was chosen as the research methodology to explore the online activities of Rwandan CGD using social media (social networking sites) to form virtual transnational networks for political purposes. Diasporic online formations and activities were mapped in order to gain increased insights into ways that CGD use social media to engage in homeland conflict, and the effect their engagement has on the conflict cycle in the home country. Results of the study revealed that Rwandan CGDs demonstrate attitudes and motivations to act in ways that are consistent with other case studies of CGD, including exhibiting an enduring commitment and loyalty to co-ethnics, a romanticized conceptualization of homeland and a myth of return home. The results also revealed Rwandan CGDs' strong propensity to use social media to engage in homeland conflict on a political level through the development of a large and dense transnational network used for a range of political purposes, including the dissemination of genocide denial and propaganda consistent with the pre-genocide propaganda campaign. Implications for peace-building and conflict analysis are discussed.

The dissertation research answers the question of what explains the variation across countries where the IMF SAP implementation is associated with the onset of armed civil conflict in some countries but not in others. Do SAPs increase the likelihood of the outbreak of armed civil conflict in recipient countries? By what causal mechanism could SAPs increase the probability of the onset of armed civil conflict? This study contributes to extant literature by taking actors’ preferences and ethnicity in recipient countries into account. I argue that the effect of SAP implementation on armed civil conflict is conditional on the ethnic characteristics of recipient countries. From a two-level game perspective, highly ethnic-fractionalized countries have a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the IMF at the international level due to their domestic weakness. Hence such governments will receive relatively moderate conditionality from the IMF because the Fund will adopt its second-order preference of containing the contagious effect of debt crisis and ensure the loan repayment. The ethnically fractionalized countries will also implement the austerity measures across different ethnic communities. The result is reducing probability of the onset of armed civil conflict when ethnic fractionalization increases. But in ethnically-dominant countries, the governments’ bargaining position at the international level is relatively weak due to their domestic strength. Therefore the governments are more likely to get stringent conditionality from the IMF because the Fund will adopt its first-order preference of satisfying its constituents by imposing stringent conditionality. The result is to increase the likelihood of the onset of armed civil conflict when ethnic dominance increases. By analyzing cross-national data for 162 countries from 1992 to 2009 based on improved measurement of IMF conditionality, the empirical results confirm the theoretical hypotheses. The statistical results also reveal that SAP impact on the outbreak of armed civil conflict varies with conditionality. Historical analyses of Ghana and Rwanda provide further understanding of the theoretical mechanisms.

Recent conflict research has relied on proxy variables of horizontal inequality to make causal assumptions, but these do not reveal the root of deprivation in aggrieved populations. However, it is important to continue to explore the greed-grievance dichotomy to explain the persistence of violent civil conflict. The purpose of this quantitative study was to expand this line of inquiry by investigating the relationship between indicators of vertical deprivation and reported civil conflict incidents to determine whether a significant correlation exists. Relative deprivation theory provided the framework for this study, which consisted of 10,779 survey responses regarding lived experience across 7 countries experiencing a total of 890 civil conflict incidents in 2016. Although tests of multiple linear regression indicated statistically significant relationships (p < .001) between two of the predictor variables and reported civil conflict incidents, the availability of electricity when connected to the main made the most substantial contribution to the model in both predictability and correlation. Therefore, the findings provide insight into the type and nature of deprivations, such as those associated with access to and availability of electricity, that have the greatest potential of becoming grievances susceptible to exploitation by conflict entrepreneurs. Implications for positive social change include using this analysis to promote increased conflict inquiry among public administration scholars and to inform a more substantive role of local government managers in identifying and remediating vertical grievances, thereby mitigating civil conflict.

Why does civil conflict spread from country to country? Existing research relies primarily on explanations of rebel mobilization tied to geographic proximity to explain this phenomenon. However, this approach is unable to explain why civil conflict appears to spread across great geographic distances, and also neglects the government’s role in conflict. To explain this phenomenon, this dissertation formulates an informational theory in which individuals contemplating rebellion against their government, or “proto-rebels,” observe the success and failure of rebels throughout the international system. In doing so, proto-rebels and governments learn whether rebellion will be fruitful, which is then manifested in the timing of rebellion and repression. The core of the dissertation is composed of three essays. The first exhorts scholars of the international spread of civil violence to directly measure proto-rebel mobilization. I show that such mobilization is associated with conflicts across the entire international system, while the escalation to actual armed conflict is associated with regional conflicts. The second chapter theorizes that proto-rebels learn from successful rebellions across the international system. This relationship applies globally, although it is attenuated by cultural and regime-type similarity. Finally, the third chapter theorizes that governments are aware of this process and engage in repression in order to thwart it. I further argue that this repression is, in part, a function of the threat posed by those regimes founded by rebels.

This dissertation addresses the puzzle of whether rebel group origins have an effect on rebel wartime behavior and the broader dynamics of civil conflict. Using a quantitative approach over three empirical chapters I study the relationship between rebel origins and conflict onset, duration and intensity, and wartime group capacity. Two qualitative cases examine the relationship between rebel origins, wartime group capacity, and adaptation during war, further unpacking the theoretical mechanisms linking group origins and conflict dynamics. I posit that rebel groups emerge from pre-existing organizations and networks that vary along military and civilian dimensions and condition the development of military and mobilization capacity of their successor insurgent groups. Groups with more developed militarization and mobilization mechanisms prior to conflict are likely to enter into civil conflict earlier in their existence and fight in longer and bloodier conflicts. I also find a strong relationship between origins characteristics and the development of military and civilian wartime capacity. Origins exert a strong legacy effect on the type and strength of intra-war capability, indicating that significant rebel adaptation is difficult.

How do riots affect civil conflict? The effects of riots on escalation and civil conflict have largely been overlooked in the peace and conflict literature. I argue that this omission is of particular significance because riots could act as a potent escalatory proxy for a government authority and legitimacy crisis, a robustly supported cause of escalation and civil conflict. Drawing on civil conflict theories concerning motivation, feasibility, and contentious politics, the hypothesis as riots increase, the intensity of state-based organized violence increases was developed. To test this hypothesis, a zero-inflated negative binomial regression analysis was conducted on 14728 country-month observations from African countries between 1997 and 2020, using riot events and state-based organized violence fatality data and theoretically and empirically motivated controls. Notwithstanding certain research design limitations, the regression analysis and the complementary tests and investigation strategies yielded findings that support the hypothesis and the supposition that riots tend to affect civil conflict by increasing the intensity of state-based organized violence. The novelty of the findings opens up avenues for future research and sheds light on the value of studying lower-level societal violence and minor-scale escalatory dynamics to enhance our collective understanding of civil conflicts.

Do institutional constraints on a regime's executive decrease the likelihood of civil conflict onset? An unconstrained executive is free to loot state resources undermining the state's capacity to effectively deal with nascent rebellions, and may be more likely to engage in violent repression, especially in the form of indiscriminate violence. This can encourage political grievances, lead to a loss of legitimacy for the regime, and provide the opportunity for would be rebel groups to attract new members by offering protection against government violence. Furthermore, the lack of guaranteed checks to executive power may incentivise actors to avoid bargained solutions if they fear future extralegal retributions. Taken together, where there is a lack of effective constraints against the executive there may be an increased risk for the onset of civil conflict. To test this proposition I employ a bayesian latent variable model which estimates executive constraint as a latent factor derived from several manifest variables and relate it to a binary measure of civil conflict onset through a logistic regression. The primary finding is that there is a negative relationship such that the predicted probability for civil conflict is lower where there exists higher levels of executive constraints. However, this is conditional on the level of GDP per capita; for low-income country-years the relationship between executive constraints and civil conflict onset is indeterminate possibly because it is easier to recruit and mobilize fighters in such settings regardless of the overall level of executive constraints. The model, however, is a poor fit to the data meaning that the presented results should be considered tentative at best. Nonetheless, this study helps to further the work on examining specific political institutions as potential risk factors for the onset of civil conflict.