Post-civil conflict nations have a strong incentive to attract foreign capital because it is vital for redevelopment and economic growth which in turn reduce the likelihood of conflict resumption. Although foreign investors tend to be risk averse and view states that have recently experienced conflict to be high risk environments, this paper argues that power-sharing mechanisms address the roots of civil dissent and therefore provide a positive signal to potential investors. By focusing on a particular peacebuilding mechanism this work is able to single out the impact of one strategy, namely power-sharing, and assess its effectiveness in attracting foreign direct investment.

In the last three decades, civil conflicts have become more complex and intractable than in the past. One reason for this development is the proliferation of rebel groups within the armed oppositions involved in these conflicts. Today, armed oppositions are more likely to be movements composed of loosely connected or competing rebel groups rather than unitary blocs. Yet, despite their centrality to the dynamics of conflict, different structural characteristics of and competitive and power relations within armed oppositions have not been taken in adequate account as possible predictors of civil conflict outcomes. To further our knowledge and cover this gap in the scholarship, the dissertation investigates how and to what extent the fragmentation, internal competition, and internal power distribution of armed oppositions affect civil conflict termination. The dissertation develops a theory that sees the fragmentation of, a moderate and severe competition, and a dispersed distribution of power within armed oppositions as having an impact on the fighting effectiveness of the rebels, the countereffort of the government, bargaining problems, and the intensity of the conflict. This impact shapes, in turn, how civil conflicts end. This theory is tested with a nested analysis consisting of a large-N and a small-N analysis. Through the large-N analysis, the dissertation demonstrates that, at a general level, these characteristics of armed oppositions indeed affect how civil conflicts end. Through the small-N analysis, the dissertation further illustrates the causal mechanisms linking these characteristics to specific civil conflict outcomes. With these findings, the dissertation makes two important contributions. First, it provides generalisable conclusions that remedy the limited generalisability of the scholarship on the phenomena under study. Second, it provides indications on how to resolve conflicts in which the involved oppositions are fragmented and bedevilled by internal competition, thus helping disentangle the proverbial complexity of multi-party civil conflicts.

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This dissertation addresses the puzzle of whether rebel group origins have an effect on rebel wartime behavior and the broader dynamics of civil conflict. Using a quantitative approach over three empirical chapters I study the relationship between rebel origins and conflict onset, duration and intensity, and wartime group capacity. Two qualitative cases examine the relationship between rebel origins, wartime group capacity, and adaptation during war, further unpacking the theoretical mechanisms linking group origins and conflict dynamics. I posit that rebel groups emerge from pre-existing organizations and networks that vary along military and civilian dimensions and condition the development of military and mobilization capacity of their successor insurgent groups. Groups with more developed militarization and mobilization mechanisms prior to conflict are likely to enter into civil conflict earlier in their existence and fight in longer and bloodier conflicts. I also find a strong relationship between origins characteristics and the development of military and civilian wartime capacity. Origins exert a strong legacy effect on the type and strength of intra-war capability, indicating that significant rebel adaptation is difficult.

Why does civil conflict spread from country to country? Existing research relies primarily on explanations of rebel mobilization tied to geographic proximity to explain this phenomenon. However, this approach is unable to explain why civil conflict appears to spread across great geographic distances, and also neglects the government’s role in conflict. To explain this phenomenon, this dissertation formulates an informational theory in which individuals contemplating rebellion against their government, or “proto-rebels,” observe the success and failure of rebels throughout the international system. In doing so, proto-rebels and governments learn whether rebellion will be fruitful, which is then manifested in the timing of rebellion and repression. The core of the dissertation is composed of three essays. The first exhorts scholars of the international spread of civil violence to directly measure proto-rebel mobilization. I show that such mobilization is associated with conflicts across the entire international system, while the escalation to actual armed conflict is associated with regional conflicts. The second chapter theorizes that proto-rebels learn from successful rebellions across the international system. This relationship applies globally, although it is attenuated by cultural and regime-type similarity. Finally, the third chapter theorizes that governments are aware of this process and engage in repression in order to thwart it. I further argue that this repression is, in part, a function of the threat posed by those regimes founded by rebels.

Understanding the conflict potential of climate variability is critical for assessing and dealing with the societal implications of climate change. Yet, it remains poorly understood under what circumstances – and how – extreme weather events and variation in precipitation patterns affect organized violence. This dissertation suggests that the impacts of climate variability on organized violence are conditional on specific climate patterns, the sensitivity of livelihoods, and state governance. These theoretical conjectures are subjected to novel empirical tests in four individual essays. Three essays investigate the relationship between climate variability and communal and civil conflict through sub-national quantitative analysis focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa. The fourth essay sheds light on causal mechanisms leading to participation in land-related conflict based on interview material on 75 ex-participants in violence from Mt. Elgon, Kenya. Essay I suggests that the exposure of vulnerable agricultural livelihoods to sustained drought increases the risk of civil conflict violence. Essay II indicates that rainfall anomalies increase the risk of communal violence, an effect which is amplified by political marginalization. Essay III finds support for the proposition that volatility in resource supply increases the risk of communal conflict over land and water in remote regions, which tend to have limited state presence. Essay IV proposes that individuals depending on agriculture are prone to participate in land-related conflict as they face impediments to leaving a conflict zone, and additionally have high incentives to partake in fighting for land. Taken together, the dissertation furthers our understanding of the specific economic and political context under which climate variability impacts armed conflict. This knowledge is important for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change and conflict prevention efforts.

Is the risk of civil conflict related to the quality of government? This dissertation contributes to the quantitative research on this topic. First, it provides a more nuanced account of the role of the government in influencing the risk of civil conflict. In doing so, the dissertation bridges a gap between the quantitative literature, which primarily focuses on types of regimes, and the qualitative literature, which emphasizes variations in how political authority is exercised within these institutions. Second, the dissertation introduces novel measures of the quality of government, and tests their association with civil peace across countries, over time. The dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and four separate essays. Essay I examines the risk of conflict across different types of authoritarian regimes. The statistical results suggest that single-party regimes have a lower risk of civil conflict than military and multi-party authoritarian regimes. The finding is attributed to the high capacity for coercion and co-optation within single-party institutions. Essay II studies whether cross-national variations in the occurrence of civil conflict are due to differences in the quality of government. The essay finds that governments that are not able to carry through such basic governing tasks as protecting property rights and providing public goods, render themselves vulnerable to civil conflict. The focus of Essay III is on patronage politics, meaning that rulers rely on the distribution of private goods to retain the support necessary to stay in power. The statistical results suggest that patronage politics per se increase the risk of conflict. The conflict-inducing effect is mediated by large oil-wealth, however, because the government can use the wealth strategically to buy off opposition. Essay IV argues that patronage politics can also lead to violent conflict between groups. The results from a statistical analysis, based on unique sub-national data on inter-group conflict in Nigeria, are consistent with this argument. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation suggest that both the form and degree of government have a significant influence on the risk of civil conflict.

Utilizzando un modello ZTNB, questa analisi verifica empiricamente come la presenza di oro, pietre preziose, droghe e idrocarburi possa interagire con l'intensità di un conflitto civile. Si propone un'analisi disaggregata a livello spaziale che permette di esplorare la presenza di tali risorse naturali all'interno delle zone coinvolte da conflitti. I dati sui depositi di oro sono stati estratti da un dataset originale che codifica la presenza globale della risorsa attraverso coordinate geografiche. I risultati ottenuti suggeriscono che le produzioni di oro, pietre preziose e idrocarburi tendono ad aumentare la durata del conflitto così come la sua intensità, mentre la coltivazione di droghe riduce il numero totale di morti. I risultati sono considerevolmente distorti quando la presenza di risorse naturali è codificata a livello paese e non più a livello delle aree di conflitto, a conferma della validità dell'approccio disaggregato applicato. Il risultato generale è che la collocazione e la tipologia delle risorse sono elementi fondamentali per definire l'impatto sull'intensità dei conflitti, poiché l'essere depredabili ed effettivamente accessibili può determinare in quale misura i ricavi delle stesse risorse possano essere deviati a sostegno dei costi militari o a fini privati. Infine, questa analisi conferma che la disponibilità di risorse naturali influenza l'intensità di un conflitto civile modificando gli incentivi dei combattenti, e che le tipologie di risorse e la loro posizione geografica sono elementi critici nel determinare la violenza dei conflitti. / By using a ZTNB model, this analysis empirically tests whether the presence of gold, gemstones, drugs and hydrocarbons interact with civil conflict intensity. I propose a spatially disaggregated analysis which allows to explore the presence of such natural resources within the zones involved by conflicts. Data on gold deposits are extracted from an original dataset which codes the global presence of gold resource through geographic coordinates. The results obtained suggest that gold, gemstones and hydrocarbons productions tend to increase conflict duration as well as its intensity, whereas drug cultivation reduces the number of total conflict deaths. Conversely, the outcomes are seriously affected when I shift natural resources variables from conflict level data to country level data, confirming the validity of the spatially disaggregated approach applied. The general finding is that the location and type of resources are crucial to define their impact on conflict intensity, since their lootability and accessibility can largely determine to what extent natural resource revenues can be diverted and misused during wartime. Above all, this analysis confirms that the availability of natural resources affects civil conflict intensity by altering fighters incentives, and that resources types and geographical location matter in determining conflict violence.

Why do some individuals choose to participate in rebellion, and what recruitment tactics can rebel groups use to affect this decision? These questions are central to the study of civil war because rebel groups must raise troops in order to challenge the government and to survive as an organization. Indeed, much of the civil war literature builds on participation as a key causal mechanism, yet it is rarely specified in theoretical or empirical models. The dissertation attempts to open this black box by tackling three sets of gaps in the existing literature; these relate to the assumptions made in most studies, the theoretical bases for understanding participation and recruitment, and the record of empirical testing. Essay I examines whether a particular type of recruitment practice, ethnic mobilization, is associated with higher levels of violence. The results show that when rebel groups mobilize along ethnic lines, there is a higher risk for intensified violence. Essay II employs new data on rebel troop size to study what factors affect participation in rebellion. The findings indicate that concerns over personal security rather than economic and social incentives best explain participation. Essay III addresses coerced recruitment, positing that conflict dynamics affect whether rebel groups shift from voluntary to coerced recruitment. Using micro-level data on the conflict in Nepal, the results show that the more losses rebels suffer on the battlefield, the greater the number of individuals they subsequently abduct. Finally, the Nepal case study presented in Essay IV suggests that indoctrination as a recruitment strategy was more important to rebel leaders than other facets of the insurgency. Taken together, this dissertation indicates that there is analytical leverage to be had by examining not only the individual’s decision to participate, but also the rebel group’s recruitment strategy, and that these rebel strategies are flexible and contingent on conflict dynamics.

The current study targeted the current issue of the Yemeni crisis and activity of the Houthi movement from the point of its internal and external causes. The activity of the extremist groups on the territory of Yemen creates significant national security risks for most of countries of the Arabian Peninsula. In these conditions, it was important to analyze the problem in detail to comprehend and envision future possible resolutions. To analyze the issue under discussion, the paper utilized the conflict and proxy war theories in the international relations (IR) sphere.  In addition, qualitative data was collected and transformed into quantitative materials using quantitative content and discourse analysis methods. The critical analysis of the selected theories led to the recognition of the key theoretical concepts applicable for the study of the Yemeni case. The methodology was applied to review the official speeches of the national leaders of the following countries and organizations: the UAE, the United States, and Hezbollah. Based on the study findings, the paper determined interests of each potential side and proposed a potential strategy to effectively minimize the security risks caused by the movement.