Despite the low success rate indicated by scholarly assessments, economic sanctions remain a commonly used foreign policy tool. Why do policymakers often turn to economic sanctions with great hope and enterprise in spite of their unimpressive success record? What determines a sanction outcome? Does the internal political dynamic of target matter in this case? How does it relate to different regime type? Hence this thesis examines the conditional relationship between the presence of domestic political opposition in the target state and sanction success conditional on the regime type by using data covering 763 US-imposed sanctions from 1945 to 2006. The findings suggest authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable to sanctions than their democratic counterparts in the presence of internal dissent groups in most cases. General Strikes are the best strategy to aid sanctions and coerce policy changes in authoritarian regimes. The presence of Guerrilla Warfare has the greatest substantive and statistical impact on sanction success. Consistent and organized internal dissent groups pose treats to the authority by weakening domestic stability or partnering with sender countries to push for policy changes.

<p>The ability to raise revenue is one of the most fundamental requirements for state- hood. Without revenues, states are unable to perform even the most basic tasks. In this dissertation I aim to answer the question: When do authoritarian elites in- vest in fiscal capacity? First, I develop a theoretical argument using computational modeling techniques. I contend that inequality increases the costs associated with higher fiscal capacity due to a possible regime change in the future. On the other hand, elite demand for government spending can raise the incentives for autocrats to increase the tax capacity of the state. Complimentarity between elite-owned capital and government investment can lead to a demand for higher taxation. Based on their personal utility associated with government spending, elites weigh the current benefit of higher tax capacity with possible future costs.</p><p>I then test the overarching theoretical argument across two different datasets. First, I empirically investigate the question on a sample of over 90 authoritarian regimes from 1980 to 2006. Estimating a number of different models and including a variety of controls, I find that inequality has a strong negative long term effect on fiscal capacity. On the other hand, more industrial countries have higher levels of capacity. In the second empirical chapter, I investigate the theoretical argument on newly collected data on tax revenue and administrative spending in local Prussian counties in the 19th century. Again, I find that local inequality has strong negative effects, while more industrial areas are associated with higher levels of fiscal capacity.</p> / Dissertation

This dissertation investigates the effect of state capacity on the probability for democratic transition and the survival of democracies. I seek to answer these quesitons through the use of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. In my statistical models, I make use of Cox Proportional Hazard Models. These are supplemented by two case studies involving South Korea and the Philippines. My expectation, which is supported by the results presented in this study, is that higher levels of state capacity will make authoritarian regimes more stable and thus make democratic transitions less likely, but if democratic transitions take place, higher levels of state capacity will make new democratic regimes more likely to survive.

The transfer of power to African leaders, at the end of the colonial era gave birth to authoritarian regimes. African Nationalist leaders liberated the continent from the chains of colonialism and bound it in the stone walls of authoritarianism and dictatorship. This is because Africa inherited institutions that were meant to be oppressive of the colonised peoples. These institutions had no room for political pluralism, public participation, free speech, a free press, and free movement among other fundamental rights and freedoms that allow for democratic governance to flourish. Without undergoing major transformations, African governments remained a product of their colonial heritage naturally becoming totalitarian, oppressive and undemocratic. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2010. / A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Dr. Girmachew Aneme of the Faculty of Law, University of Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia. 2010. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Esta tese refere-se à problemática das transições políticas de regimes militares para democracias articulada com a cultura política. Busca-se, com isso, verificar nos contextos de Brasil e Argentina, as diferenças nas percepções dos cidadãos em termos de confiança nos militares, avaliação da situação dos seus governos, interesse por política, preferência pelo regime democrático, satisfação com a democracia, opinião sobre o voto e capital social, plasmado pela confiança interpessoal e institucional. Estas diferenças poderiam ser provenientes de dois o poder de mobilização que os indivíduos possuem em relação a um grupo. É um eguido individualmente porgentina o processo foi mais abrupto, com um fracasso mais evidente dos militares, que saíram de cena completamente derrotados (O’DONNELL e SCHMITTER, 1988). Busca-se examinar, assim, se uma transição gradual e negociada, como a brasileira, gera vínculos e predisposições mais fracos dos cidadãos em relação à democracia, ou seja, uma menor qualidade democrática de um ponto de vista maximalista (DIAMOND e MORLINO, 2004), além de menores índices de capital social, em contraponto com o caso argentino, em que o apelo democrático tenderia a ser maior pelo fato de a ditadura ter saído de cena com uma imagem mais clara de fracasso político. Para verificar tais impactos na prática, serão utilizados dados do Latinobarómetro de 1995, 2000, 2005 e 2010- eventualmente complementados por dados do World Values Survey de 1990- analisando as diferenças em termos de cultura política e capital social nos dois países, levando em consideração a diferença entre os seus legados. / This thesis refers to the matter of political transition of military regimes to democracy combined with political culture. Thus it aims to verify, both in Brazil and in Argentina, the differences in perception of citizens in terms of trust in militaries, evaluation of their governments' situation, interest in politics, preference for democratic regime, satisfaction with democracy, opinion about vote and social capital, represented by interpersonal and institutional trust. These differences could be derived form two distinct models of transition: while in Brazil the transition happened in a slow, gradual and negotiated way, in Argentina the process was more abrupt, presenting a more evident failure of militaries, who left the scene completely defeated (O'DONNELL and SCHIMITTER, 1988). Therefore, the thesis aims to examinate if a negotiated and gradual transition, like the Brazilian, generates weaker ties and predispositions of citizens in relation to democracy, which means a lower democratic quality from a maximalist point of view (DIAMOND and MORLINO, 2004), in addition to lower levels of social capital, in contrast to the Argentinean case, in which the democratic appeal would tend to be enhanced due to the fact that the dictatorship ended with a clearer image of failure. In order to verify these impacts in practice, data from Latinobarómetro for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 will be used- complemented by data from the World Values Survey for 1990 when necessary- analyzing the differences in terms of political culture and social capital in the two countries, taking into account the differences between their legacies.

abstract: This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Political Science 2019

<p>This thesis is an investigation into the causes behind the emergence, maintenance and defeat of dominant authoritarian party regimes (DPARs). The emergence of these regimes during certain critical junctures in a country's history is attributed to the ability of charismatic leaders to co-opt political elites using electoral instruments and incentives under the banner of a single party. The presence of institutional mechanisms that can smooth the leadership transition process, provide rewards for elites to remain in the dominant party and increase the costs of elite defections are important explanatory factors in DPAR maintenance. DPARs also employ different strategies to co-opt and divide the opposition in order to reassert their political dominance. Intra regime splits are a necessary but not sufficient condition to weaken a DPAR. Institutional reform which further weakens a DPAR and increases the probability of future elite splits is introduced when the opposition can play a veto card. The mutually reinforcing effects of elite splits and institutional reform explain the downfall of DPARs in Mexico, Taiwan, Senegal and Paraguay. The DPAR in Malaysia is at a critical juncture whereby an opposition veto which can possibly lead to institutional reform currently hangs in balance.</p> / Dissertation

This paper analyzes the effect of political and economic factors on the risk of regime change in countries between 1975 and 2010, using survival analysis with time-dependent covariates. The findings show that negative economic growth increases the risk of regime change in the following year, and that a higher level of GDP per Capita, as well as international trade, has an inhibiting effect on the risk of regime change in democracies. The results also show that countries with young regimes are more likely to experience a regime change, and that countries with a long tradition of democratic governance suffer virtually no risk of experiencing a regime failure. These findings lend heavy support to the democratic consolidation theory, while giving mixed support to other theories of economic and political causes of regime change. The more generalized approach to regime change used in this paper provides a stepping stone for opening up a greater understanding of the mechanisms which cause regime change in all types of governments, and regardless of the direction of the change in relation to democracy.

Esta tese refere-se à problemática das transições políticas de regimes militares para democracias articulada com a cultura política. Busca-se, com isso, verificar nos contextos de Brasil e Argentina, as diferenças nas percepções dos cidadãos em termos de confiança nos militares, avaliação da situação dos seus governos, interesse por política, preferência pelo regime democrático, satisfação com a democracia, opinião sobre o voto e capital social, plasmado pela confiança interpessoal e institucional. Estas diferenças poderiam ser provenientes de dois o poder de mobilização que os indivíduos possuem em relação a um grupo. É um eguido individualmente porgentina o processo foi mais abrupto, com um fracasso mais evidente dos militares, que saíram de cena completamente derrotados (O’DONNELL e SCHMITTER, 1988). Busca-se examinar, assim, se uma transição gradual e negociada, como a brasileira, gera vínculos e predisposições mais fracos dos cidadãos em relação à democracia, ou seja, uma menor qualidade democrática de um ponto de vista maximalista (DIAMOND e MORLINO, 2004), além de menores índices de capital social, em contraponto com o caso argentino, em que o apelo democrático tenderia a ser maior pelo fato de a ditadura ter saído de cena com uma imagem mais clara de fracasso político. Para verificar tais impactos na prática, serão utilizados dados do Latinobarómetro de 1995, 2000, 2005 e 2010- eventualmente complementados por dados do World Values Survey de 1990- analisando as diferenças em termos de cultura política e capital social nos dois países, levando em consideração a diferença entre os seus legados. / This thesis refers to the matter of political transition of military regimes to democracy combined with political culture. Thus it aims to verify, both in Brazil and in Argentina, the differences in perception of citizens in terms of trust in militaries, evaluation of their governments' situation, interest in politics, preference for democratic regime, satisfaction with democracy, opinion about vote and social capital, represented by interpersonal and institutional trust. These differences could be derived form two distinct models of transition: while in Brazil the transition happened in a slow, gradual and negotiated way, in Argentina the process was more abrupt, presenting a more evident failure of militaries, who left the scene completely defeated (O'DONNELL and SCHIMITTER, 1988). Therefore, the thesis aims to examinate if a negotiated and gradual transition, like the Brazilian, generates weaker ties and predispositions of citizens in relation to democracy, which means a lower democratic quality from a maximalist point of view (DIAMOND and MORLINO, 2004), in addition to lower levels of social capital, in contrast to the Argentinean case, in which the democratic appeal would tend to be enhanced due to the fact that the dictatorship ended with a clearer image of failure. In order to verify these impacts in practice, data from Latinobarómetro for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 will be used- complemented by data from the World Values Survey for 1990 when necessary- analyzing the differences in terms of political culture and social capital in the two countries, taking into account the differences between their legacies.

Esta tese refere-se à problemática das transições políticas de regimes militares para democracias articulada com a cultura política. Busca-se, com isso, verificar nos contextos de Brasil e Argentina, as diferenças nas percepções dos cidadãos em termos de confiança nos militares, avaliação da situação dos seus governos, interesse por política, preferência pelo regime democrático, satisfação com a democracia, opinião sobre o voto e capital social, plasmado pela confiança interpessoal e institucional. Estas diferenças poderiam ser provenientes de dois o poder de mobilização que os indivíduos possuem em relação a um grupo. É um eguido individualmente porgentina o processo foi mais abrupto, com um fracasso mais evidente dos militares, que saíram de cena completamente derrotados (O’DONNELL e SCHMITTER, 1988). Busca-se examinar, assim, se uma transição gradual e negociada, como a brasileira, gera vínculos e predisposições mais fracos dos cidadãos em relação à democracia, ou seja, uma menor qualidade democrática de um ponto de vista maximalista (DIAMOND e MORLINO, 2004), além de menores índices de capital social, em contraponto com o caso argentino, em que o apelo democrático tenderia a ser maior pelo fato de a ditadura ter saído de cena com uma imagem mais clara de fracasso político. Para verificar tais impactos na prática, serão utilizados dados do Latinobarómetro de 1995, 2000, 2005 e 2010- eventualmente complementados por dados do World Values Survey de 1990- analisando as diferenças em termos de cultura política e capital social nos dois países, levando em consideração a diferença entre os seus legados. / This thesis refers to the matter of political transition of military regimes to democracy combined with political culture. Thus it aims to verify, both in Brazil and in Argentina, the differences in perception of citizens in terms of trust in militaries, evaluation of their governments' situation, interest in politics, preference for democratic regime, satisfaction with democracy, opinion about vote and social capital, represented by interpersonal and institutional trust. These differences could be derived form two distinct models of transition: while in Brazil the transition happened in a slow, gradual and negotiated way, in Argentina the process was more abrupt, presenting a more evident failure of militaries, who left the scene completely defeated (O'DONNELL and SCHIMITTER, 1988). Therefore, the thesis aims to examinate if a negotiated and gradual transition, like the Brazilian, generates weaker ties and predispositions of citizens in relation to democracy, which means a lower democratic quality from a maximalist point of view (DIAMOND and MORLINO, 2004), in addition to lower levels of social capital, in contrast to the Argentinean case, in which the democratic appeal would tend to be enhanced due to the fact that the dictatorship ended with a clearer image of failure. In order to verify these impacts in practice, data from Latinobarómetro for 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 will be used- complemented by data from the World Values Survey for 1990 when necessary- analyzing the differences in terms of political culture and social capital in the two countries, taking into account the differences between their legacies.