Over the past two decades governments worldwide have begun to take action to correct gender disparity in representative bodies, resulting in drastic increases in women’s numeric representation. It is unclear, however, how these increases influence legislative behavior. This research contributes to our understanding of how increases in women’s numeric representation influences substantive representation of women. I collected an original dataset to examine this relationship across twenty-three subnational Argentine legislatures over eighteen years. This project represents one of the first empirical efforts to examine women’s substantive representation over a large number of legislatures over a long duration of time. A key piece of the puzzle is to understand if female exhibit distinct preferences from their male colleagues. The second chapter of the dissertation uses a new data set of ideal point estimates recovered from cosponsorship data to examine gender differences in legislative preferences. I find strong evidence to suggest women display different legislative preferences than their male colleagues. Chapter three investigates how increases in women’s numeric representation influence women’s legislative behavior. Previous research suggests that increasing women’s numeric representation should enhance the probability that women work together to pursue common legislative agendas. Yet, I demonstrate that as the percentage of women in the chamber increases, women are increasingly less likely to work together. I argue that this unexpected finding can be explained by considering how institutions shape women’s legislative incentives. In chapter four, I develop theoretical expectations about the conditions under which increases in the proportion of female legislators, in combination with institutional arrangements, will foster or stifle women’s opportunities and incentives to represent women’s interests. The chapter provides strong empirical support for the hypothesis that women behave differently conditional on institutional incentives. These findings imply that understanding institutions is key to understanding how and when female representatives will stand for women. Taken together, this dissertation makes an important contribution to our understanding of how changes in the proportion of female legislators and differences in institutional contexts shape women’s legislative behavior.

<p>This thesis is an investigation into the causes behind the emergence, maintenance and defeat of dominant authoritarian party regimes (DPARs). The emergence of these regimes during certain critical junctures in a country's history is attributed to the ability of charismatic leaders to co-opt political elites using electoral instruments and incentives under the banner of a single party. The presence of institutional mechanisms that can smooth the leadership transition process, provide rewards for elites to remain in the dominant party and increase the costs of elite defections are important explanatory factors in DPAR maintenance. DPARs also employ different strategies to co-opt and divide the opposition in order to reassert their political dominance. Intra regime splits are a necessary but not sufficient condition to weaken a DPAR. Institutional reform which further weakens a DPAR and increases the probability of future elite splits is introduced when the opposition can play a veto card. The mutually reinforcing effects of elite splits and institutional reform explain the downfall of DPARs in Mexico, Taiwan, Senegal and Paraguay. The DPAR in Malaysia is at a critical juncture whereby an opposition veto which can possibly lead to institutional reform currently hangs in balance.</p> / Dissertation

Esta dissertação analisa a autonomia municipal na implementação de programas federais. Partiu-se da teoria sobre relações intergovernamentais no Brasil e implementação de políticas públicas para analisar a implementação do Mais Educação/Ministério da Educação (MEC) no Município de São Paulo, considerando o período de 2011 a 2016. Para realizar a análise, foi construído um quadro analítico que considera elementos topdown e bottom-up das teorias de implementação de políticas públicas. Foram considerados o desenho da política federal e o desenho da política municipal, incluindo seus incentivos institucionais, as relações interorganizacionais e a burocracia de médio escalão (BME). O método da pesquisa foi o estudo de caso único, operacionalizado empiricamente por meio de análise documental e de entrevistas semiestruturadas. Foram analisados o desenho do programa federal, a implementação dos programas municipais de expansão da jornada de ensino e as características do Mais Educação/MEC na rede de ensino. Verificamos que os programas municipais influenciaram a implementação da política federal por trazerem uma série de incentivos institucionais a este programa. Além disso, verificamos que o município levou cerca de 3 anos para construir outros incentivos institucionais para a implementação do programa federal em sua rede de ensino, conseguindo, assim, coordenar o programa. De 2011 a 2014, a adesão das unidades escolares ao programa foi marcada por diferenças inter-regionais, sobretudo de 2011 a 2013. Como principais conclusões, a pesquisa mostra que o Município de São Paulo construiu um arranjo de implementação colegiado junto ao MEC por ter criado uma série de incentivos institucionais para a implementação do programa federal em sua rede de ensino; e que a atuação empreendedora de parte da BME explica, pelo menos em parte, as diferenças inter-regionais em um contexto de pouca coordenação por parte da SME / This dissertation analyzes municipal autonomy in the implementation of federal programs. It was based on the theory of intergovernmental relations in Brazil and the implementation of public policies to analyze the implementation of More Education/Ministry of Education (MEC) in the city of São Paulo, considering the period from 2011 to 2016. To carry out the analysis, an analytical framework that considers topdown and bottom-up elements of public policy implementation theories. The design of the federal policy and the design of the municipal policy, including its institutional incentives, interorganizational relations and the middle-level bureaucracy (MLB) were considered. The research method was the single case study, operationalized empirically through documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. The design of the federal program, the implementation of the municipal programs of expansion of the teaching day and the characteristics of the More Education/MEC in the education network were analyzed. We verified that the municipal programs influenced the implementation of the federal policy by bringing a series of institutional incentives to this program. In addition, we found that the municipality took about 3 years to build other institutional incentives for the implementation of the federal program in its educational network, thus managing to coordinate the program. From 2011 to 2014, school units membership of the program was marked by interregional differences, especially from 2011 to 2013. As a key finding, the survey shows that the Municipality of São Paulo has built a collegial implementation arrangement with the MEC for having created A series of institutional incentives for the implementation of the federal program in its educational network; and that entrepreneurial activity on the part of BME explains, at least in part, the interregional differences in a context of little coordination by the SME

Submitted by Natalia Langenegger (natalia.langenegger@gmail.com) on 2014-05-22T11:46:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_-_Natalia_Langenegger_rev_pós_banca_v2.pdf: 1337918 bytes, checksum: 32b0a24319c0ca0ca08f8767e357e22c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2014-05-22T11:51:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_-_Natalia_Langenegger_rev_pós_banca_v2.pdf: 1337918 bytes, checksum: 32b0a24319c0ca0ca08f8767e357e22c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-22T12:11:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_-_Natalia_Langenegger_rev_pós_banca_v2.pdf: 1337918 bytes, checksum: 32b0a24319c0ca0ca08f8767e357e22c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-28 / The subject of this project is the granting of standing for individuals to file collective actions. More specifically, this research aims to discuss the arguments presented against this standing by jurists and parliamentarians amid the debates on the drafting of a Code of Collective Actions for Brazil, which resulted in the filed Bill of the New Law of Civil Action (Bill nº 5.139/09). Furthermore, this study conducts a review of the institutional environment within which collective actions are currently processed and then reflects on the possibility of offering institutional incentives capable of stimulating individuals to promote collective actions, should they be granted such legitimacy. The study assumes that the augmentation of the list of entities which are granted standing to file collective actions can contribute to increasing (or an increase in) access and democratization of justice, but considers that the mere inclusion of individuals amongst the subjects who are granted such standing would not be sufficient for this standing to be exercised. It is believed that it would be necessary for procedural legislation to provide specific institutional incentives in order for individuals to assume authorship of collective actions involving all modes of collective interests. Thus, the research adopts an institutional perspective which considers procedural law capable of influencing the parties’ behavior during the process by establishing rules of conduct and changing the costs and benefits related to the participation in judicial proceedings. The study concluded that the arguments presented against the granting of standing for individuals to file collective actions are based on reasons that can be circumvented by modifying certain procedural rules and by a more active posture of judges in conducting such lawsuits. It also identified the fact that the institutional environment within which collective actions in Brazil are currently processed does not provide incentives for members or groups of the civil society to promote these actions, making it necessary for the procedural legislation to provide additional institutional incentives. / O objeto deste trabalho consiste na atribuição de legitimidade ativa de pessoas físicas em ações coletivas. Mais especificamente, a pesquisa procura problematizar os argumentos contrários a essa legitimação apresentados por juristas e parlamentares em meio aos debates sobre a elaboração de um Código de Processos Coletivos para o Brasil, que resultou no arquivado Projeto de Lei de Nova Lei de Ação Civil Pública (PL nº 5.139/09). Além disso, o estudo realiza uma avaliação sobre o ambiente institucional dentro do qual atualmente são processadas ações coletivas e também reflete sobre a possibilidade de serem oferecidos incentivos institucionais capazes de estimular pessoas físicas a promover demandas coletivas, caso lhes fosse atribuída legitimidade para tanto. O estudo parte do pressuposto de que a ampliação do rol de legitimados ativos para a proposição de ações coletivas seria capaz de colaborar para a ampliação do acesso e democratização da justiça, mas que a simples inclusão de pessoas físicas entre os legitimados ativos não seria suficiente para que esta legitimidade fosse exercida. Acredita-se que seria necessário à legislação processual oferecer incentivos institucionais específicos para que pessoas físicas assumam a autoria de ações coletivas envolvendo todas as modalidades de interesses transindividuais. Assim, a pesquisa adota uma perspectiva institucional segundo a qual a legislação processual é capaz de influenciar o comportamento das partes no processo mediante o estabelecimento de regras de conduta e pela alteração dos custos e benefícios relacionados à participação em processo judicial. O trabalho concluiu que os argumentos apresentados contra a concessão de legitimidade ativa em ações coletivas para pessoas físicas são fundados em justificativas que podem ser contornados pela modificação de determinadas regras processuais e por uma postura mais ativa dos magistrados na condução de tais demandas. Além disso, identificou que o ambiente institucional dentro do qual são atualmente processadas as ações coletivas não fornece estímulos para que membros ou agrupamentos da sociedade civil promovam ações coletivas, sendo necessário que a legislação processual ofereça incentivos institucionais adicionais.

Esta dissertação analisa a autonomia municipal na implementação de programas federais. Partiu-se da teoria sobre relações intergovernamentais no Brasil e implementação de políticas públicas para analisar a implementação do Mais Educação/Ministério da Educação (MEC) no Município de São Paulo, considerando o período de 2011 a 2016. Para realizar a análise, foi construído um quadro analítico que considera elementos topdown e bottom-up das teorias de implementação de políticas públicas. Foram considerados o desenho da política federal e o desenho da política municipal, incluindo seus incentivos institucionais, as relações interorganizacionais e a burocracia de médio escalão (BME). O método da pesquisa foi o estudo de caso único, operacionalizado empiricamente por meio de análise documental e de entrevistas semiestruturadas. Foram analisados o desenho do programa federal, a implementação dos programas municipais de expansão da jornada de ensino e as características do Mais Educação/MEC na rede de ensino. Verificamos que os programas municipais influenciaram a implementação da política federal por trazerem uma série de incentivos institucionais a este programa. Além disso, verificamos que o município levou cerca de 3 anos para construir outros incentivos institucionais para a implementação do programa federal em sua rede de ensino, conseguindo, assim, coordenar o programa. De 2011 a 2014, a adesão das unidades escolares ao programa foi marcada por diferenças inter-regionais, sobretudo de 2011 a 2013. Como principais conclusões, a pesquisa mostra que o Município de São Paulo construiu um arranjo de implementação colegiado junto ao MEC por ter criado uma série de incentivos institucionais para a implementação do programa federal em sua rede de ensino; e que a atuação empreendedora de parte da BME explica, pelo menos em parte, as diferenças inter-regionais em um contexto de pouca coordenação por parte da SME / This dissertation analyzes municipal autonomy in the implementation of federal programs. It was based on the theory of intergovernmental relations in Brazil and the implementation of public policies to analyze the implementation of More Education/Ministry of Education (MEC) in the city of São Paulo, considering the period from 2011 to 2016. To carry out the analysis, an analytical framework that considers topdown and bottom-up elements of public policy implementation theories. The design of the federal policy and the design of the municipal policy, including its institutional incentives, interorganizational relations and the middle-level bureaucracy (MLB) were considered. The research method was the single case study, operationalized empirically through documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. The design of the federal program, the implementation of the municipal programs of expansion of the teaching day and the characteristics of the More Education/MEC in the education network were analyzed. We verified that the municipal programs influenced the implementation of the federal policy by bringing a series of institutional incentives to this program. In addition, we found that the municipality took about 3 years to build other institutional incentives for the implementation of the federal program in its educational network, thus managing to coordinate the program. From 2011 to 2014, school units membership of the program was marked by interregional differences, especially from 2011 to 2013. As a key finding, the survey shows that the Municipality of São Paulo has built a collegial implementation arrangement with the MEC for having created A series of institutional incentives for the implementation of the federal program in its educational network; and that entrepreneurial activity on the part of BME explains, at least in part, the interregional differences in a context of little coordination by the SME

Die Dissertation untersucht ob partizipative Governance ein effektives Mittel ist um lokale Regierungen in Guatemala dazu zu bewegen ihren Wählern gegenüber verstärkt Rechenschaft abzulegen und den Haushalt mehr an den Bedürfnissen der Armen auszu-richten. Das erste Papier bereitet die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse zur Wirkung von und den Bedingungen für effektive partizipative Governance auf. Das zweite Papier stellt ein neues Verfahren zur Kalibrierung qualitativer Interviewdaten für fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) vor. In einer qualitativ-vergleichenden Ana-lyse von zehn ländlichen Gemeinden untersucht das dritte Papier wie sich effektive par-tizipative Governance, politischer Wettbewerb und Zugang zu lokalen Medien auf die Haushaltsgestaltung einer Lokalregierung auswirken. Das vierte Papier analysiert mit derselben Methode die Bedingungen für effektive partizipative Governance. Das fünfte Papier präsentiert eine Fallstudie zweier Gemeinden und diskutiert Politikoptionen für die Implementierung von partizipativer Governance in Guatemala. Die Ergebnisse der Papiere zeigen, dass effektive partizipative Governance in Kombination mit starkem politischem Wettbewerb zu einer armutsorientierteren Ausrichtung öffentlicher Ausga-ben in den zehn Gemeinden führt, da Wähler besser informiert sind. Jedoch deuten die Ergebnisse auch darauf hin, dass partizipative Governance wegen des geringen Grades zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisation, des niedrigen Bildungsniveaus und hoher Armut in Guatemala nicht effektiv implementiert wird. Partizipative Governance kann also lokale Regierungen dazu bewegen Rechenschaft abzulegen und den Haushalt armutsorientier-ter zu gestalten. Ihre effektive Implementierung wird jedoch in Guatemala lange dauern und einen hohen Ressourceneinsatz erfordern. Daher sollten politische Entscheidungs-träger und Geber auch die Stärkung anderer Informations- und Rechenschaftslegungs-mechanismen, wie der Gemeinderäte, in Betracht ziehen. / This thesis analyses whether participatory governance is an effective means for increas-ing local government accountability and for making local government spending more responsive to the needs of the poor in rural Guatemala. The first paper evaluates the scientific evidence on the impact of and the conditions for effective participatory gov-ernance. The second paper presents a new technique for calibrating qualitative interview data for fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). In a qualitative compara-tive analysis of ten rural Guatemalan municipalities the third paper examines how effec-tive participatory governance, competitive elections, and access to local media influence the allocation of local government spending. The fourth paper analyses the conditions for effective participatory governance with the same empirical method. The fifth paper presents a comparative case study of two municipalities and discusses policy options for implementing participatory governance in Guatemala. Overall, the papers’ findings show that effective participatory governance is sufficient for local government responsiveness in the study area when it is combined with competitive elections, because it increases voter information about local government performance. Yet, the findings also suggest that it will be difficult to implement participatory governance effectively in Guatemala due to the low degree of civil society organization, the low level of education of the population and the high level of poverty. The conclusion drawn from these findings is that effective participatory governance arrangements can make local governments more accountable and responsive, but that it will require much time and resources to implement them. Policy makers and donors should therefore also consider strengthening other information mechanisms, as well as existing accountability mechanisms, such as elected Municipal Councils.