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Esta pesquisa pretende estudar como denúncias e evidências de corrupção mobilizam partidos da oposição, eleitores e prefeitos incumbentes levando à punição de prefeitos corruptos durante as campanhas de reeleição. Usando um banco de dados oriundo de relatórios de auditoria aleatórios elaborados pela Controladoria Geral da União que analisam como as transferências federais foram usadas em pequenos municípios brasileiros, nós mostramos que o momento em que os resultados da auditoria são divulgados aos eleitores desempenha um papel importante para saber se prefeitos corruptos serão punidos. Quando os resultados de auditoria produzem provas de corrupção antes da eleição, os prefeitos são menos propensos a concorrer à reeleição. Além disso, os municípios em que as auditorias foram divulgadas antes e durante o período eleitoral tiveram menores taxas de reeleição dos prefeitos. Mostramos isso devido ao aumento da candidatura de candidatos de partidos da oposição como rivais. Nossa análise é restrita a 270 municípios cujos prefeitos estavam em seu primeiro mandato, e cujas administrações foram auditadas entre 2003 e 2004. Nossas conclusões lançam luz sobre os mecanismos que ajudam a explicar os resultados anteriores que mostram que evidências de corrupção punem prefeitos corruptos. Chamamos à atenção para a importância da dinâmica política como ajudar a explicar porque os prefeitos corruptos vão ou não ser punidos. / This research aims to study how corruption allegations and evidence mobilize opposition parties, voter and incumbent mayors leading to the punishment of corrupt mayors during re-election campaigns. Using a database based on random audit reports prepared by the Controladoria Geral da União examining how federal funds were used in small Brazilian municipalities, we show that the timing of when audit findings are disclosed to voters plays an important role in whether corrupt mayors will be punished. When audit records produce evidence of corruption prior to the election, mayors are less likely to run for re-election. Moreover, municipalities where audits were disclosed before and during the election period had lower rates of re-election of the mayors. We show this due to the increase in the candidacy of opposition party candidates as rivals and votes. Our analysis is restricted to 270 municipalities whose mayors were in their first term, and whose administrations were audited by federal accountants between 2003 and 2004. Our findings shed light on the mechanisms which help to explain previous findings showing that random audit corruption evidence punishes corrupt mayors. We draw attention to the importance of political dynamics as helping to explain why corrupt mayors will or will not be punished.

Esta pesquisa pretende estudar como denúncias e evidências de corrupção mobilizam partidos da oposição, eleitores e prefeitos incumbentes levando à punição de prefeitos corruptos durante as campanhas de reeleição. Usando um banco de dados oriundo de relatórios de auditoria aleatórios elaborados pela Controladoria Geral da União que analisam como as transferências federais foram usadas em pequenos municípios brasileiros, nós mostramos que o momento em que os resultados da auditoria são divulgados aos eleitores desempenha um papel importante para saber se prefeitos corruptos serão punidos. Quando os resultados de auditoria produzem provas de corrupção antes da eleição, os prefeitos são menos propensos a concorrer à reeleição. Além disso, os municípios em que as auditorias foram divulgadas antes e durante o período eleitoral tiveram menores taxas de reeleição dos prefeitos. Mostramos isso devido ao aumento da candidatura de candidatos de partidos da oposição como rivais. Nossa análise é restrita a 270 municípios cujos prefeitos estavam em seu primeiro mandato, e cujas administrações foram auditadas entre 2003 e 2004. Nossas conclusões lançam luz sobre os mecanismos que ajudam a explicar os resultados anteriores que mostram que evidências de corrupção punem prefeitos corruptos. Chamamos à atenção para a importância da dinâmica política como ajudar a explicar porque os prefeitos corruptos vão ou não ser punidos. / This research aims to study how corruption allegations and evidence mobilize opposition parties, voter and incumbent mayors leading to the punishment of corrupt mayors during re-election campaigns. Using a database based on random audit reports prepared by the Controladoria Geral da União examining how federal funds were used in small Brazilian municipalities, we show that the timing of when audit findings are disclosed to voters plays an important role in whether corrupt mayors will be punished. When audit records produce evidence of corruption prior to the election, mayors are less likely to run for re-election. Moreover, municipalities where audits were disclosed before and during the election period had lower rates of re-election of the mayors. We show this due to the increase in the candidacy of opposition party candidates as rivals and votes. Our analysis is restricted to 270 municipalities whose mayors were in their first term, and whose administrations were audited by federal accountants between 2003 and 2004. Our findings shed light on the mechanisms which help to explain previous findings showing that random audit corruption evidence punishes corrupt mayors. We draw attention to the importance of political dynamics as helping to explain why corrupt mayors will or will not be punished.

In this dissertation we analyze the role of parties’ electoral competition in aggregating voters’ preferences over policy and its impact on tax design. The representation of voters’ interests is central for the analysis of public finance since the issue of aggregation is closely linked to the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution, and the size and composition of public spending. Parties’ aggregation of preferences is related to the mechanism in which policy makers (parties) weigh the relative merits of competing goals of the tax system (in our analysis, redistribution versus efficiency), and reveals the welfare calculus throughout parties identify groups of individuals who might be beneficiated (hurt) by policy changes. In the first essay we analyze the influence of voters in modifying tax policy through tax initiatives. In this essay we argue that the process of aggregation of preferences between the competition for votes in a representative democracy and the majority rule are different. This, in turn, might lead to the approval of a tax rate limit (TRL) initiative. We argue that the rationale for a TRL proposal is to substitute feasible tax structures rather than to constrain the government’s power to collect taxes. In addition, we provide a model that predicts the tax structure that would arise as a result of a TRL The second essay addresses the role of voters’ partisan attitudes in the determination of fiscal policies. We argue that partisan attitudes and its distribution across the electorate influence the proportion of the expected votes that different coalitions deliver in the election. We identify conditions in which voters’ partisan attitudes affect the provision of a public good and the redistributive properties of the tax structure. The third essay extends our previous analysis of the impact of voters’ partisan attitudes on tax design by incorporating parties that are policy motivated. In this setting, the relative merits of efficiency versus redistribution in designing the tax system are determined by the process of aggregation of voters’ preferences and parties’ preferences over policy. The conflict between parties and the electorate’s preferences over tax policy depends on voters’ partisan attitudes. In particular, voters’ party affiliation soft parties’ electoral constraints, allowing parties to advance the interests of their constituents. The model predicts that redistribution (efficiency) will play a more prominent role for a party that represents a coalition of low (high) income individuals with a high (low) taste for public goods.

We follow the approach of expressive voting and consider that voters with more extreme ideology can enjoy higher utility after voting. However, along with effect of ideology, voters also take the difference of his ideology and candidate¡¦s into account. Given the above assumptions, two candidates choose their ideology before voters decide whether and for whom to vote. Two candidates¡¦ ideology converges to the middle point if voters¡¦ utility generated by expressive voting approach is less important than by instrumental voting approach. In the opposite, two candidates¡¦ ideology diverge and the voters with mild ideology refuse to vote in point if voters¡¦ utility generated by expressive voting approach is more important. We examine the ANES data of ten U.S. presidential elections from 1972 to 2008. The nested logit model is used to estimate the corresponding coefficients of voters¡¦ utility generated by expressive voting approach and instrumental voting approach. The data supports our conjecture that voters with more extreme ideology are more likely to cast their votes.

Neste estudo investigamos o efeito da fórmula eleitoral na competição municipal brasileira, mais precisamente, nas eleições para o cargo de Prefeito em 2008 e 2012. Utilizamos o conceito de competição eleitoral que corresponde ao número de candidatos efetivos concorrendo em cada pleito. Para medir isso, recorremos ao número de candidatos efetivos (NCE), índice que estabelece o número real de candidaturas que tem peso em uma disputa eleitoral. Nosso questionamento norteador é saber se haveria diferenciação na competição política nas cidades com turno único que utilizam a fórmula de Plurality (Maioria simples), comparada com aquelas cidades que possuem a possibilidade de segundo turno que utilizam a fórmula de Majority Runoff (maioria absoluta)? Nosso objetivo é testar as Leis de Duverger que indicam que quando é utilizada a fórmula de Plurality tendemos para bicandidaturas, enquanto ao utilizarmos a fórmula de Majority Runoff tendemos para multicandidaturas na disputa majoritária. Essa tarefa será realizada pela análise comparada das competições municipais, em todas as cidades brasileiras, através dos dados provenientes do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) que mantém os resultados das eleições gerais no país. / We investigated the effect of the electoral formula in the Brazilian city, more precisely, in the elections for the office of Mayor in 2008 and 2012. We use the concept of electoral competition that corresponds to the number of effective candidates competing in each election. To measure this, we use the number of effective candidates (NCE), an index that establishes the actual number of applications that have weight in an electoral contest. Our guiding question is whether there would be differentiation on competition policy in cities with a single round using the formula Plurality (simple majority), compared with those cities that have the possibility of runoff using the formula Majority Runoff (absolute majority)? Our goal is to test the Laws of Duverger indicate that when using the formula Plurality tend to bicandidaturas while when we use the formula Majority Runoff tend to multicandidaturas in majority contention. This task is performed by the comparative analysis of municipal competitions in all Brazilian cities, using data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that holds the results of the general elections in the country.

Neste estudo investigamos o efeito da fórmula eleitoral na competição municipal brasileira, mais precisamente, nas eleições para o cargo de Prefeito em 2008 e 2012. Utilizamos o conceito de competição eleitoral que corresponde ao número de candidatos efetivos concorrendo em cada pleito. Para medir isso, recorremos ao número de candidatos efetivos (NCE), índice que estabelece o número real de candidaturas que tem peso em uma disputa eleitoral. Nosso questionamento norteador é saber se haveria diferenciação na competição política nas cidades com turno único que utilizam a fórmula de Plurality (Maioria simples), comparada com aquelas cidades que possuem a possibilidade de segundo turno que utilizam a fórmula de Majority Runoff (maioria absoluta)? Nosso objetivo é testar as Leis de Duverger que indicam que quando é utilizada a fórmula de Plurality tendemos para bicandidaturas, enquanto ao utilizarmos a fórmula de Majority Runoff tendemos para multicandidaturas na disputa majoritária. Essa tarefa será realizada pela análise comparada das competições municipais, em todas as cidades brasileiras, através dos dados provenientes do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) que mantém os resultados das eleições gerais no país. / We investigated the effect of the electoral formula in the Brazilian city, more precisely, in the elections for the office of Mayor in 2008 and 2012. We use the concept of electoral competition that corresponds to the number of effective candidates competing in each election. To measure this, we use the number of effective candidates (NCE), an index that establishes the actual number of applications that have weight in an electoral contest. Our guiding question is whether there would be differentiation on competition policy in cities with a single round using the formula Plurality (simple majority), compared with those cities that have the possibility of runoff using the formula Majority Runoff (absolute majority)? Our goal is to test the Laws of Duverger indicate that when using the formula Plurality tend to bicandidaturas while when we use the formula Majority Runoff tend to multicandidaturas in majority contention. This task is performed by the comparative analysis of municipal competitions in all Brazilian cities, using data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that holds the results of the general elections in the country.

Neste estudo investigamos o efeito da fórmula eleitoral na competição municipal brasileira, mais precisamente, nas eleições para o cargo de Prefeito em 2008 e 2012. Utilizamos o conceito de competição eleitoral que corresponde ao número de candidatos efetivos concorrendo em cada pleito. Para medir isso, recorremos ao número de candidatos efetivos (NCE), índice que estabelece o número real de candidaturas que tem peso em uma disputa eleitoral. Nosso questionamento norteador é saber se haveria diferenciação na competição política nas cidades com turno único que utilizam a fórmula de Plurality (Maioria simples), comparada com aquelas cidades que possuem a possibilidade de segundo turno que utilizam a fórmula de Majority Runoff (maioria absoluta)? Nosso objetivo é testar as Leis de Duverger que indicam que quando é utilizada a fórmula de Plurality tendemos para bicandidaturas, enquanto ao utilizarmos a fórmula de Majority Runoff tendemos para multicandidaturas na disputa majoritária. Essa tarefa será realizada pela análise comparada das competições municipais, em todas as cidades brasileiras, através dos dados provenientes do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) que mantém os resultados das eleições gerais no país. / We investigated the effect of the electoral formula in the Brazilian city, more precisely, in the elections for the office of Mayor in 2008 and 2012. We use the concept of electoral competition that corresponds to the number of effective candidates competing in each election. To measure this, we use the number of effective candidates (NCE), an index that establishes the actual number of applications that have weight in an electoral contest. Our guiding question is whether there would be differentiation on competition policy in cities with a single round using the formula Plurality (simple majority), compared with those cities that have the possibility of runoff using the formula Majority Runoff (absolute majority)? Our goal is to test the Laws of Duverger indicate that when using the formula Plurality tend to bicandidaturas while when we use the formula Majority Runoff tend to multicandidaturas in majority contention. This task is performed by the comparative analysis of municipal competitions in all Brazilian cities, using data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that holds the results of the general elections in the country.

This paper investigates how exposure to extreme weather affects public support for climate policies. I use temperature data from the extreme heatwaves during the summers of 2018 and 2019 and examine whether temperature anomalies affected the results of five German state elections held in the autumn of these years. Using the vote share change of the Green Party as a measure of public support for climate policies, I do not find a general baseline effect of extreme temperatures. When considering possible heterogeneities however, I find that there is a positive effect of temperatures in electoral districts with more employed in the agricultural sector and in electoral districts with more informed voters. The estimated interaction effects are large compared to the mean vote share of the Green Party and the estimates obtained for other parties.

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