O presente trabalho busca analisar as obras de Rousseau Discurso sobre a Origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens (Segundo discurso) e Emílio ou da Educação de forma a apresentá-las como obras complementares no que se refere aos conceitos de Natureza e educação. A hipótese central repousa na ideia de que Rousseau encontra, no Segundo discurso, um problema no desenvolvimento social da humanidade e busca, a partir da construção de um homem adequadamente educado no Emílio, concertar o erro cometido pela espécie no passado. Essa leitura nos leva a compreensão de que existe uma natureza humana dada pela natureza e uma segunda natureza construída pelo homem, a qual deve ser construída de forma a não prejudicar a primeira. A pesquisa é bibliográfica com caráter teórico e, subsidiariamente histórico. Foram consideradas em especial as duas obras clássicas tomadas como objeto de estudo. / This study seeks to analyze the works of Rousseau\'s Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of inequality among men (Second Discourse) and Emile, or on Education in order to present them as complementary works in relation to the concepts of life and education. The central hypothesis rests on the idea that Rousseau finds in his Second Discourse an issue in the social development of mankind and seek, troughout the construction of a properly educated man Emile , to fix the error comitted by our species in the past. This reading leads us to understand that there is a human nature given by Nature and a second nature built by man, which must be constructed so as not to undermine the first. This paper is based on bibliographic research with theoretical foundation and historical elements. Especial consideration was given to the two classical works subject of this study.

O presente trabalho busca analisar as obras de Rousseau Discurso sobre a Origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens (Segundo discurso) e Emílio ou da Educação de forma a apresentá-las como obras complementares no que se refere aos conceitos de Natureza e educação. A hipótese central repousa na ideia de que Rousseau encontra, no Segundo discurso, um problema no desenvolvimento social da humanidade e busca, a partir da construção de um homem adequadamente educado no Emílio, concertar o erro cometido pela espécie no passado. Essa leitura nos leva a compreensão de que existe uma natureza humana dada pela natureza e uma segunda natureza construída pelo homem, a qual deve ser construída de forma a não prejudicar a primeira. A pesquisa é bibliográfica com caráter teórico e, subsidiariamente histórico. Foram consideradas em especial as duas obras clássicas tomadas como objeto de estudo. / This study seeks to analyze the works of Rousseau\'s Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of inequality among men (Second Discourse) and Emile, or on Education in order to present them as complementary works in relation to the concepts of life and education. The central hypothesis rests on the idea that Rousseau finds in his Second Discourse an issue in the social development of mankind and seek, troughout the construction of a properly educated man Emile , to fix the error comitted by our species in the past. This reading leads us to understand that there is a human nature given by Nature and a second nature built by man, which must be constructed so as not to undermine the first. This paper is based on bibliographic research with theoretical foundation and historical elements. Especial consideration was given to the two classical works subject of this study.

Principe trouvant une expression solennelle à l’article 6 C.E.D.H., le droit au procès équitable irradie aujourd’hui l’ensemble de notre droit interne. Dans un contexte de subjectivisation du droit, le droit administratif n’échappe pas à cette « irrésistible extension du contentieux du procès équitable » (Mme KOERING-JOULIN). Cette assertion trouve une manifestation éclatante quant aux pouvoirs de sanctions et de règlement des différends reconnus aux autorités administratives. La définition européenne du champ d’application du droit au procès équitable, suivie par la Cour de cassation et adaptée par le Conseil d’État, permet, en effet, à l'article 6 précité de faire florès en ce domaine. Ainsi, en l’état actuel de la jurisprudence administrative, le moyen tiré de la violation de cette stipulation peut utilement être invoqué à l’encontre des autorités administratives indépendantes, tant dans le cadre de leur activité répressive que contentieuse. Depuis maintenant huit ans, le respect de cette garantie s’impose à la procédure d’établissement des sanctions fiscales. A suivre cette ligne jurisprudentielle, l’extension du droit au procès équitable à l’ensemble des autorités administratives répressives voire contentieuses pourrait être la voie de l’avenir. Une telle évolution n’est toutefois pas sans soulever certaines questions. La processualisation croissante de la répression administrative, sous l’effet du droit au procès équitable, n’est-elle pas une contradiction en soi ? Ne va-t-elle pas à rebours de l’objectif initialement poursuivi par l’externalisation de la sanction ? Plus fondamentalement, l’assujettissement de l’administration aux garanties spécifiques à la procédure juridictionnelle ne participe-t-il pas au rétablissement d’une certaine confusion entre l’administration et la juridiction ? N'y a-t-il pas là renaissance, sous une forme évidemment nouvelle, de la figure que l'on croyait révolue de l'administrateur-juge ? / The right to a fair trial is enshrined in the article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and irradiates now all French law. In the context of the subjectivization of the law, administrative law is also subject to this "unstoppable rise of disputes in the name of the right to a fair trial" (Mrs. KOERING-JOULIN). This assertion is particularly true regarding the powers of sanction and the settlement of disputes granted to the administrative authorities. The European definition of the right to a fair trial applied by the Court of Cassation and adapted by the Council of State allows a wide application of this right. So, given the current state of the administrative case law, the right to a fair trial can be usefully claimed against independent administrative authorities as regard either their law enforcement activities or litigation practice. And the tax administration has also been compelled to respect this fundamental right for eight years now. In line with this settled jurisprudence, the extension of the right to a fair trial to all the administrative authorities may be the way of the future. But such an evolution raises a few questions. Isn't the increasing jurisdictionalization of the administration activities as a result of the right to a fair trial an inconsistency in itself? Doesn't it go against the primary goal of the outsourcing of the administrative penalties? More fundamentally, doesn't subjecting the administrative authorities to the specific principles of court procedures participate in reinstating some confusion between administration and jurisdiction? Isn’t it the rebirth, under a new form, of the administrator-judge we thought was long gone?