This dissertation studies the reaction of trading behavior of investors, especially institutional investors, to the public information in Taiwan. Two kinds of public information are chosen in this dissertation. One is open-ending closed-end funds under the regulation set up by Taiwan authority. The other is the change of stocks in MSCI Taiwan Index that is decided by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), a well-known foreign institution in constructing various indices. Consistent with earlier studies using U.S. data, our results show that open-ending is a wealth-enhancing event for shareholders. We also provide evidence of the existence of noise traders in the closed-end fund market. The evidence is derived from the trading behavior of domestic institutional investors and small individual investors, who ignore price discounts when open-ending is imminent. The trading by noise traders impedes price adjustments to the discounts, and provides profit opportunities to arbitragers. Furthermore, we show that foreign investors gain considerable wealth, largely at the expense of domestic institutional investors and small individual investors, in the open-ending process. On average, their gains account for 30% of the total gains associated with open-ending, or NT$562 millions per case. On the issue of the change of stocks in MSCI Taiwan Index, we find that MSCI prefers to select the securities with good performance, high liquidity, and large firm size into MSCI Taiwan Index while tends to drop the securities with poor performance, lower liquidity, and small firm size from MSCI Taiwan Index. Besides, consistent with the previous studies, prices increase (decrease) significantly for stocks added to (deleted from) the MSCI Taiwan Index after the announcement date. As well as the deletions, the price decreases for unchanging stocks after the announcement date. However, there is no evidence to find that foreign investors have information advantage in MSCI news over domestic investors. Foreign investors increase (decrease) their holdings on stocks included in (excluded from) the MSCI Taiwan Index after the announcement date. Moreover, price pressure hypothesis is not supported. Visibility hypothesis, information content hypothesis, downward sloping demand curves hypothesis are supported. Finally, for additions and deletions, the market-adjusted returns are driven by the contemporaneous excess buy of foreign investors and the contemporaneous excess sells of domestic corporations and individuals.

The dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay investigates the ability of prior returns, relative to some aggregate market returns, to predict future returns on industry style portfolios. By pooling time series of returns across industries for the period between July 1969 and June 2012, we find that prior returns differential predicts one month ahead returns negatively, even in the presence of a set of popular state variables. The predictability remains significant and negative for up to 5 month ahead returns. The predictability is shown to be robust to alternative specifications, estimation methodology and industry classifications. A possible explanation of this finding is based on time–varying (dynamic) loss aversion among investors. More specifically, when combined with house money effects, prior performance has inverse relationship with degree of loss aversion leading to predictability in the next period returns. The second essay examines the nature of time variation in the risk exposure of country mutual funds to the US market movement and to the benchmark foreign market movement. It uses weekly data on 15 closed end funds and 19 exchange traded funds for the sample period between January, 2001 and December, 2012. Conditional factor models are employed to uncover the time variation in the estimated betas through short horizon regressions. The findings of the paper indicate considerable time variation in risk exposure of country mutual funds to the US market and foreign market risk factors. Additional investigation reveals the following observations. First, the US market betas suffer greater variation over the sample period than the target foreign market betas. Second, the overall fluctuation in betas for the closed end funds is found to be higher than that for the exchange traded funds. Third, emerging market funds experience more oscillation in the risk exposure than their developed market counterparts. It is found that a combination of the US macroeconomic state variables and investors’ sentiment can predict future betas significantly. The findings of the paper have important implication for US investors seeking diversification benefits from country mutual funds.

Der erste Artikel liefert Beweise dafür, dass ein Liquiditätsschock bei geschlossenen Fonds zu einer Liquiditätsverschlechterung bei offenen Fonds führen kann. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Aktien von geschlossenen Fonds, die aufgrund eines Marktversagens notverkauft wurden, temporär im Preis sinken. Offene Fonds, die viele der betroffenen Aktien halten, erleiden daraufhin einen Kapitalabfluss, der weitere Notverkäufe bedingt. Dies unterstreicht die Ansteckungsgefahr zwischen den beiden Finanzmärkten. Der zweite Artikel untersucht, ob Fonds, die mit Staatsanleihen handeln, ihr Risiko durch den Wertpapierverleih erhöhen, indem sie die hierbei erhaltenen Sicherheiten risikoreich reinvestieren. Hiermit konsistent finden wir, dass die Returnvolatilität von Fonds ansteigt, je mehr Wertpapiere verliehen werden. Diese Korrelation ist nur evident, wenn der für den Wertpapierverleih verantwortliche Agent bereits in der Vergangenheit solch eine Strategie praktiziert hat. Sie verschwindet hingegen, wenn der Agent Sicherheiten nicht risikoreich reinvestieren kann. Im dritten Artikel stellen wir ein neues Maß vor, mit dem sich die Handelsaktivität von Fonds drei Tage vor den Geschäftsberichten untersuchen lässt. Stark handelnde Fonds halten bei Berichtsschluss mehr Gewinner- und weniger Verliereraktien. Zudem sind die üblichen Maße, die zur Identifizierung von Window Dressing verwendet werden, signifikant höher. Aktien, die in den letzten drei Tagen vor den Juli und Dezember Berichten einen starken Nachfrageüberschuss aufweisen, steigen in dieser Periode um durchschnittlich 20 Bsp. Dieser Anstieg ist nicht durch Informationstheorien erklärbar, da die Preise innerhalb von einer Woche auf ihr ursprüngliches Niveau zurückfallen. Aktien mit hoher Liquidität zeigen geringere Anstiege und kehren schneller zum Ausgangspreis zurück. Die Preisbewegungen lassen sich nicht durch einen einzelnen Faktor, wie Window Dressing oder Portfolio Pumping, erklären. / The first paper provides evidence that a liquidity shock to closed-end funds can transmit to open-end funds. Using the failure of the market for auction rate securities we show that forced asset sales of highly levered closed-end funds result in temporary price declines in those assets. Open-end funds that hold significant numbers of the affected stocks in turn experience outflows, forcing them to conduct additional fire-sales. These forced sales induce additional price pressure consistent with financial contagion. The second paper examines whether mutual bond funds increase their risk exposure through securities lending transactions by reinvesting the cash collateral of these transactions in risky assets. Consistent with such behavior, we find that the return volatility of government bond funds increases with the percentage of securities on loan. This relation is only evident among funds whose lending agent likely reinvests the lending collateral riskily and disappears if the lending program is managed by agents who typically cannot make risky reinvestments. The third paper provides a new way to measure the trading activity by mutual funds in the last three days of their reporting periods. Consistent with window dressing, heavy end-of-period (EoP) traders report more winner, fewer loser stocks and higher return and rank gaps, yet perform no better. Stocks with a high positive EoP trade imbalance show significant price increases of about 20 bps at the end of reporting periods in June and December. Inconsistent with information trading, prices revert within a week. Liquid stocks appreciate less strongly and revert more quickly. Finally, we show that window dressing, portfolio pumping, or fund flows alone are unlikely to explain our results.

Betrügerisches Verhalten bei geschlossenen Fonds ist in Deutschland Statistiken zufolge für jährliche Kapitalverluste im mittleren dreistelligen Millionenbereich verantwortlich. Der Gesetzgeber hat sich in der Vergangenheit wiederholt dem Problem angenommen und eine Vielzahl von zivil-, straf- und öffentlich-rechtlichen Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung des Anlegerschutzes auf den Weg gebracht, die mit dem Inkrafttreten des Kapitalanlagegesetzbuchs (KAGB) im Jahr 2013 ihren bisherigen Höhepunkt erreicht haben. Die Zweckdienlichkeit dieser Maßnahmen wird von Kritikern indes bezweifelt, darüber hinaus scheint sich in jüngerer Zeit ein neuartiges Phänomen des „sanktionslosen Betrugs“ auf dem Kapitalmarkt zu etablieren, bei dem es den Tätern gelingt entweder ohne, oder ohne nennenswerte Sanktionen – insbesondere in strafrechtlicher Hinsicht – davonzukommen. Als Beispiele seien hier die Debi Select Fonds aus Landshut sowie die POC-Fonds aus Berlin genannt, bei denen die im Hintergrund agierenden „Strippenzieher“ trotz millionenschwerer Anlegerschädigung weder in zivil- noch in strafrechtlicher Hinsicht zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden konnten. Die vorliegende Arbeit widmet sich der systematischen Erkundung dieses Phänomens, indem sie die Themenkomplexe „(sanktionslose) betrügerische geschlossene Fonds“ und „Anlegerschutz“ aus ökonomischer und rechtlicher Perspektive theoretisch analysiert und hieraus Verbesserungsvorschläge ableitet, die anschließend durch eine explorativ-empirische Expertenbefragung abgesichert und ergänzt werden. Konkret beantwortet die Arbeit folgende zentrale Forschungsfrage: „Was ist betrügerisches Verhalten bei geschlossenen Fonds und warum ist dies zum Teil sanktionslos?“ sowie vier ergänzende Forschungsfragen: (1) „Wie sieht die Anatomie betrügerischer geschlossener Fonds aus?“ (2) „Was sind die Ursachen und Anreizstrukturen, die betrügerisches Verhalten bei geschlossenen Fonds begünstigen?“ (3) „Welche Maßnahmen eignen sich zur Abwehr bzw. zur Eindämmung des betrügerischen Verhaltens bei geschlossenen Fonds?“ (4) „Bieten die zivil-, straf- und öffentlich-rechtlichen Maßnahmen des Gesetzgebers, insbesondere das KAGB einen ausreichenden Schutz vor betrügerischen geschlossenen Fonds?“ / Fraudulent behavior in closed-end funds is, according to statistics, responsible for annual capital losses in the mid-triple-digit millions. Legislators have repeatedly addressed the problem in the past and initiated a large number of civil, criminal and public-law measures to improve investor protection, which reached their peak in 2013 with the entry into force of the so-called “Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch” (KAGB). The usefulness of these measures are doubted by critics, moreover it appears that a new phenomenon of 'unsanctioned fraud' on the capital market appears to be established recently, where the perpetrators succeed either without or without significant sanctions, especially in criminal matters. Examples include the Debi Select funds from Landshut and the POC funds from Berlin, in which the 'stripping pullers' operating in the background could be held accountable neither in civil nor in criminal law despite millions in damage to investors. The present work is devoted to the systematic investigation of this phenomenon by theoretically analyzing the topics '(non-sanctioned) fraudulent closed-end funds' and 'investor protection' from an economic and legal perspective and deriving recommendations for improvement, which are then confirmed and supplemented by an explorative-empirical expert survey become. Specifically, the paper answers the following central research question: 'What is fraudulent behavior in closed-end funds and why is this partially sanctionless?' And four complementary research questions: (1) 'What is the anatomy of fraudulent closed-end funds?' (2) 'What are the causes and incentive structures that favor fraudulent behavior in closed-end funds? (3)'What measures are appropriate for the prevention or the containment of fraudulent behavior in closed-end funds?' (4) 'Do civil, criminal and public legislative measures, in particular the KAGB, provide sufficient protection against fraudulent closed-end funds?'