<p>Due to the apparent global economic conditions, at the end of 2008, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued amendments to IAS 39 <em>Financial instruments: recognition and measurement </em>and IFRS 7 <em>Financial instruments: disclosures</em> in October and November, 2008. The amendments allow banks to reclassify their non-derivative financial instruments in rare circumstances. This thesis investigates whether banks in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) reclassify financial instruments, in their financial statements of 2008 and 2009.</p><p>The result of the study shows that 47% of the sample Nordic banks reclassified financial instruments in 2008 and 12% in 2009. All banks increased their net profit as a result of reclassifying financial instruments in 2008. The return on equity (ROE) increased significantly compared to whether the banks would not had reclassified their financial instruments. Tendencies found among the sample Nordic banks are that larger and less profitable banks used the possibility to reclassify financial instruments to a greater extent. Because none of the banks made losses on their choice to reclassify in 2008, the conclusion is that the opportunity given due to the amendments are mostly used by the banks to enhance the net income and the key ratio ROE. This shows that management decisions are short-term. This also indicates that the amendments may be misused by management to enhance current profit for their own benefit. The thesis also concludes that the departure from fair-value as the valuation method for financial instruments, due to recent massive critic, is unlikely.</p>

This diploma work describes the financial and economical crisis that has emerged in the USA during the year 2007. In the work the preceding recessions and the flow of the current crisis are being analyzed. Attention is also given to a detailed study of the pre-crisis period in the USA economics and the identification of the root causes of the crisis and their interrelationship. The final part of the work is dedicated to the examination of the crisis consequences and the possible ways of its progress

The main task of the diploma thesis is an analysis of financial performance and position of Morgan Stanley during several successive periods before and during the subprime financial crisis. Through the analysis of trends in key items, it also demonstrates strong cyclicality of financial performance and position of the investment bank. The first chapter deals with history and key divisions of the Company. The following chapter generally discusses selected phenomena, which, as per the author's view, significantly influenced industry-wide record-breaking performance during the period before the subprime crisis, and which substantially determined Morgan Stanley's risk profile and performance's corrections later during the Crisis. The core part of the Thesis is conceived as an analysis of financial performance and position of Morgan Stanley during the selected periods. The analysis of pre-crisis period until 2006 in the third chapter demonstrates growth of activities lying behind the unprecedented profitability of the Institution. The following fourth chapter analyzes deteriorating financial performance during the subprime crisis and indicates crucial strategy changes, implemented by the Company at the end of 2008. Effects of the strategic changes and challenges of the future development of the Institution are discussed in the last chapter. Additionally, the Thesis includes annexes, which further deal with selected topics and their general relations to investments banks and two annexes which compare Morgan Stanley with its nearest peers during specific periods.

依據之前的文獻研究，市場上主要是在LHP (Large Homogeneous Portfolio) 假設下利用單因子常態關聯結構模式(One factor double Gaussian copula model) 評價擔保債權憑證 (Collateralized debt obligation, CDO)。但這會造成擔保債權憑證的評價與市場報價的差距過大，且會造成base correlation偏斜的情況。Kalemanova et al. (2007) 提出用Normal inverse Gaussian (NIG) 取代常態分配評價擔保債權憑證，此模型不但計算快速而且可以準確估計權益分券 (equity tranche) 的價格，但是它也過於高估了其它的分券的價格。 在本文中使用多變量封閉常態分配(Closed skew normal, 簡稱CSN) 分配取代NIG分配作擔保債權憑證分券的評價，CSN分配具有常態分配的性質，其線性組合仍具有封閉性的特質，且具有較多的參數以控制分配的偏態與峰態。但是與單因子常態關聯結構模式相同，多變量封閉常態分配的單因子關聯結構模式仍然無法估計的很準確，僅有在最高等級分券(senior tranche)的評價上有明顯的改進。 因此在本文中我們使用NIG與CSN複合分配之單因子關聯結構模式評價擔保債權憑證分券，在實例分析時得到極佳的評價結果，並且比單因子常態關聯結構模型具有更多的的參數以使模型更符合實際的需求。 / This article extends the Large Homogeneous Portfolio (LHP) and one factor double Gaussian copula approach for pricing CDOs. In the literature, the one factor double Gaussian copula model under LHP assumption fails to fit the prices of CDO tranches, moreover, it leads to the implied base correlation skew. Some researchers proposed using one factor double NIG copula model to price CDO tranches. It not only economizes on time but also fits the equity tranches exactly, but NIG models do not price other tranches well simultaneously. On the other hand, we substitute the NIG distribution with the Closed Skew normal (CSN) distribution. This family also has properties similar to the normal distribution, which is closure under convolution, and has extra parameters to control the shape. By using this model we get a better fit in the senior tranches, but it seriously overprices subordinate tranches. Thus we consider a mixture distribution of NIG and CSN distributions. The employments of this mixture distribution are comparatively well, and furthermore it brings more flexibility to the dependence structure.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

The dissertation is composed of three empirical research papers analyzing the development on credit derivatives markets in recent years characterized by the global financial crisis in 2007- 2009 and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. The basic motivation of the thesis is to contribute to the clarification of the turbulent development on credit derivatives markets. The first paper addresses main flaws of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market during the global financial crisis. The second paper examines the impact of the Greek debt crisis on sovereign credit default swap (CDS) reliability. The third paper analyzes whether a resulting change in CDS terms restored confidence in CDS contracts. An introductory chapter presents a common framework for the three papers. In the first paper, we examine valuation of a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) in 2007- 2009. One Factor Gaussian Copula Model is presented and five hypotheses regarding CDO sensitivity to entry parameters are analyzed. Four main deficiencies of the CDO market are then articulated: i) an insufficient analysis of underlying assets by both investors and rating agencies; ii) investment decisions arising from the valuation model based on expected cash-flows and neglecting other factors such as mark-to-market losses; iii)...