Precipitated by important work in recent natural law political theory, this research revisits the relationship between political association and human flourishing. Does the political community itself realize some aspect of human sociability intrinsic to our full flourishing or is it simply an instrumental good? The inquiry begins with a thorough examination of the merits of John Finnis’s influential argument for an instrumental political common good, pointing to a significant lacuna in his inattention to the value of political activity, as opposed to the operation of government and law. In building an alternative positive account the argument relies upon both formal and substantive considerations, generally employing an Aristotelian methodology of understanding the whole via a consideration of its constitutive parts. First, drawing from Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries to unpack the basic structure of part/whole relationships within the “body politic,” I argue that political community is partially defined by the nature of its basic constitutive parts. The next chapter considers the substantive good of familial association, particularly in light of longstanding concerns with the family’s particularity and inequality. I argue that the intrinsically liberal and educative character of parental love rightly orients children to virtuous activity and invests familial association with an intrinsic rationality. The final two chapters bring direct focus onto the political common good: First, I argue that a normatively compelling account of the political common good must be both inclusivist, i.e., including within its purpose the irreducibly diverse goods of every individual and basic association within the community, and distinctive, i.e., including within the calculus of practical reason the good of the political association as such. Lastly, I argue that the political common good is intrinsically—though only partially—constitutive of the human social good. Aquinas makes a crucial shift away from Aristotle’s political primacy in his more pluralistic account of human sociability and emphasis on the extensiveness of the political good over the superiority of political activity per se. Nevertheless, there are essential human virtues—justice, love, generosity—that are uniquely, if not exclusively, fostered in political community and potentially realized in civic friendship. / text

Thesis advisor: R. Shep Melnick / This paper analyzes Pope Francis’s view of politics, particularly politics in the United States. Beginning with his speech before a special joint session of Congress on September 24, 2015, this paper explores many of the themes the Pope introduces in this speech, and compares those themes to those in other works he has published since being elected Pontiff in 2013. Then, this paper applies what he has said about contemporary American politics with the analysis of other scholars of American politics. Ultimately, I find that the Pope is very aware of problems in the United States, but hopes to present a positive alternative to address what he identifies as the contemporary world’s ills. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

The Common Good was the ancient patrimony of a Scottish burgh, and the central resource of urban government before local rates. By the early nineteenth century this revenue was under considerable strain due to rapid population growth and urban expansion. As pressure on urban institutions and resources increased, so did debts secured against the revenue stream from Common Good assets, anxieties about which triggered the campaign for burgh reform. In 1833, as the Burgh Reform Act changed the electoral basis of burgh government, Edinburgh was declared bankrupt due to levels of borrowing incurred to build and extend the New Town and to expand Leith harbour. This thesis uses Common Good accounts as its quantitative basis. The disbursements of extant accounts for the period 1820-56 were recorded and assigned analytical categories in order to compare expenditure of different types over time. Such detailed analysis constitutes a major contribution to the existing historiography of Scottish cities and local government, providing insight into changing spending and priorities, and the effects on the unravelling of the old political order. It also facilitates discussion of the changing nature of corruption and probity in public life during a period when expectations of those holding office changed substantially. In the 1820s burgh reform seemed likely, yet in responding to the challenges of urban government, the unreformed Council was innovative. Two case studies illustrate the contingency function of the Common Good. Whilst George IV’s visit is well-known, that the Council used Common Good money to provide civic hospitality and promotion is not. The Great Fires of Edinburgh of 1824 were very damaging, especially around Parliament Square, and the Council offered a sophisticated response using the resources of the Common Good which included emergency aid to those in need, and the establishment of the first municipal fire brigade. In 1833 Edinburgh was declared bankrupt, and the City’s assets were transferred to trustees appointed for the Creditors. Without control of its finances during protracted negotiations, the new, elected Council suffered from a ‘legitimacy deficit.’ The Settlement Act 1838 served to ‘translate’ the Burgh Reform Act, 1833 to Edinburgh’s needs, as it restructured municipal debt and gave Leith a portion of Edinburgh’s Common Good, which meant Leith could make use of its police burgh status gained in 1833. This case shows the higher importance of local legislation to a major city rather than general acts. With the problems of the former political system resolved, Edinburgh’s 1856 Extension Act expanded municipal boundaries and transferred police powers to the Council, so moving towards a unitary authority. Neither burgh reform nor the restructuring of local government can be understood without first analysing how the Common Good was used, and this thesis takes important strides in that direction.

In this work I investigate the role of emotion in the moral philosophies of Immanuel Kant and T.H. Green. Noting Kant's reputation as a rationalist holding a predominately negative view toward emotions, I studied the works of Kant with this two-fold question in mind: Why did Kant allegedly find emotions as hindrances to moral actions, and what exactly would such a view entail if it were indeed his perspective? Based on Kant's writings regarding duties to others in Doctrine of Virtues, I show that in his discussion on sympathetic actions there appears to be a reliance on emotions in the construction of a moral response to another's fate. I place Kant's theory in juxtaposition with T.H. Green's moral philosophy because Green, a lesser-known British Idealist, is commonly presented as a theorist within the Kantian tradition. However, working exclusively with Green's major work, Prolegomena to Ethics, there are notable differences between Kant and Green. Green does not hold a negative view of emotions as Kant did, and more fundamentally, the distinction between Kant and Green stems from their differing perspectives of human nature. Whereas Kant presented human nature as comprised of two coexisting, and conflicting, natures - the animal nature and the moral nature - Green dissolved this dualism by making reason that which unifies the human being's animal nature and moral nature. Hence, it is my purpose to study Green's moral philosophy against the backdrop of Kant's moral theory, with particular focus on the role of emotions and sympathy in human behavior. In this comparative analysis, I show how Green's theory, although heavily indebted to Kant, works to correct some problematic issues that arise from Kant's denigration of emotions inherent in his dualism. Furthermore, in this discussion that begins as an examination of two views on the relationship between emotions and morality, one is pressed to entertain a deeper question concerning how these thinkers arrived at their views of human nature. This progression is indeed appropriate, at least when considering Kant and Green, because their regard for emotions is directly dependent upon their views of human nature as distinct from animal nature. In the end, it is suggested that Green's theory not only serves to correct Kant's work, but by rectifying Kant's problematic dualistic view of human nature, Green created a philosophy all his own that may more accurately represent the true nature of humankind.

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 168-171).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-147)

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 156-162).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 168-171).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-147)

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan, SJ / Why should any society acknowledge and address recognition as a vital human need? This dissertation primarily sets out to offer a theological ethical response to this opportune and critical question. Fundamentally, it does not attempt to develop a new theory of recognition or, even, correct the existing ones. Rather, in agreement with the Aristotelian eudemonistic principle that the end of ethics is virtuous action and drawing on major theories of recognition, it highlights the necessity of acting virtuously in a manner that properly addresses the human need for due recognition. Its ultimate goal is to highlight the ethical significance of recognition as a vital human need. This goal is premised on the central thesis that all human beings need to be duly recognized and consistently treated as subjects with inherent dignity and fundamental rights; and, that failure to address the need for recognition leads to a catch-22 situation in human society. Therefore, it argues that doing a proper social ethics, especially Catholic Social Ethics, practically demands that we duly address the human need for recognition and explore how to integrate the habit of mutual recognition into the moral schemas of our societies so as to create a thriving culture of recognition – one that normalizes, prioritizes, and sustains mutual recognition as a common ground for negotiating the common good in modern multicultural and pluralistic societies. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.