Cross-national comparative approaches have yielded a rich set of insights about the diversity of national forms of contemporary capitalism, including the ways in which the organization of work and employment differs across countries. At the same time, the cross-national framework has also functioned in certain respects as a conceptual straitjacket, preventing us from recognizing alternative structuring principles in the macro context, and the existence of patterns that cut across national boundaries. The five papers that comprise this dissertation together seek to advance a dual agenda for advancing the macro-comparative study of work and employment, one that recognizes both the strengths and limitations of the cross-national framework. Looking at different sets of high- and middle-income countries, the papers use various statistical methods (including OLS and cross-classified multilevel regression models) to consider outcomes ranging from union organization to unemployment to non-standard working arrangements. On the one hand, this project offers new insights into the cross-national diversity of systems of work and employment. For example, one paper adds to our understanding of why rates of temporary employment vary so widely across national varieties of capitalism, and the reasons why increases in temporary employment have been so high in Continental European countries. On the other hand, the project also shows that certain features of work organization are structured more by occupational as opposed national distinctions, with particular occupational patterns extending across countries. Indeed, one paper demonstrates that patterns of "voluntary" as well as "involuntary" part-time employment vary much more along occupational as opposed to national lines, and that rates of part-time employment are not just high but remarkably uniform across countries for certain kinds of service workers. These and other findings from this dissertation add to our understanding of how national boundaries structure the landscape of work and employment, while also being cross-cut in important ways by other types of organizing logics. More broadly, they contribute to the development of a productive middle ground between perspectives that emphasize the persistence of cross-national differences in the organization of contemporary capitalism, and those stress similarities and shared trends.

In the past decades, European labour markets have undergone profound changes, witnessing a process of liberalisation and flexibilisation, in part through the spread of various forms of atypical employment. These new forms of employment have been argued to be of generally lower quality than standard employment, presenting several disadvantages across a range of employment-related dimensions. Nevertheless, the disadvantages experienced by atypical workers are argued to differ depending on nationally specific institutional settings, as employment regulations, welfare institutions and collective representation are commonly claimed to play a significant role in the shaping of disadvantage. Within the field of comparative political economy, a literature has emerged dealing with issues of dualisation and insider-outsider divides associated with these new forms of employment, mainly focusing on institutional divides in employment and welfare protection and political representation between standard and atypical workers and their consequences in terms of social inequalities. Authors within this literature have argued divides to be different across groups of countries within Europe. Specifically, an important distinction has been claimed to exist between Liberal countries, where divides are argued to be limited, and Southern European countries, where they are said to be among the highest. But this literature has mostly considered disadvantages from an institutional perspective, without empirically investigating whether institutional divides actually translate into individual disadvantages. At the same time, within sociology, authors have investigated individual disadvantages experienced by atypical workers under the broad concept of precariousness. Nevertheless, these scholars have not provided a systematic analysis of the relation between different institutional frameworks and individual disadvantages. This thesis aims at partly bridging these two literatures, by providing an analysis of how different institutional settings impact on disadvantages as experienced at the individual level. To do this, this thesis explores the disadvantages experienced by a specific category of atypical workers, namely temporary agency workers. It focuses on two countries which have been argued to present very different institutional divides across a broad range of employment-related dimensions. The UK is seen as the main example of Liberal country in the European context, providing limited employment protection to all workers, a fragmented system of industrial relations and a social protection system mainly based on means-testing and mostly aimed at poverty prevention. In contrast, Italy has been considered one of the European countries with the most highly segmented labour market, with high employment protection for core workers but very little for workers at the margin. At the same time, both its industrial relations system and it social protection system are said to strongly discriminate against people in atypical forms of employment. These claims are explored through semi-structured interviews with temporary agency workers in the service sector, trade unionists and other relevant stakeholders involved in atypical employment. The study demonstrates that temporary agency workers in the two countries experience partly different disadvantages. Although differences in the institutional settings can be said to contribute to explaining these differences, the analysis reveals a more complex picture. I show that institutional divides do not necessarily translate into individual disadvantages, as they interact among each other and with other factors in moulding individual experiences in a variety of ways. At the same time, individual disadvantages are present even when no institutional divide exists. Thus, the study argues that considering disadvantages only in terms of institutional divides oversimplifies a more complex and varied reality, and calls for more attention to be paid to how institutional divides are translated into individual disadvantages.

Bancos nacionais de desenvolvimento (BDs) são importantes braços financeiros e burocráticos do Poder Executivo na maior parte dos países, mas pouco se conhece sobre os elementos condicionantes de suas trajetórias e de seu papel. Esta tese analisa o desenvolvimento institucional dessas organizações a partir de bases sobre instituições financeiras de desenvolvimento (IFDs) no mundo e da comparação detalhada de três BDs: o KfW alemão, o brasileiro BNDES e a Nafin mexicana. A amostra global de países não revela convergência de trajetórias diferentemente, indica maior pluralidade de IFDs paralelamente ao desenvolvimento econômico e financeiro e ao aumento do controle da sociedade sobre o Executivo. Isso contraria proposições que apontam para a convergência a um sistema financeiro privado, com predomínio do mercado de capitais. A análise histórica mostra diferentes rotas dos BDs: (i) ampliação de área de atuação; (ii) redução e redefinição de atribuições e, no limite, (iii) extinção. As capacidades de autopreservação financeira e de adaptação às conjunturas e à agenda do Executivo são fatores de resiliência dessas instituições. O crescimento de atribuições, por sua vez, relaciona-se com o alargamento do campo politicamente negociado de atuação do BD no sistema financeiro. As trajetórias do KfW, expressão de um arranjo corporativista, e a do BNDES, de subordinação não mediada ao Executivo, caracterizam-se pelo estabelecimento de novas funções e competências ao longo do tempo. A configuração institucional do BNDES dá margem, contudo, a mudanças de diretrizes em razão da alternância de poder no Executivo e mesmo na sua direção característica desfavorável à pactuação e à continuidade de objetivos de longo prazo. O caso mexicano envolve a diminuição de escopo institucional no bojo de reformas liberais, com limitação ou extinção de capacidades de política pública. Palavras-chave: Bancos de desenvolvimento, Bancos públicos, Mudança institucional, Economia política comparada, KfW, BNDES, Nafin. / National development banks (NDBs) are important financial and bureaucratic arms of the Executive Power in most countries, yet little is known about their role and the elements that shape their trajectories. This thesis analyses the institutional development of these organizations based on development finance institutions (DFIs) around the world and on the comparison between three NDBs: the KfW in Germany, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and Mexicos Nafin. The global sample of countries does not reveal any convergence of trajectories. Instead, it indicates a greater number of DFIs running parallel to economic and financial development and the increase in control by society over the Executive. This counters propositions that place greater emphasis on trajectories that move in the direction of a private financial system with a greater role played by capital markets. The historical routes taken by the NDBs point to different trajectories: (i) expansion in the area of activity (ii) the reduction and re-definition of attributes and ultimately, (iii) extinction. The powers of financial self-preservation and adaptation to economic cycles and to the Executive agenda reflect the resilience of these institutions. The increase in attributes, in turn, is related to the expansion of the policatilly negotiated field of the NDB in the financial system. The trajectories of the KfW, reflecting a corporatist arrangement, and that of the BNDES, of unmediated subordination to the Executive, are characterized by the introduction of new functions and competences over time. The institutional configuration of the BNDES, however, leaves room for changes in guidelines based on alternating power within the Executive, and even in its management a feature which works against the consensus and continuity concerning long-term objectives. The Mexican example involves a decrease in the scope of liberal reforms, with the limitation or extinction of public policy capabilities.

Ce travail propose un retour sur la notion de "capitalisme d'État" sur les plans à la fois théorique et empirique, comparatif et monographique, afin de renouveler notre compréhension du rôle économique des États dans la période actuelle. Il repose sur un examen critique de contributions théoriques passées au sujet des relations État-marché, y compris notamment des écrits ayant abordé explicitement le "capitalisme d'État" durant le siècle dernier ainsi que ces dernières années. Il s'agit, de plus, de formuler et d'appliquer un nouveau cadre conceptuel et méthodologique rendant possible d'évaluer les modalités, sites institutionnels et degrés d'intensité du contrôle et de l'influence étatiques sur la vie économique. Enfin, ce travail incorpore une investigation en profondeur des manifestations institutionnelles et des ramifications sociétales des prérogatives économiques du parti-État en République populaire de Chine, la formation nationale la plus souvent identifiée au capitalisme d'État aujourd'hui. Cette étude constitue donc une tentative de démontrer la pertinence d'un concept de capitalisme d'État reconstruit pour une économie politique critique, en particulier vis-à-vis du programme de recherches actuel sur le capitalisme comparé. Elle vise, de plus, à assumer et à retravailler la problématique des acteurs sociaux et de la formation des élites afin de mieux élucider l'organisation et l'action de l'État capitaliste. Dans la mesure où elle contribue à éclairer la trajectoire de développement chinoise et la configuration politico-économique actuelle du pays, cette étude représente aussi un effort en vue de mieux intégrer le cas chinois dans la recherche comparative en économie politique. / This study seeks to revisit the notion of "state capitalism", at once theoretically and empirically, comparatively and monographically, in view of renewing the critical understanding of the state's involvement in capitalist markets in the current period. This endeavour is premised on a critical examination of the extant theoretical literature on state-market relations, including past writings that have grappled explicitly with "state capitalism", both in the previous century and in recent years. It entails, further, the design and implementation of a novel conceptual-methodological framework for the comparative assessment of degrees, modalities, and institutional sites of state control and influence over the economic process. Finally, it features an in-depth investigation of the institutional instantiations and societal ramifications of the party-state's economic attributions in the People's Republic of China, the national formation most frequently identified with state capitalism today. Overall, this study embodies an attempt to vindicate the relevance of a reconstructed concept of state capitalism for critical political economy, and specifically for the research agenda on comparative capitalism. Additionally, it purports to reclaim the problematics of social agency and elite formation in relation to the elucidation of the capitalist state. In so far as it sheds light on China's development trajectory in the reform era and on its present-day political-economic configuration, this study also represents an effort to further the integration of China within comparative research in political economy.

Bancos nacionais de desenvolvimento (BDs) são importantes braços financeiros e burocráticos do Poder Executivo na maior parte dos países, mas pouco se conhece sobre os elementos condicionantes de suas trajetórias e de seu papel. Esta tese analisa o desenvolvimento institucional dessas organizações a partir de bases sobre instituições financeiras de desenvolvimento (IFDs) no mundo e da comparação detalhada de três BDs: o KfW alemão, o brasileiro BNDES e a Nafin mexicana. A amostra global de países não revela convergência de trajetórias diferentemente, indica maior pluralidade de IFDs paralelamente ao desenvolvimento econômico e financeiro e ao aumento do controle da sociedade sobre o Executivo. Isso contraria proposições que apontam para a convergência a um sistema financeiro privado, com predomínio do mercado de capitais. A análise histórica mostra diferentes rotas dos BDs: (i) ampliação de área de atuação; (ii) redução e redefinição de atribuições e, no limite, (iii) extinção. As capacidades de autopreservação financeira e de adaptação às conjunturas e à agenda do Executivo são fatores de resiliência dessas instituições. O crescimento de atribuições, por sua vez, relaciona-se com o alargamento do campo politicamente negociado de atuação do BD no sistema financeiro. As trajetórias do KfW, expressão de um arranjo corporativista, e a do BNDES, de subordinação não mediada ao Executivo, caracterizam-se pelo estabelecimento de novas funções e competências ao longo do tempo. A configuração institucional do BNDES dá margem, contudo, a mudanças de diretrizes em razão da alternância de poder no Executivo e mesmo na sua direção característica desfavorável à pactuação e à continuidade de objetivos de longo prazo. O caso mexicano envolve a diminuição de escopo institucional no bojo de reformas liberais, com limitação ou extinção de capacidades de política pública. Palavras-chave: Bancos de desenvolvimento, Bancos públicos, Mudança institucional, Economia política comparada, KfW, BNDES, Nafin. / National development banks (NDBs) are important financial and bureaucratic arms of the Executive Power in most countries, yet little is known about their role and the elements that shape their trajectories. This thesis analyses the institutional development of these organizations based on development finance institutions (DFIs) around the world and on the comparison between three NDBs: the KfW in Germany, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and Mexicos Nafin. The global sample of countries does not reveal any convergence of trajectories. Instead, it indicates a greater number of DFIs running parallel to economic and financial development and the increase in control by society over the Executive. This counters propositions that place greater emphasis on trajectories that move in the direction of a private financial system with a greater role played by capital markets. The historical routes taken by the NDBs point to different trajectories: (i) expansion in the area of activity (ii) the reduction and re-definition of attributes and ultimately, (iii) extinction. The powers of financial self-preservation and adaptation to economic cycles and to the Executive agenda reflect the resilience of these institutions. The increase in attributes, in turn, is related to the expansion of the policatilly negotiated field of the NDB in the financial system. The trajectories of the KfW, reflecting a corporatist arrangement, and that of the BNDES, of unmediated subordination to the Executive, are characterized by the introduction of new functions and competences over time. The institutional configuration of the BNDES, however, leaves room for changes in guidelines based on alternating power within the Executive, and even in its management a feature which works against the consensus and continuity concerning long-term objectives. The Mexican example involves a decrease in the scope of liberal reforms, with the limitation or extinction of public policy capabilities.

A central theme in the comparative political economy of the welfare state is the complementaries between political institutions, social policy, and labour markets. Yet little has been written to uncover this political-economic nexus in China, the world’s second largest economy. This thesis partly addresses this gap by studying the country’s public pension arrangement, the most expensive component of the Chinese welfare state. It reveals the working of the political-economic nexus in contemporary China by showing how it leads to two puzzling characteristics of the Chinese pension system, namely the rapid expansion in the absence of electoral pressures and the persistent regional fragmentation despite an authoritarian central government. It argues that the decentralised authoritarianism, in which China’s authoritarian central state delegates to regional governments and motivates them to achieve its developmental goals, drives municipal authorities to compete with each other in generating economic growth. In the inter-municipal economic competition, local leaders adopt an expansionary yet localising pension policy. This facilitates the formation of specific industrial skills, which are productive for particular local industries, and the retention of skilled industrial workers. All of this is important to local economic development in a context of industrial upgrading and labour market tightening. It is argued this is the political-economic logic of China’s pension system.

This thesis examines the conditions under which democratically elected policymakers are more likely to provide policies that compensate individuals that lose from international trade. It develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework of compensation in open economies that accounts for differences in the degree to which governments benefit losers from trade. It first develops a theory of preference formation based on economic geography, and then argues that electoral and legislative institutions jointly condition the supply of compensation. The theoretical analysis provides three sets of observable implications evaluated using micro- and macro-level data in Europe and Latin America. First, exposure to international competition increases demand for policy that compensates for the costs of trade, but this effect is more pronounced among those individuals in economically specialised and uncompetitive contexts where reemployment in the event of a shock is difficult. Second, policymakers in proportional electoral systems face weak incentives to target trade losers in geographically concentrated and uncompetitive regions. In contrast, majoritarian institutions generate incentives to increase compensation when trade losers are geographically concentrated. Another implication is that under some conditions, the presence of a strong upper house that represents regional interests dampens the provision of compensation, and the relative effect of electoral rules. The empirical implications of the argument are tested using a multi-method research strategy that combines cross-national and case study analyses and draws on quantitative and qualitative techniques. Chapter 3 tests the micro-level implications of the model using survey data for European regions over 2002-2006. The findings indicate that regional economic specialization and regional competitiveness jointly condition the impact of trade on preferences for compensation. Chapter 4 systematically tests the extent to which the geographical concentration of trade losers conditions the effect of electoral institutions on levels of compensation. It uses panel data from 14 European countries from 1980 to 2010. The findings indicate that where trade losers are concentrated, lower district magnitude leads to more compensation. Chapters 5 and 6 conduct case studies of compensation in Spain and Argentina, both countries that underwent deep liberalisation and offer significant variation at the regional and institutional level. Chapter 5 explores preferences over compensation in selected regions in Spain and Argentina, and shows that regional specialisation and competitiveness were important in shaping levels of support for compensation. Chapter 6 examines the role of electoral institutions and legislative veto bargaining in shaping the politics of compensation in Spain and Argentina.

日本的經濟外交政策屬於外交政策的一環，但也由於其牽涉到使用經濟手段而有了特殊性，亦即必須在國際格局之外，兼顧國內政治經濟的環境變動因素，因此本文試圖從日本的國內政經聯盟變化，包含政黨、官僚、財界等所組成之鐵三角及民間社會因素的開放性多元互動，去探討其對外經濟外交政策演變之影響。本文從比較政治經濟途徑切入具體的研究個案，以日本對中國之有償日圓借款於1979年的開始至2005年決議結束這兩個時間點觀察，突顯出經濟外交政策乃受到國內政經環境的影響，而「國家」以外的「社會」因素又如何能夠在這兩個時間點，藉由各種和政黨或官僚之聯盟關係影響政策之演變。本文透過質量化方法研究發現，當政經聯盟的主要行動者間有足夠之共同利益時，將會尋求結盟但不打破鐵三角的方式產出有利的政策結果，而對中有償借款之結束，恰是財界角色的誘因從開始的強力運作到後來轉為逐漸淡出，再加上民意相對於開始時產生的巨大反差，使得在這兩個時間點有著截然不同的政策產出結果，亦即該政策的變化被「利益」和「民意」兩項決定性因素所交叉影響著。