Several models of animal associative learning are described. The evidence for the concept of associability is reviewed. The review contains a detailed account of blocking, including the Mackintosh, Bygrave and Picton (1977) experiment. It is shown that the two major associability models need to be modified, mathematically, to simulate the results of this experiment. A general, simple framework for investigating putative associability changes is suggested. A review of stimulus pre-exposure effects is put into this framework, and indicates a suitable direction for research. The experiments looked for associability changes of both conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. Sometimes the stimulus was a predictor of subsequent events; if not, it was predicted by another stimulus. A variety of procedures was employed. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 tried to replicate and extend previous work with a conditioned stimulus predicting subsequent events, but they were unsuccessful. Experiments 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 investigated whether conditioned and unconditioned stimuli would change in associability when they were well predicted. Unfortunately, the data were difficult to interpret. An appetitive-aversive transfer paradigm was used in Experiments 9, 10, and 11; there was some evidence that a tone could change in associability, both when it was acting as a predictor, and when it was being predicted. Alternative Interpretations were also discussed. In Experiments 12 and 13, a shock was used to predict the occurrence of food; and there was no evidence that the associability of the shock could be increased in this way.

Two experimental studies were reported in which attempts were made to increase resistance to the negative effects of set. Set interference was measured by performance on 1) a task in which a set was experimentally induced, 2) a series of problems presumed to involve implicit sets, and 3) a test of creativity presumed to involve implicit sets. The experimental treatments consisted of tasks which required set-breaking. An important aspect of this research was that no hints or instructions concerning sets were provided. The findings offer modest support for the view that learning experiences can be designed which will increase resistance to interference from set. Suggestions for future research on this problem were discussed. These experiments utilized a novel research design in which each group of subjects acted as both an experimental and a control group. Thus, each study was, in essence, two studies. The advantages and limitations of this design were discussed.

No description available.

Domestic dogs have co-habited with humans for at least 15000 years. Close social interaction between the two species has promoted inter-specific communication and dogs now show advanced skills in responding to human signals in comparison to wolves. However, research into dogs' abilities to interpret human signals has predominantly focussed on visual gestures, while their responses to vocal signals remain under-investigated. Exploring the perception of human speech by dogs, a phylogenetically distant species, could provide new insights into the evolution of mammal communication. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to assess human speech perception by dogs. Speech is composed of two main communicative components: the segmental phonemic cues carrying the linguistic content and the supra-segmental cues transmitting information about the speaker such as their gender, age and emotional state. I first explore how dogs perceive supra-segmental cues, determining that they are capable of the cross-modal discrimination of human gender. I then provide a review detailing the mechanisms underlying cross-modal associations in mammal communication, before testing which of these mechanisms may enable dogs to cross-modally associate cues to human age. The results indicate that dogs learn to match some voices to humans according to their age category, while also perceiving more general cross-modal correspondences in the environment. Finally, I investigate how dogs dissociate the main communicatory components of speech during processing, providing evidence that dogs differentially process segmental and supra-segmental cues according to their communicative content. In doing so, dogs appear to express parallel hemispheric biases to those reported in humans. Additionally, the results provide the first clear demonstration that dogs attend to the combinatory structure of the phonemic content in learnt commands. Overall, this thesis extends our knowledge of dogs' perception of human signals, indicating that they are capable of perceiving each of the main components of speech in a functionally relevant manner. Together the results suggest that dogs share some of the cognitive and social processes involved in speech perception with human listeners.

<p> The purpose of this study was to examine whether intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religious motivations mediate the relationship between the religious philosophy and perceived well-being of believers. The intrinsic-extrinsic-quest paradigm has been the dominant measure of religious motivation for more than 3 decades. However, the different effects of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest motivation on the well-being of believers has not been tested on a stratified, purposeful sample of the major world religions. A quantitative, quasi-experimental research design was used with an online, self-report questionnaire and mediation analysis to examine the effects of religious motivation on the relationship between religious philosophy and well-being. A stratified, purposeful sample of 763 members of the major world religions completed assessments of religion and well-being. Linear regressions revealed that intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religious motivations were three distinct constructs, that they do exist across the world religions, and that they mediated the relationship between different religions and well-being, depending on which predictor and outcome variables were being examined in the mediation triangle. Positive social change is possible for counselors, therapists, psychologists of religion, religious leaders, and laypersons at the individual and societal level through knowing which religious beliefs, motivations, and practices are associated with positive affect, satisfaction with life, the fulfilment of basic human needs, eudaimonic well-being, and better physical health. Individuals come to religion mainly during times of personal crises as a way of coping, expecting urgent results, and these findings illuminate the effectiveness of their chosen coping strategy. </p>

Issued also as Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Bibliography: p. 56-57.

A satisfactory account of human cognitive evolution will explain not only the psychological mechanisms that make our species unique, but also how, when, and why these traits evolved. To date, researchers have made substantial progress toward defining uniquely human aspects of cognition, but considerably less effort has been devoted to questions about the evolutionary processes through which these traits have arisen. In this article, I aim to link these complementary aims by synthesizing recent advances in our understanding of what makes human cognition unique, with theory and data regarding the processes of cognitive evolution. I review evidence that uniquely human cognition depends on synergism between both representational and motivational factors and is unlikely to be accounted for by changes to any singular cognitive system. I argue that, whereas no nonhuman animal possesses the full constellation of traits that define the human mind, homologies and analogies of critical aspects of human psychology can be found in diverse nonhuman taxa. I suggest that phylogenetic approaches to the study of animal cognition-which can address questions about the selective pressures and proximate mechanisms driving cognitive change-have the potential to yield important insights regarding the processes through which the human cognitive phenotype evolved.

The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a receptive vocabulary measure, and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), a measure of general intelligence, have been two tests widely used by educators and psychologists, respectively. In addition to being used as a measure of receptive vocabulary, the PPVT was frequently used as a measure of intelligence. While the authors of the PPVT established IQ scores, this use of the PPVT frequently brought criticism from professional psychologists who felt that the test was not comprehensive enough to be used as a measure of general intelligence. The PPVT was revised in 1981, and the term "IQ" was no longer used as a descriptive term for the standardized scores. The authors clearly stated that the PPVT-R measured only one important facet of intelligence: receptive vocabulary. The revised version's age range expanded to 2 1/2 through 40. The changes in the revision of the WAIS, also introduced in 1981, were not as significant as those of the PPVT-R. The WAIS-R was standardized for adults over the age of 16, so the PPVT-R and the WAIS-R share a larger age range (16-40) than did the original two versions (ages 16-18). The inclusion of adult norms on the PPVT-R make it possible to examine the relationship between receptive vocabulary (as measured by the PPVT-R) and general intelligence (as measured by the WAIS-R) for adults of average intelligence. Through this study, sixty subjects between the ages of 16 and 33 were compared on these two instruments. Subjects were volunteers drawn primarily from a college population. Correlations, regression equations, and standard errors of estimate were obtained for the Total sample: Males, Females, Younger (CA 16-23), and older (CA 24-33). Data from age by sex cells (Younger Males, Older Males, Youngei Females and Older Females) were also examined, but were interpreted cautiously due to the small sample size (N=15) in these cells. Results indicated that the PPVT-R (Form L) and WAIS-R (all three scales) have much commonality and significant correlations for all groups. There was one exception of a non-significant correlation with the Performance Scale for the Older group. The age by sex data revealed that the Older Female sub-group correlations between tests were not statistically significant. However, it was recognized that this sub-group was very restricted and probably not representative of females aged 24-33. Cautions regarding interpretation of the data are given. The lack of available information on comparison of these two frequently used tests leaves this area open for continued research.

The ability to infer the invisible displacement of objects has long been thought to elude most species with the exception of humans and great apes. However, in recent years, a number of researchers have proposed that this elusive capacity, rather than reflecting profound differences in the conceptual abilities of monkeys and other nonprimates, may instead reflect differences in processing capacities (such as inhibition and working memory). This thesis investigated knowledge of occluded object movements involving gravity, in rhesus and stumptail macaques (Macaca mulatta and arctoides), and two- and three-year-old children (Homo sapiens). In the first part of the thesis, using manual search tasks, a behavioural analysis revealed a number of biases that influence search on invisible displacement tasks, but also showed that contrary to the contentions of some authors, these biases do not mask the existence of correct representations. One study did reveal how seemingly mundane differences between tasks might lead to markedly different patterns of search and emergence of biases. In the second part of the thesis, in the first direct test of the prediction-postdiction hypothesis, an analysis of anticipatory eye gaze suggested that an inability to predict the location of an object does not account for the looking-searching dissociation that has become so prevalent in both the developmental and comparative literature. In attempting to bring together the findings from all the chapters, a framework is suggested in which representations are viewed as differing in strength such that the strength of a representation may determine whether or not a pre-existing bias surfaces in behaviour.

<p>What makes our minds human? How did they evolve to be this way? This dissertation presents data from two complementary lines of research driven by these orienting questions. The first of these explores the `what' of human cognitive evolution through comparative studies with chimpanzees and bonobos. The general aim of these studies is to understand which aspects of cognition are unique to humans, and which are shared with our closest living relatives. Chapters 2-3 test the hypothesis that humans have unique cognitive skills for reasoning about the attention of other individuals (theory of mind), and unique motivation to use these skills in cooperative contexts with conspecifics. In Chapter 2 I show that understanding others' attention is unlikely to be the `small difference that makes the big difference', as some researchers have proposed. However, my data support the possibility that species differences in the ontogeny of these skills may have robust consequences for the adult cognitive phenotype. In Chapter 3 I show that (contrary to previous reports) nonhuman apes are also motivated to engage in some simple triadic social activities, which resemble those characteristic of human children. Again however, I identify important differences between humans and other apes in their spontaneous preferences for these types of activities, and their attitudes toward a partner when cooperative behaviors are interrupted. The second half of this dissertation (Chapters 4-5) explores the `why' and `how' of cognitive evolution. Chapter 4 outlines the kind of research questions and methods that comparative psychologists will need to embrace in order to use the comparative method to its full potential in the study of cognitive evolution. Chapter 5 provides a proof of principle for this approach using a dataset including 33 species tested on two cognitive tasks measuring inhibitory control. Here I show that cognitive skills for inhibitory control are closely related to phylogeny across species, and strongly predicted by absolute (but not relative) brain size. Further, I show that two of the other leading hypotheses put forth to explain primate intelligence, namely sociality and diet, do not predict cognitive skills on these tasks. These data illustrate the power of the comparative method for understanding cognitive evolution, and provide a starting point for future studies embracing this approach. Collectively, this research refines our understanding of how human cognition differs from that of other primates, and illustrates the utility of studying cognitive evolution from an explicitly phylogenetic comparative framework.</p> / Dissertation