A separação histórica entre as ciências naturais e as ciências sociais fundamenta-se na distinção ontológica entre os domínios da natureza e da cultura, e na ideia moderna de que a condição (cultural) humana corresponde a um afastamento radical dos outros animais. Porém, somando-se a outros críticos insatisfeitos com essa visão dualista, muitos estudiosos do comportamento animal tem utilizado o termo cultura em referência a não humanos, provocando uma controvérsia que ainda parece longe de um consenso. Neste trabalho, investiguei o sentido da noção de cultura para os antropólogos e o uso etológico (limitando-nos aos primatas) do termo, com os objetivos de compreender melhor a controvérsia e identificar caminhos possíveis na busca por um consenso. Na Antropologia, a noção moderna de cultura se desenvolveu do século XIX até os anos 1950. Cultura passou a ser vista como um fenômeno emergente exclusivamente humano, dependente de nossa capacidade de utilizar símbolos e correspondendo aos padrões e normas comportamentais, artefatos, ideias e, principalmente, valores que os indivíduos adquirem no processo de socialização. Mais recentemente, essa concepção de cultura, e a epistemologia dualista que a sustenta, tem sido alvo de críticas e intenso debate. Ainda que não compartilhem um arcabouço teórico comum, virtualmente todos os antropólogos contemporâneos concordam que o comportamento cultural humano é fundamentalmente simbólico. A discussão recente em torno da atribuição de cultura a primatas não humanos remonta aos estudiosos japoneses que, na década de 1950, acompanharam a dispersão de uma nova técnica de manipulação de alimento em Macaca fuscata, e descreveram o fenômeno com os termos pré-cultura, subcultura e cultura infra-humana. A partir da década de 1960, as pesquisas de campo com populações selvagens e as evidências experimentais de aprendizagem em contexto social levaram ao estabelecimento da Primatologia Cultural e os prefixos foram abandonados. Entre primatólogos, o termo cultura se refere a padrões comportamentais que dependem de um contexto social para se desenvolver, e que podem atravessar gerações. Eu sugiro uma estratégia analítica que distingue os motivos de discordância entre descrições, explicações, teorias e visões de mundo, e argumento que a controvérsia é complexa e inclui discordâncias entre visões de mundo sem, no entanto, dividir os envolvidos em grupos homogêneos (digamos, primatólogos contra antropólogos). Por conta disso, a redefinição e o uso que os primatólogos fazem do termo acabam por manter ilesos os fundamentos da dicotomia natureza/cultura, o que pode explicar, parcialmente, a manutenção da controvérsia. Concluo que o diálogo entre os dois lados da fronteira será imprescindível para os pesquisadores que estiverem interessados em buscar uma abordagem consensual. É possível alcançar um consenso, mas a busca por uma abordagem sintética do comportamento animal que inclua os humanos deverá levar ao abandono ou reconstrução das dualidades natureza/cultura, inato/adquirido e gene/ambiente, e também da atribuição de primazia causal aos genes. Além disso, é necessário discutir a fundo sobre como incluir a questão do simbolismo e do significado em uma perspectiva comparativa / The Western ontological distinction between nature and culture, and the idea that the human (cultural) condition makes us radically different from other animals, are evident in the historical separation between the natural and social sciences. In parallel to other critics of this dualist view, some animal behaviorists have been using the term culture in relation to nonhumans, starting a controversy that is still far from cooling down. In this study, I investigated the meaning of the term culture as used by anthropologists, and also its recent use by ethologists (limiting myself to primatology), in order to better understand the controversy and identify possible paths that might lead to a consensus. In Anthropology, the modern concept of culture developed between the 19th century and the 1950s. It came to be seen as an emergent phenomenon exclusive to human social life. It was dependent on our capacity to use symbols and corresponded to behavioral patterns and norms, artifacts, ideas, and values that individuals acquire in the process of socialization. But this conception of culture, and the dualist epistemology supporting it, have since been largely criticized and intensely debated. Although contemporary anthropologists do not share a common ground or framework, virtually all of them agree that human cultural behavior is fundamentally symbolic. Recent attribution of culture to nonhuman primates started with Japanese scholars who, from the 1950s onward, have followed closely the spread of novel behaviors in Macaca fuscata, which they described with expressions such as preculture, subculture and infrahuman culture. Since the 1960s, field studies on wild populations and experimental research on learning in a social context, have led to the establishment of Cultural Primatology, and the prefixes were abandoned. Among primatologists, the term culture refers to behavioral patterns that depend on the social context to develop and that might be recurrent through generations. I suggest that it might be analytically useful to distinguish the matters of a disagreement between descriptions, explanations, theories and worldviews, and argue that this controversy goes all the way up to the highest reason of disagreement (worldviews). Still, one cannot divide those involved in it into a few homogeneous groups (say, primatologists contra anthropologists). Primatologists redefinition and use of the term do not alter the foundations of the criticized nature/culture dichotomy, and that might at least partially explain the maintenance of the controversy. It is possible to reach a consensus, but the search for a synthetic framework for animal behavior that includes humans might lead to the abandonment or reconstruction of the related dichotomies of nature/culture, innate/acquired and gene/environment, as well as of the causal primacy attributed to genes. It is also necessary to discuss how to include symbols and meanings in a comparative perspective

Gegenstand dieser Dissertation war die Frage, wie Menschenaffen physische Beziehungen zwischen Objekten verstehen. In der ersten Studie (STUDIE I) wurden drei Menschenaffenarten und Kinder mit einem Problem konfrontiert, dessen Lösung die Verwendung eines flüssigen Werkzeugs (Wasser) erforderte. Schimpansen und Kinder entdeckten einsichtsvoll eine Lösung, um an eine Belohnung (Erdnuss) zu gelangen, die sich außerhalb ihrer Reichweite befand. Verschiedene Kontrollbedingungen untermauerten die Zielgerichtetheit des Verhaltens der erfolgreichen Schimpansen. Die getesteten Gorillas und die Orang-Utans konnten die Aufgabe nicht lösen. Zwei weitere Studien widmeten sich der Frage, ob Schimpansen Gewicht als kausal relevantes Unterscheidungsmerkmal nutzen können. In STUDIE II war es Aufgabe der Schimpansen aus insgesamt fünf in Form und Größe identischen Flaschen diejenige zu finden, die als einzige Fruchtsaft enthielt, wobei diese sich entweder durch ihr Gewicht (kausales Merkmal) oder durch ihre Farbmarkierung (arbiträres Merkmal) von den anderen Flaschen unterschied. Es zeigte sich, dass die Testtiere schnell lernten, den kausal relevanten Hinweisreiz zu nutzen, dies ihnen jedoch anhand des arbiträren Hinweisreizes nicht gelang. In STUDIE III waren Schimpansen entweder Zeuge einer kausal informativen Ereignisabfolge (hervorgerufen durch die physische Wirkung des Futters) oder einer rein arbiträren (hervorgerufen durch ein Ereignis, dass in keinerlei kausalem Zusammenhang zum Futter stand). Auch hier waren die Tiere nur dann erfolgreich, wenn die Testsituation kausale Rückschlüsse ermöglichte. Zusammenfassend lassen sich die Daten dahingehend interpretieren, dass – ähnlich wie bei Menschen – die kausale Kognition bei Schimpansen nicht nur auf rein perzeptuellen Informationen, sondern zudem auf strukturellen Abstraktionen ihrer physischen Umgebung beruht. / This thesis focused on the topic of primates’ understanding of physical object–object relations. In the first study (STUDY I), three great ape species and human children were confronted with a problem that required the use of a liquid tool in order to access a reward (peanut). Without any training, some chimpanzees and human children found the solution in an insightful way. Several control conditions confirmed the goal directedness of chimpanzees’ behavior. None of the tested gorilla and orangutan subjects were successful. The next two studies addressed chimpanzees’ notion of weight as a causally relevant object property. In STUDY II, chimpanzees were required to detect a bottle containing juice from five opaque bottles of equal shape and size. The bottle of juice differed either by weight (causal property) or by color (arbitrary property) from the other bottles. It turned out that subjects readily inferred the bottle of juice from its causally relevant property but were not able to use the arbitrary cue during the course of the experiment. In STUDY III chimpanzees had to infer the location of a reward (banana) by passively watching an external procedure. Two kinds of event sequences were presented: a causally informative sequence (derived from the physical effect of the reward) and a completely arbitrary sequence (derived from an action unrelated to the reward). Again, chimpanzees performed more correctly when the situation allowed for causal judgments but failed to make useful inferences when the underlying logic was arbitrary. Taking together all of the current data, I suggest that—similar to in humans—chimpanzees’ causal cognition is based not only on perceptual information but also on structural abstraction about their physical environment.

A separação histórica entre as ciências naturais e as ciências sociais fundamenta-se na distinção ontológica entre os domínios da natureza e da cultura, e na ideia moderna de que a condição (cultural) humana corresponde a um afastamento radical dos outros animais. Porém, somando-se a outros críticos insatisfeitos com essa visão dualista, muitos estudiosos do comportamento animal tem utilizado o termo cultura em referência a não humanos, provocando uma controvérsia que ainda parece longe de um consenso. Neste trabalho, investiguei o sentido da noção de cultura para os antropólogos e o uso etológico (limitando-nos aos primatas) do termo, com os objetivos de compreender melhor a controvérsia e identificar caminhos possíveis na busca por um consenso. Na Antropologia, a noção moderna de cultura se desenvolveu do século XIX até os anos 1950. Cultura passou a ser vista como um fenômeno emergente exclusivamente humano, dependente de nossa capacidade de utilizar símbolos e correspondendo aos padrões e normas comportamentais, artefatos, ideias e, principalmente, valores que os indivíduos adquirem no processo de socialização. Mais recentemente, essa concepção de cultura, e a epistemologia dualista que a sustenta, tem sido alvo de críticas e intenso debate. Ainda que não compartilhem um arcabouço teórico comum, virtualmente todos os antropólogos contemporâneos concordam que o comportamento cultural humano é fundamentalmente simbólico. A discussão recente em torno da atribuição de cultura a primatas não humanos remonta aos estudiosos japoneses que, na década de 1950, acompanharam a dispersão de uma nova técnica de manipulação de alimento em Macaca fuscata, e descreveram o fenômeno com os termos pré-cultura, subcultura e cultura infra-humana. A partir da década de 1960, as pesquisas de campo com populações selvagens e as evidências experimentais de aprendizagem em contexto social levaram ao estabelecimento da Primatologia Cultural e os prefixos foram abandonados. Entre primatólogos, o termo cultura se refere a padrões comportamentais que dependem de um contexto social para se desenvolver, e que podem atravessar gerações. Eu sugiro uma estratégia analítica que distingue os motivos de discordância entre descrições, explicações, teorias e visões de mundo, e argumento que a controvérsia é complexa e inclui discordâncias entre visões de mundo sem, no entanto, dividir os envolvidos em grupos homogêneos (digamos, primatólogos contra antropólogos). Por conta disso, a redefinição e o uso que os primatólogos fazem do termo acabam por manter ilesos os fundamentos da dicotomia natureza/cultura, o que pode explicar, parcialmente, a manutenção da controvérsia. Concluo que o diálogo entre os dois lados da fronteira será imprescindível para os pesquisadores que estiverem interessados em buscar uma abordagem consensual. É possível alcançar um consenso, mas a busca por uma abordagem sintética do comportamento animal que inclua os humanos deverá levar ao abandono ou reconstrução das dualidades natureza/cultura, inato/adquirido e gene/ambiente, e também da atribuição de primazia causal aos genes. Além disso, é necessário discutir a fundo sobre como incluir a questão do simbolismo e do significado em uma perspectiva comparativa / The Western ontological distinction between nature and culture, and the idea that the human (cultural) condition makes us radically different from other animals, are evident in the historical separation between the natural and social sciences. In parallel to other critics of this dualist view, some animal behaviorists have been using the term culture in relation to nonhumans, starting a controversy that is still far from cooling down. In this study, I investigated the meaning of the term culture as used by anthropologists, and also its recent use by ethologists (limiting myself to primatology), in order to better understand the controversy and identify possible paths that might lead to a consensus. In Anthropology, the modern concept of culture developed between the 19th century and the 1950s. It came to be seen as an emergent phenomenon exclusive to human social life. It was dependent on our capacity to use symbols and corresponded to behavioral patterns and norms, artifacts, ideas, and values that individuals acquire in the process of socialization. But this conception of culture, and the dualist epistemology supporting it, have since been largely criticized and intensely debated. Although contemporary anthropologists do not share a common ground or framework, virtually all of them agree that human cultural behavior is fundamentally symbolic. Recent attribution of culture to nonhuman primates started with Japanese scholars who, from the 1950s onward, have followed closely the spread of novel behaviors in Macaca fuscata, which they described with expressions such as preculture, subculture and infrahuman culture. Since the 1960s, field studies on wild populations and experimental research on learning in a social context, have led to the establishment of Cultural Primatology, and the prefixes were abandoned. Among primatologists, the term culture refers to behavioral patterns that depend on the social context to develop and that might be recurrent through generations. I suggest that it might be analytically useful to distinguish the matters of a disagreement between descriptions, explanations, theories and worldviews, and argue that this controversy goes all the way up to the highest reason of disagreement (worldviews). Still, one cannot divide those involved in it into a few homogeneous groups (say, primatologists contra anthropologists). Primatologists redefinition and use of the term do not alter the foundations of the criticized nature/culture dichotomy, and that might at least partially explain the maintenance of the controversy. It is possible to reach a consensus, but the search for a synthetic framework for animal behavior that includes humans might lead to the abandonment or reconstruction of the related dichotomies of nature/culture, innate/acquired and gene/environment, as well as of the causal primacy attributed to genes. It is also necessary to discuss how to include symbols and meanings in a comparative perspective

The principle of least effort suggests that animals should minimize effort to reinforcement. Thus, not pecking should be preferred over pecking. However, pigeons often peck when it is allowed but not required (e.g., fixed time schedules) but pecking may be adventitiously reinforced. In the present experiment, to better compare a schedule of reinforcement that requires pecking with one that requires the absence of pecking, we compared a fixed-interval (FI) schedule in which reinforcement follows the first peck after the interval has elapsed and a differential-reinforcement-of-other behavior (DRO) schedule which requires pigeons abstain from pecking for a similar interval. The delay to reinforcement was matched on a trial-by-trial basis by extending the duration of the FI to match the DRO schedule that preceded it. Of 12 pigeons, 6 preferred the DRO schedule over the FI schedule and 6 did not show a schedule preference. Those that were indifferent between the schedules had acquired the contingences, as they responded appropriately to the two schedules but had a spatial preference stronger than their schedule preference. Individual differences in the preference of the pigeons may be related to their behavior during the DRO.

Attitudes are usually defined as feelings for or against something (Remmers and Gage, 1955). They are very important in the lives of people because they help determine future success in an individual's life. Because of them one works to get the things he wants, one votes for or against certain issues, one joins a cause, opposes something, or attempts to influence others.

Despite having being discovered nearly 80 years ago, bonobos (Pan paniscus) are still one of the least well understood of the great apes, largely remaining in the shadow of their better known cousins, the chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). This is especially evident in the domain of communication, with bonobo vocal behaviour still a neglected field of study, especially compared to that of chimpanzees. In this thesis, I address this issue by exploring the natural vocal communication of bonobos and its underlying cognition, focusing on the role that vocalisations play during two key contexts, food discovery and sex. In the context of food-discovery, I combine observational and experimental techniques to examine whether bonobos produce and understand vocalisations that convey meaningful information about the quality of food encountered by the caller. Results indicate that bonobos produce an array of vocalisations when finding food, and combine different food-associated calls together into sequences in a way that relates to perceived food quality. In a subsequent playback study, it was demonstrated that receivers are able to extract meaning about perceived food quality by attending to these calls and integrating information across call sequences. In the context of sexual interactions, I examine the acoustic structure of female copulation calls, as well as patterns in call usage, to explore how these signals are used by individuals. My results show that females emit copulation calls in similar ways with both male and female partners, suggesting that these signals have become partly divorced from a function in reproduction, to assume a greater social role. Overall, my results highlight the relevance of studying primate vocalisations to investigate the underlying cognition and suggest that vocalisations are important behavioural tools for bonobos to navigate their social and physical worlds.

Non-math majors enrolled in lower-division math courses at an urban university were surveyed on their math attitudes, coping behaviors, and math anxiety (MATHANX). The Revised Ways of Coping Checklist (RWCC), Revised Math Anxiety Rating Scale, and other questions were presented to 30 men and 32 women. Hierarchical regressions showed that after controlling for attitudinal covariates, emotion-focused coping behaviors (EMOTFOC) were strongly associated with MATHANX (F(5,54)=18.66, 12 < .0001), but problem-focused coping behaviors (PROBFOC) were not. The RWCC subscale most highly correlated with MATHANX was Wishful Thinking (r = .70, p < .0001). Ss were then dichotomized on PROBFOC and EMOTFOC, providing four behavioral groups. An ANCOVA controlling for attitudinal covariates showed behavioral group membership significant with respect to MATHANX (F(3,58)=6.07, p < .001), and an ANOVA revealed that students who reported high EMOTFOC coupled with low PROBFOC experienced the greatest MATHANX (,E(3,58) = 12.66, p < .0001). Males and females reported virtually identical MATHANX (M=36.30 for males, 36.44 for females), and the only significant gender difference was for avoidance coping, which was used more by males (F(1,60) = 5.43, p < .03]. Results from this study suggest that fewer gender differences may exist in MATHANX and coping than have been found in the past. Additionally, this study identifies the need for future research to determine whether EMOTFOC is the behavioral component, or one of the determinants, of math anxiety.

The pervasiveness of autism has significantly increased over the past 2 decades with the 2014 Center for Disease Control and Prevention report indicating 1 in 68 children are diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Early intervention is recommended as the most effective treatment approach. Nevertheless, previous research has indicated that White children are diagnosed with ASD about 1.5 years earlier than are Non-White children. A current gap remains in literature regarding ASD and different racial groups, and evidence has been inconclusive regarding disparities in identifying and diagnosing ASD. To fill this gap, this study investigated the relationship between child race, parents and teachers’ perceptions, and diagnosis of ASD among White and Non-White groups. The theoretical framework was the critical race theory. Archival data from the Psychological and School Services of Eastern Carolina included 48 preschool children from White (18) and Non-White (30) groups. The data’s variables of race, perceptions, and diagnosis were analyzed using multivariate analysis of variance. Results indicated a higher rate of diagnosis of ASD among the White group compared to the Non-White group. Yet, teachers’ perceptions of ASD were higher for the Non-White group, while parents’ perceptions of ASD were lower for the Non-White group. This finding confirms the nuances of ASD among racial groups which could promote efforts to better educate parents and teachers on developmental milestones, explore families’ unique beliefs, and emphasize the importance of accurate early detection. Also, considerations of culturally sensitive screening, diagnostic measures, protocols, and practices may be embraced to safeguard that children, regardless of race, receive timely and competent care.

<p>My thesis examines how eugenicist and psychologist Robert M. Yerkes’ experimental intelligence research helped to situate the non-human primate as the ideal research subject for human betterment research in the twentieth century U.S. Yerkes believed that the primate was the ideal research subject to address questions of human betterment and social welfare, specifically best to create methods of evaluating the imagined threat of intellectual disability. While Yerkes has been studied extensively in the history of psychology, primatology, and eugenics, rarely have his separate contributions to these fields been placed in conversation with one another. Placing the primate at the center of Yerkes’ work allows for all three fields to engage with one another in a new perspective. By analyzing Yerkes’ publications about the Multiple-Choice Experiment within the context of the American eugenics’ movement, we can see how the primate came to hold a central position in U.S. scientific research, the advancement of human welfare and betterment, and as a means of defining what it means to be human. This story offers a glimpse into this longer process of how the primate came to occupy this position, but even a glimpse offers historians of the American eugenics’ movement new questions. What was the role of the non-human animal in the formulation of American eugenic theories? How have we historically used the natural world in our attempts to separate ourselves from it? And can we truly reconcile a history with eugenics if we continue to ignore the role of animals within it, they who today exist unquestionably within the status of the sub-human?</p>