Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / eaders and governments using mechanisms to maintain national interest, power, and security. One such instrument is the use of coercive force or compellence. Compellence is a strategy of control designed to impose change, using limited military or non-military methods, upon an opponent. The United States implements compellence policy through a mixture of key actors who portray powerful images to the rest of the world. Its leaders reinforce these images internally (with self, local, regional, cultural ties) and externally (with others based, foreign perception on a larger international scope). As U.S.-led forces in Iraq affect America's image throughout the Middle East and the world, its image of Iraq remains opaque due to U.S. perception and misperception. Is compellence policy conducive to future U.S.-Iraqi relations? How effective is it? And why did U.S. compellence policy in Iraq succeed on some levels and not on others? This thesis examines the effectiveness of U.S. compellence policy as a viable method in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003. Key operations and players will be evaluated and an analysis will explore political, social and economic levels of effectiveness of compellence policy in Iraq. / Civilian, Department of Navy

The current political fraction between Russia and the West has led to the breakdown of the cooperative post-Cold War security order. Russia’s dramatic reliance on its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal is of concern for how Moscow might shape its foreign policy. Based on the gap in the existing literature on the role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) and regional influence, this paper aims to examine the role of TNWs for Russia’s regional influence by answering the following research question: What changes in the nuclear doctrines, with regards to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s increased regional influence? This thesis uses the theoretical frame of Coercive Diplomacy, with focus on compellence, which provides an alternative explanation to one state’s behavior against another in the pursuit of influence. In order to test the hypothesis, offensive changes in the doctrines, with regard to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s likelihood of increasing its regional influence, this qualitative study examines the cases of Georgia and Armenia. The implementation of the analytical framework on the empirical material occurs through the method of structured focused comparison. The findings indicate that despite Russia’s engagement in compellence against Georgia and Armenia, the cases show very different outcomes.

Thesis advisor: Robert Ross / This paper discusses the Linebacker II bombing campaign of the United States in North Vietnam, more famously known as the "Christmas Bombings." It examines the campaign as an attempt to compel North Vietnam to accept changes to the peace agreement being negotiated in Paris by Henry Kissinger and others. Specifically, it looks at three aspects of compellence—capability, credibility, and clarity of goals—and analyzes how the United States did in each of these three areas, concluding that the United States ultimately failed to adequately compel North Vietnam. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science Honors Program. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science.

Scholars find that compellence and coercion tend to fail even when done by strong states against weaker states. Research suggests that such failure primarily rests with the initiator and that the target is successful. Does this mean that the weaker states have found the means to withstand threats? This study investigates compellence from the view of the target of such threats. In this study, we investigate resistance to compellence and their outcome by testing factors resting in both the initiator of threats and the target. We find that compellence does indeed tend to fail but so do attempts at resisting such threats. Furthermore, the study finds that the outcome of compellent threats is not dependent on the investigated factors in the initiator and the target. The study also proposes that the most common outcome of compellent threat situations is one where both parties fail to reach their preferred outcome.

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The overarching goal of this study is to conduct an investigation of regional perspectives on the impact of Israel's nuclear monopoly on nuclear decisions in the Middle East. This Dissertation addresses the question as to why regional actors have taken divergent nuclear paths relative to Israel's nuclear posture. The point of departure for this inquiry is whether the 'introduction' of Israel's nuclear weapons has ever played a pivotal role in the nuclear decisions and escalation dynamics in the Middle East. In so doing, this study addresses why Israel has maintained a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Within this context, the nuclear decisions are analyzed while employing three specific Independent Variables, namely: conventional balance; alliance reliance; and the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons. The analysis of the Egypt and Iran cases demonstrated layers of common and divergent responses, namely in relation to their perception of conventional, nonconventional, and nuclear deterrence. The dissertation addressed how both countries perceived and reacted to the underlying principles that underpinned Israel's nuclear posture. The main findings of this dissertation serve the logic of comparison between Egypt and Iran. These findings are addressed in terms of: a) the essence of reaction whether it applies to the nuclear posture or nuclear capabilities; b) the mere existence of a nuclear decision; c) the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons in terms of deterrence, compellence, and coercion; d) the difference between the official, semi-official and unofficial rhetoric; e) the significance of the legal reaction. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation addressed two comparative reactions to Israel's nuclear posture, namely Egypt's and Iran's divergent nuclear paths. In so doing, it addressed the nuclear decisions of Egypt and Iran from 1955 to 2021. This dissertation made an effort in investigating how a tacit ally, namely the Shah, perceived Israel's nuclear posture. As analyzed, the literature tends to overlook the story of Iran's reaction under the Shah. Therefore, more research is necessary to decipher the puzzle of why allies feel alarmed or concerned by a nuclear ambition of a close regional partner. An important issue that this dissertation addressed while investigating reactions to Israel's nuclear posture was the delicate issue of decoupling Israel's posture from other established nuclear powers or nuclear aspirants. Within this context, it is central that this study underscores the impacts of the Indian, and Pakistani bombs and the impact of Iraq's nuclear ambition and to make a strong and substantiated case as to why Iran's reaction addressed Israel's posture and not Iraq or India. The same analysis applies to Egypt which witnessed the emergence of another nuclear aspirant in the 1980s, namely Iraq. In the final analysis, the main findings of this dissertation support the argument that comparative regional reactions to Israel's nuclear posture help investigate and test the main assumptions that underpinned opacity. Within this context, future researchers might further analyze the trichotomy of conventional; nonconventional, and nuclear deterrence because regional actors might employ the case of monopoly for explicit or tacit bargaining that fulfills the overarching interest of guaranteeing a robust conventional force. The underlying foundation of this research is to address how regional actors perceive and react to asymmetries in power, resolve, and stake.

強制外交（coercive diplomacy）的概念在一九七０年代由學者Alexander L. George首度提出，主張強制外交應屬於防守型的危機管理（defensive crisis management），亦有別於一般所謂的嚇阻（deterrence）與壓制（compellence）等策略。施行強制外交時，相關決策者透過威脅使用武力，或使用有限度的武力，以勸說對手停止或放棄現正從事的行動，並防止危機情勢的升高，及避免戰爭的發生。冷戰期間，美、蘇兩國的領導人對於該一策略的運用極為廣泛與普遍，甘迺迪政府對於古巴飛彈危機的處理便是著名的案例。冷戰結束，國際關係進入所謂的後冷戰時期，面對區域衝突、人道危機和恐怖主義威脅等問題，強制外交更常被相關決策者和國際組織所施行、採用，亦多次在國際間重大的衝突與危機處理過程中扮演著關鍵的角色，並展現其重要性和多元化的一面。因此，鑑於強制外交對於後冷戰時期之國際危機處理和衝突解決的重要性和必要性，本研究旨在透過強制外交相關理論的介紹與整理，以及後冷戰時期強制外交相關個案的研究分析，總結歷史的經驗與教訓，深入探討其施行現況與成效，並提出具體之研究發現與政策建議。期盼所得之研究成果能使吾人對於該策略有更深一層的認識與了解。 關鍵詞：強制外交、壓制、危機管理、後冷戰時期、區域衝突、人道干涉、反恐行動 / In the 1970s, Alexander L. George first introduced and defined the concept of coercive diplomacy. According to George, he claims that coercive diplomacy is a strategy of defensive crisis management. Besides, coercive diplomacy is also different from the strategy of deterrence or compellence. When policymakers and political elites decide to manipulate coercive diplomacy, they should employ threats and / or limited force to persuade opponents to call off or undo adverse actions, which are thought aggressive. Furthermore, the purpose of using coercive diplomacy is to prevent crisis situation from escalating or causing wars. During the Cold War era, leaders of United States and Soviet Union used this strategy intensively. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 can also be thought as a famous case of successful coercive diplomacy. When international relations enters into the post-Cold War era, coercive diplomacy still plays as important role in crisis management and conflict resolution. Policymakers of countries and international organizations, like the United Nations and the NATO, prefer to use coercive diplomacy to deal with regional conflicts, humanitarian intervention, and counterterrorism. Coercive diplomacy also demonstrates its necessity and significance of solving these problems. In order to give us a comprehensive understanding of coercive diplomacy, this thesis focuses on theories of coercive diplomacy and case studies, especially the experiences after the Cold War. Then, in final chapter of this thesis, the author generalizes lessons and experiences come from the cases analyzed and studied. In addition, the author also tries to make conclusions about the efficacy of coercive diplomacy and thus tries to offer some guidelines for policymakers. Keywords: coercive diplomacy, compellence, crisis management, post-Cold War era, regional conflicts, humanitarian intervention, counterterrorism