The purpose of this project was to examine team compensation systems and to evaluate the impact of their critical elements--level (what to motivate), compensation mixture (what rewards motivate), and employee perceptions (how to motivate)--on team effectiveness. Twenty-three organizations, 108 teams, and 769 team members participated in this study. Project results found that teams that utilized team level rewards, especially when associated with a complete compensation mixture, had significantly higher team effectiveness scores compared to teams that utilized only individual level rewards. With respect to employee perceptions, results found that: (a) perceptions of system understanding, measure controllability, pay-for-performance, and payout frequency, particularly, were significant components of employee compensation system satisfaction; and (b) employee compensation system satisfaction and perceptions of compensation system effectiveness were significantly related.

by Tam Wing Wah, Michael. / Bibliography: leaves 35-37 / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1984

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This study considers the determination of the ex ante pay-performance relationship. A single-period partial equilibrium model is used to show that the executive income can be expressed as a function of the firm's return expressed in dollar terms. The executive income is jointly determined by the opening firm size and current return, which function as a managerial talent proxy and self-selection mechanism respectively. Comparing to Jensen and Murphy (1990) wealth-based Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS), this research presents an income-based PPS. The alternative PPS not only overcomes a misleading misspecification in Jensen and Murphy (1990), but also corrects Rosen's (1992) argument for only including return in the pay performance relationship. This research finds empirically that both the opening firm size and stock return play a significant role in determining executive income. This study provides supplementary evidence to Murphy's (1986) Learning Model. However, shareholder income may not be an ideal performance measure in capturing the multi-period pay-performance relationship.

This dissertation contains five research projects within the context of two distinctive issues that concern the effectiveness of executive compensation in aligning executive interests with shareholders and how institutional investors play a role in structuring corporate governance mechanisms. The objective of this dissertation is to first determine how institutions should exert their influence if they are serious about alleviating agency problems and improving firm performance. Second, the thesis seeks to determine whether institutional investors use their influence to shape executive compensation and corporate governance mechanisms in a manner consistent with aligning managerial interests with shareholders and increasing shareholder wealth. The thesis finds that CEOs with option incentives increase the likelihood that a firm will increase risk by undertaking both major real investments and acquisitions. Moreover, CEO option grants are positively related to measures of firm valuation and operating performance suggesting option incentives are an important mechanism to align CEO interests with shareholders. This is robust to alternative measures of firm valuation and operating performance, also various estimation techniques. Using these findings to motivate the direction of institutional influence on executive compensation, it is found that institutional investors, particularly smaller activist traders, significantly increase option grant incentives received by executives. Institutional influence also raises CEO pay which is consistent with preservation of reservation CEO utility levels. Addressing the role of institutional investors in the context of other corporate governance mechanisms, it is found that institutional investor influence is also negatively related to board size and positively related to board independence, which is achieved by removal of inside directors. Such actions are consistent with empirical studies that show smaller boards and increased levels of independent directors improve firm performance and board decision making. The main conclusion from this dissertation is that option incentives are an effective mechanism to align CEO interests with those of shareholders. Institutional investors appear to recognise this importance, and effectively use their influence to increase options received by executives. Combined with institutional investors putting in place corporate boards that provide better oversight of management, institutional investors appear to be effective monitors of the firms in which they invest.

With the coming of knowledge economy, competence of knowledge workers has become important human capital in organizations. Competence of knwoeldge workers contribute to organizations¡¦ competitiveness and performance. With the pervasion of information technology in all sorts of organizations, competence of IT professionals has become more and more critical. It is no difference in media industries. Digitalization and electronization are the trends in media industries in recent year. These trends further enhance the reliance of organizations on the competence of IT professionals. Literature about compensation is aboundant, but few addresses IT compensation issues, let along IT compensation in media industries. Therefore, this research investigates into IT comepsantion issues in a leading radio station. Specifically, this research aims to understand: First, what are the factors impacting IT recruiting and IT compensation? What are the core competence of IT professionals in media firm? Using case study approach, this research found professional skills and work experiences matter the most in recruiting, but may not reflect in compensation. This research also identified five types of competence which IT professionals should possess in media firm: professionalism, leadership, interpersonal skill, practical experience, and m motivation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, December 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-77). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

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Abstract not available. / Thesis (MBA)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville, 2011.