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Fifth-year growth responses of Douglas-fir to crowding and other competition /Cole, Elizabeth C. January 1984 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 1984. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 166-176). Also available on the World Wide Web.
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Optimal Capacity Investment, and Pricing Across International Markets Under Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Duopoly CompetitionAhmed, Anas A. 11 May 2010 (has links)
In this dissertation we investigate joint optimal capacity investment, pricing and production decisions for a multinational manufacturer who faces exchange rate uncertainties. We consider a manufacturer that sells its product in both domestic and foreign markets over a multiperiod season. Because of long-lead times, the capacity investment must be committed before the selling season begins. The exchange rate between the two countries fluctuates across period and the demand in both markets is price dependent. In the first part, the model considers three scenarios: (1) early commitment to price and quantity with central sourcing, (2) postponement of prices and quantities with central sourcing, and (3) local sourcing. We derive the optimal capacity and the optimal prices for each scenario, and investigate the impact of the exchange rate parameters and the length of the selling season on optimal capacity investment, production allocation, and pricing decisions. We observe that while the price and production decisions in the domestic market are independent of the exchange rate under early commitment and local sourcing scenarios, the exchange rate between two countries directly impacts these decisions under the postponement setting. We identify thresholds and gain insights on investment costs, market potentials, exchange rate drifts, and selling season length for the choice of entering a foreign market under all scenarios. In the second part of this dissertation, we consider a duopoly competition in the foreign country. We consider a single period setting and we model the exchange rate as a random variable. We assume two scenarios: (1) Exogenous Model, where the price of the foreign manufacturer is set a priori, and (2) Endogenous Model, where the prices are set simultaneously based on a Nash Game outcome. In the Exogenous Model, we study the impact of exchange rate and foreign manufacturer's price on optimal capacity and prices. In the Endogenous Model, we investigate the impact of competition and exchange rate on optimal capacities and optimal prices. We show how competition can impact the decision of the home manufacturer to enter the foreign market.
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Normenkonkurrenz beim Schutz von Marken und geschäftlichen Bezeichnungen /Schaefer, Thorsten, January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Hamburg, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 267-284).
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The role of market competition in the performance of the Electrical and Mechanical Services trading fundMak, Chi-hang. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (M. P. A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.
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Silverside Diets and Potential Competition in the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway: The Invasive Menidia audens versus the Native Labidesthes sicculus.Strongin, Kyle 2009 May 1900 (has links)
I investigated dietary differences, overlap and shifts for two atherinid fish species inhabiting the highly modified Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway (TTW) in Mississippi, U.S.A. The Mississippi silverside (Menidia audens) is now common throughout the waterway and apparently invaded from the Tennessee River after man-made connection with the Tombigbee River in the mid 1980s. A subsequent decline in the distribution and abundance of the native brook silverside (Labidesthes sicculus) led to speculation that dietary competition might be involved. I used extant data to test the null hypotheses that diets are not different between the two silverside species in TTW, that dietary overlap between them is random and that no dietary niche shift occurs for either species in the presence or absence of its putative competitor. I accomplished this by quantifying the diet of both species from sympatric and allopatric collections, then using multivariate statistics and null models to test for significant dietary differences, overlap, and niche shifts. The analysis indicated that diets differed significantly between the two species. However, dietary overlap at sites of co-occurrence was greater than expected under conditions of incipient competitive exclusion; and, dietary niche shifts were not found when the diet of either species in allopatric collections was compared to its diet in sympatric collections. Thus, there was no evidence for direct involvement of dietary competition in the population trends of silversides in the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. Yet, it appears that M. audens is replacing L. sicculus in dominant habitats of TTW, just as has happened in other, similar systems. Simulations with STELLA� were used to estimate the degree of inter-specific competition that might account for observed rates of replacement. Results implied a 10 % ecological advantage of M. audens over L. sicculus.
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Integration of Non-Efficiency Objectives in Competition LawGreen, Ofer 24 February 2009 (has links)
Competition law constitutes part of broader policies. Thus, in addition to the pursuit of
efficiency, competition law expresses non-efficiency concerns. The paper will explore the theoretical perspectives as to the objectives of competition law; analyze the practical aspects that implementation of non-efficiency objectives entail; and suggest a framework for implementation of non-efficiency objectives within competition law. As will be argued, non-efficiency objectives should – to varying degrees along the axes of time, place and circumstances - play a meaningful role in competition analysis. The primary assertion of the paper will be that competition law ought to consistently strive to outline the contours
of those axes. Such contours should be drawn primarily on the basis of the potential
adverse effects of the restrictive trade practice upon efficiency, as compared to the
potential public benefit that may stem from the practice, as well as upon the circumstances that prevail within the jurisdiction.
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Integration of Non-Efficiency Objectives in Competition LawGreen, Ofer 24 February 2009 (has links)
Competition law constitutes part of broader policies. Thus, in addition to the pursuit of
efficiency, competition law expresses non-efficiency concerns. The paper will explore the theoretical perspectives as to the objectives of competition law; analyze the practical aspects that implementation of non-efficiency objectives entail; and suggest a framework for implementation of non-efficiency objectives within competition law. As will be argued, non-efficiency objectives should – to varying degrees along the axes of time, place and circumstances - play a meaningful role in competition analysis. The primary assertion of the paper will be that competition law ought to consistently strive to outline the contours
of those axes. Such contours should be drawn primarily on the basis of the potential
adverse effects of the restrictive trade practice upon efficiency, as compared to the
potential public benefit that may stem from the practice, as well as upon the circumstances that prevail within the jurisdiction.
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Three Essays on Fiscal Competition and Public PolicyLiu, Yongzheng 13 August 2013 (has links)
This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to fiscal competition. The first essay investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and compares it with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Given two asymmetric regions, I show that under the Nash equilibrium, the more productive region tends to spend more on public input, which results in this region attracting more capital than the less productive region. The comparison of the two equilibria reveals that the leader region obtains a first mover advantage under the Stackelberg setting. This suggests that if regions interact with each other sequentially as in the Stackelberg equilibrium, then the regional disparity that is due to the heterogeneity of productivity is likely to be mitigated or enlarged, depending on which region performs the leadership role in the competition process.
This second essay examines how a fiscal equalization system affects the disciplining effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in a decentralized economy. I build a model in which regions that are heterogeneous in initial endowments try to attract capital by competing public input that enhances the productivity of capital; meanwhile, a fiscal equalization system is imposed by the central government to reduce regional disparities in fiscal capacity. The key prediction, borne out in data from the German equalization system, is that while competition for capital strengthens discipline in the well-endowed regions, it weakens discipline in the poorly endowed regions. However, a conventional equalization transfer scheme, common to many countries, can be effective in correcting the distortion driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments across competing regions.
This third essay aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent and possible channels of tax competition among provincial governments in China. Using a panel of provincial level data for 1993-2007, I find strong evidence of strategic tax interaction among provincial governments. Tax policy is approximated by average effective tax rates on foreign investment, taking into account the tax incentives available to foreign investors. In line with the predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature, I also highlight the impact of each province's characteristics (including its size and level of industrialization) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors. Finally, I explicitly identify the establishment of development zones as an important conduit for tax competition among provinces.
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Konkurrensbegränsande samarbeten - en bevisfråga / Anti-competitive cooperations – a question of proofLindström, Anna, Büttner, Rasmus January 2011 (has links)
Syftet med konkurrenslagstiftningen är att främja konkurrensen marknadsaktörer emellan. En effektiv konkurrens bidrar till en bättre resursanvändning i samhället, medan en otillräcklig konkurrens ledertill onödigt stora kostnader. Sedan inträdet i den Europeiska Unionen (EU) 1995 har Sverige ett dubbelt rättssystem för konkurrensrätt, den EU-rättsliga lagstiftningen är inte bara vägledande utan i materiellt hänseende även bindande. En grundläggande bestämmelse inom konkurrensrätten är förbudet mot konkurrensbegränsande samarbete, detta regleras i 2:1 Konkurrenslag 2008:579 (KL) och i artikel 101.1 Lissabonfördraget (EUF-fördraget). Ett sådant samarbete innebär att två eller flera företag går samman och avtalar om exempelvis pris eller marknadsuppdelning och är föremål för uppsatsens undersökning. Uppsatsen syftar till att undersöka viss problematik som uppstår vid tillämpningen av denna lagstiftning. Ett parallellt marknadsuppträdande kan ha många grunder, men det kan också indikera att en samordning föreligger. Det parallella uppträdandet i sig är inte förbjudet, förutom när det grundar sig i ett samordnat förfarande. Det är dock inte alltid enkelt att fastställa när så är fallet och det är vad uppsatsen undersöker. Ur den EU-rättsliga praxisen framkommer tre kumulativa rekvisit som slår fast när ett samordnat förfarande anses föreligga. En allmängiltig rättsvetenskaplig princip är att den som påstår någonting också ska styrka detta. Samma princip gäller i lagstiftningenom konkurrensbegränsande samarbeten, där dock viss oklarhet råder kring bevisbördans placering. Uppsatsen försöker fastställa när bevisbördan förflyttas från den som påstår att en överträdelse skett (ofta en konkurrensvårdande myndighet) till företagen. Det som framkommer är att det finns tre olika presumtionsregler för bevisbördans placering. Två av dessa rör samordnade förfaranden medan en rör avtal. Dessa presumtionsregler föreskriver när bevisbördan hamnar hos företagen och vad dessa då måste bevisa. Till sist undersöks tre stora, svenska kartellmål. Syftet med framställningen är att undersöka hur det svenska rättsväsendet följer och tolkar det som framkommit i EU-rätten. Det ska råda full konvergens mellan de materiella reglerna. Marknadsdomstolen (MD) uttalar i ett av målen att de EU-rättsliga processrättsliga reglerna är vägledande men att dessa måste följas för en enhetlig tillämpning av den materiella lagstiftningen. MD väljer att tolka och använda sig av EU-rätten i samtliga undersökta rättsfall, vissa brister kan dock skådas och nya frågeställningar uppkommer. / The aim of competition law is to support competition between operators. An effective competition will contribute to a better use of recourses in society, while an inadequate competition leads to unnecessarily big costs. Since Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995 the country has got a double competition law. The EU-law is not only indicative but also binding when it comes to the material part. A fundamental part of the competition law is the prohibition of restrictive cooperation. This part of the law is regulated in the Swedish Competition Act Chapter 2, Article 1 and in article 101.1 of the Lisbon Treaty. Such a restrictive cooperation means that two or more companies get together and for instance agree over prices or market sharing. The essay aims to investigate some problems that come up at the application of the law. Parallel conduct can have many reasons, but it can also indicate a concerted practice. The parallel behavior in itself is not improperly, it is only forbidden when it occurs because of a concerted practice. However, it is not always easy to detect this, and that is what the essay aims to investigate. As a result the essay finds that there are three cumulative requirements which state when a concerted practice is at hand. A universal principle is the principle that tells us that the one who states something also has to prove that statement. This is current also in the competition law, thought here is some confusion about the placement of the burden of proof. The essay wants to find out when the burden of proof is moved from the part which states that there is a law violation over to the companies. It is found that there are three different presumption rules that tell us when the companies get the burden of proof and what they then have to prove. Two of those rules concern concerted practice while one concerns agreements. At last three important Swedish cartel cases will be investigated. The aim is to find out how the Swedish judicial system monitors and interprets the EU-law. There is to be full convergence between the material laws. Marknadsdomstolen (MD) declares in one of the cases that even the procedural EU-law has to be followed, because otherwise also the material part would differ. MD makes use of the EU-law in all the investigated cases, however some gaps can be found and new issues arise.
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Competition in the Swedish Banking SectorHålander, Eva January 2012 (has links)
This thesis aims to evaluate the competitive situation in the Swedish banking sector. The banking sector in Sweden is characterized by its high degree of concentration, with four major banks controlling a large share of the market. Combined with high profits and high interest margins, this has raised concerns regarding the competitive pressures in the sector. Many existing theories in the literature try to evaluate competition based on market structure, however modern research concludes that high concentration does not necessarily imply less competition. By using a model that estimates the elasticity of factor input prices, the competitive behavior among the market players can be assessed and the results reveal a less competitive situation on the Swedish market compared to previous research within the field of banking competition.
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