The history of Post-Object art can be dated from about 1966. The term Post-Object describes two classes of art activity: Post-Minimal and Conceptual. Post-Minimal art (ie. Earthworks, Bodyworks, Process, and Systems art) derives from the phenomenological interests of some of the major Minimalist figures (ie. Morris, Andre, leWitt, and Smithson). Conceptual art, stringently defined, entails the use of word language to state artistic intentions. By 1969, many of the more progressive Conceptualists in America and England became associated with the "Art & Language group" (hereafter cited as A & L). This group published Art-Language--The Journal of Conceptual Art. An analysis of A & L has had to deal with various historiographical problems. These include: the lack of historical perspective; the failure of contemporary art writers to produce a sensible critical-historical framework; the unintelligibility of A & L writings. This study refers to the art-works and articles produced by the members of Art-Language's editorial board (ie. Atkinson, Bainbridge, Baldwin, Hurrell, Kosuth, Burn and Ramsden, and Harrison. The discourse that was carried on by these eight individuals is analyzed with reference to a four phase developmental model: "early" (c.1966-8); "insular" (c.1969-70); "transitional" (c.l970-1); and "pluralistic" (c.1972-3). A & L contended that the condition of Post-Object art enabled art theory and art criticism, as well as art-object production, to be viewed as art-making. In order to understand this notion, one must be first acquainted with the relationship between Post-Object art and Modernist art. In the course of its historical development, Modernist art shifted the creative (ie. active, central) sector of art-making from the role of object maker to the role of critic. The Modernist conception of art is a highly self-referential one. Post-Object art, in particular A & L, developed this insular conception of art to its ultimate conclusion. In this sense, A & L's "early" work with theoretical art-objects and theoretical frameworks is discussed in the context of both traditional art-making, and Post-Object art-making. Then, A & L's position vis-a-vis Post- Object art is clarified with reference to the criticisms that the group levelled at this wider community. These criticisms are interpreted historically as polemical writings which served to establish A & L's priority within the Post-Object domain, and prepare the ground for the subsequent production of a general Post-Object theory of art. The group was familiar with the methodology of Analytical philosophy and sought to employ this knowledge to construct a rational "art-language". This notion was developed in the "insular" phase according to a positivistic viewpoint that was originally suggested by Kosuth. In the course of this programme though, difficulties were incurred and the group was forced to gradually relativize Its viewpoint. During 1970 and 1971 (ie."transitional" phase), A & L's inquiry shifted from Its self-referential position towards an analysis of the dominant force. in contemporary art--Modernism. The group felt that Modernism could be effectively described with reference to Richard Wollheim's 'Physicalist" theory. They further suggested that Modernism could be interpreted as a reductive extensional logic based on Wollheim's Physicalist principle. Wollheim suggests that a Physicalist theory coordinates the entire development of Modern art history. In response to this contention, A & L used. T.S. Kuhn's theory of Paradigms(developed for the History and Philosophy of Science) to characterize Modernism as the established sector of a wider "Material-Character/ Physical-Object Paradigm of art. In 1972 and 1973 (ie. "pluralistic" phase), A & L became conscious of contemporary developments in Linguistic philosophy, and accordingly accepted "contextual analysis", or "pluralism", as "their viewpoint". This analytical stance enabled them to investigate the Material-Character/Physical-Object Paradigm in the context of contemporary culture. This investigation revealed the ideological background of this paradigm, and outlined some of the reasons why this phenomenon had become entrenched in the contemporary art community. / Arts, Faculty of / Art History, Visual Art and Theory, Department of / Graduate

This thesis deals with the design and implementation of an object-oriented simulator for conceptual graphs. Conceptual graphs are a means of representing information and knowledge. In particular, they may be used to represent the behavior of mechanisms. Conceptual graph simulation provides the means for verifying that the conceptual graph model of the system is a proper representation of the mechanism. The motivation for the design of this simulator is to help a conceptual graph model designer overcome the imprecision and ambiguity inherent in the English language. When a person translates an English language specification of a system to a conceptual graph model, the model may be incomplete, owing to semantic gaps in the English language specification. The simulator attempts to help the designer fill in these gaps by pointing out missing concepts and relations needed to simulate the model. This thesis covers the issues involved in designing such a simulator, and the implementation of the simulator in Java. The working of the simulator is demonstrated by simulating sample conceptual graphs. Also, a set of action procedures, and a small library of device schema graphs are created, so that devices may be effectively modeled. / Master of Science

Conceptual development and conceptual change processes are described by a longitudinal study on preschool children’s conception of the earth. Conceptual change is often described as a causal process in which changes in an embraced system of beliefs result in a new system of beliefs. A normative line of research has been dominating the research field of conceptual change. There has been a search for specific conceptions that are missing in the learners’ reasoning or that prevent conceptual change from occur. Here, the learner’s capacity of reasoning is focused. The children’s reasoning is described in its own right (Driver &amp; Easley, 1978). It is argued that conceptual change is to be understood as an intentional activity with regard to the learner, that is, what the learner is doing when trying to understand something. Children were interviewed annually from four to six years of age. There were 37 children participating, of which 29 were followed during all three years. The children were interviewed about their conceptions of the earth. The results directs the focus of conceptual change from specific conceptions to structural changes. The children processed a lot of conflicting information. However, there does not appear to be any specific conflict that causes the process of conceptual change to occur. Rather, conceptual change is about the reorganization of the sum total of beliefs and to find adequate contexts to which they relate. Conceptual change involves a simultaneous processing of information and complex conception as well as revisions and changes at a model level, and all of this processing is related to contexts for description and explanation. The result also indicates some core stability in reasoning over the course of the investigation. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defence the folowing papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 1: Manuscript; Paper 2: Manuscript.</p>

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In this study, the balance between conceptual and procedural teaching and its effect on the development of algebraic reasoning was examined. Participants included two seventh grade mathematics teachers and their students in targeted classes (N = 33). One video taped lesson from each teacher was selected for in-depth analysis of the balance between conceptual teaching, procedural teaching, and classroom time that included neither. Student participants took pretest and posttest algebra tests. Distribution of student responses and scores were analyzed for the degree of conceptual understanding demonstrated by students and then related to observed instructional practices. It was concluded that the students of the teacher with a more explicit conceptual emphasis in her lessons performed better on the test and were better able to exhibit flexible reasoning in unfamiliar contexts. Students whose teacher focused more heavily on procedural instruction without conceptual connections were less flexible in their reasoning and unable to apply some of the procedures taught in class.

This dissertation offers a reconsideration of the uses of photography under the aegis of Conceptual Art between 1966 and 1973 by analyzing the ways photography challenged epistemological limits, and, despite the claims regarding the medium’s inherent indexicality, emphasized experience over exactitude, and doubt in place of certainty. By focusing on four American practitioners, I argue for the “benefit of the doubt;” in other words, for the value of disbelief and hesitation, marking the reorientation of art at this time towards critical methods which oppose all orthodoxies, including but not limited to formalist dogmas, and instead are committed to the denial of autonomy in favor of understanding meaning as infinitely contingent. The dissertation is divided among four key case studies, including Mel Bochner (n. 1940), Bruce Nauman (n. 1941), Douglas Huebler (1924-1997), and John Baldessari (n. 1931). Each chapter argues for the unique contribution of photography in relation to conceptual art practices, while also situating the projects of these individual practitioners within the broader history of the medium of photography. I explore specifically the concepts of seriality, transparency and theory in Bochner; performance, “worklessness,” and failure in Nauman; portraiture, mapping and impossibility in Huebler; humor, didacticism, choice and chance in Baldessari. This project looks back continuously to significant precursors, in particular the work of Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968), as a means of engaging the status and function of art after the Readymade, particularly as concerns de-skilling, disinterest, affirmative irony, and nominalism, as well as the dialectic between inclusivity and inconclusivity.

This dissertation offers a reconsideration of the uses of photography under the aegis of Conceptual Art between 1966 and 1973 by analyzing the ways photography challenged epistemological limits, and, despite the claims regarding the medium’s inherent indexicality, emphasized experience over exactitude, and doubt in place of certainty. By focusing on four American practitioners, I argue for the “benefit of the doubt;” in other words, for the value of disbelief and hesitation, marking the reorientation of art at this time towards critical methods which oppose all orthodoxies, including but not limited to formalist dogmas, and instead are committed to the denial of autonomy in favor of understanding meaning as infinitely contingent. The dissertation is divided among four key case studies, including Mel Bochner (n. 1940), Bruce Nauman (n. 1941), Douglas Huebler (1924-1997), and John Baldessari (n. 1931). Each chapter argues for the unique contribution of photography in relation to conceptual art practices, while also situating the projects of these individual practitioners within the broader history of the medium of photography. I explore specifically the concepts of seriality, transparency and theory in Bochner; performance, “worklessness,” and failure in Nauman; portraiture, mapping and impossibility in Huebler; humor, didacticism, choice and chance in Baldessari. This project looks back continuously to significant precursors, in particular the work of Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968), as a means of engaging the status and function of art after the Readymade, particularly as concerns de-skilling, disinterest, affirmative irony, and nominalism, as well as the dialectic between inclusivity and inconclusivity.

On what does the meaning of the concept of water depend? I consider three possible answers: the physical world, theory, or both the physical world and theory. Each answer supports a particular history. If the history unique to an answer is confirmed by the actual history of the concept of water, then there is supporting evidence for that account of meaning. I have documented the historical development of the concept of water, focusing on three periods: the ancient Greeks, the 18th and 19th centuries, and the 20th and 21st centuries. Conceptual change figures prominently in that history, and when enough historical data are available communication across theories is obvious. Those features suggest that the meaning of the concept of water depends on the physical world and the theory in which it is embedded. The physical world explains cross theory communication; and theory accounts for the conceptual changes that I have documented. The history of the concept of water suggests that Putnam (1975) is right: meaning depends on the physical world and the theory in which it is embedded. He’s right, however, for the wrong reasons. Putnam relies on a thought experiment to demonstrate that the physical world contributes to meaning, but the history suggests that he built some chemically implausible assumptions into that thought experiment.