In the first chapter, I investigate the welfare effect of the government subsidizing medical insurance. To that extent, I construct and simulate a partial equilibrium computational model of medical care consumption and choice of insurance contracts. I use the overall utility of agents as a welfare measure and find that it is not welfare improving to subsidize uninsured agents by taxing insured ones. In addition I use the framework to verify the insurance contract choice effect and find a strong insurance contract choice effect. In Chapter 2, I investigate the effect of the price setting process under managed health care plans, such as HMOs and PPOs, on prices, profits of insurance companies and medical care providers, and household’s welfare compared to the indemnity plans prevalent before the advent of managed care. I construct a simple game played between a representative insurance company and a medical care provider to determine the price of medical care paid by insured and uninsured households. In addition, insurance companies set premiums not through solving the usual principal-agent problem which forces a zero profit condition, but rather and more realistically by optimizing profits. The outcome of this game is compared to the outcome of the indemnity plans where no price negotiations would occur. In Chapter 3, I investigate the effect of the suggested reform to the United States’ tax code in treatment of housing assets. In particular, I study the effect of the abolishment of the preferential tax treatment of housing assets (tax deductible mortgage interest payments and tax-free imputed rents) on the ownership and foreclosure rates in the housing market. I construct a model where heterogeneous agents decide on housing tenure in which default on housing mortgages occurs in equilibrium. I use this model to quantify the effect of this preferential tax treatment. I find that the elimination of the preferential tax treatment of housing assets results in a 33.4% reduction in foreclosures. Specifically, only eliminating the tax deductibility of interest on mortgage payments leads to a 12.4% reduction in foreclosure rates, while only taxing imputed rents generates a 32.5% reduction in foreclosure rates. / text

Paper [I] Using a unique and highly detailed data set on energy consumption at the appliance-level for 200 Swedish households, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)-based end-use specific load curves are estimated. The estimated load curves are then used to explore possible restrictions on load shifting (e.g. the office hours schedule) as well as the cost implications of different load shift patterns. The cost implications of shifting load from "expensive" to "cheap" hours, using the Nord Pool spot prices as a proxy for a dynamic price, are computed to be very small; roughly 2-4% reduction in total daily costs from shifting load up to five hours ahead, indicating small incentives for households (and retailers) to adopt dynamic pricing of electricity. Paper [II] Using a detailed data set on appliance-level electricity consumption at the hourly level, we provide the first estimates of hourly and end-use-specific income elasticities for electricity. Such estimates are informative about how consumption patterns in general, and peak demand in particular, will develop as households’ income changes. We find that the income elasticities are highest during peak hours for kitchen and lighting, with point estimates of roughly 0.4, but insignificant for space heating. Paper [III] In this paper, I estimate the price elasticity of electricity as a function of the choice between fixed-price and variable-price contracts. Further, assuming that households have imperfect information about electricity prices and usage, I explore how media coverage of electricity prices affects electricity demand, both by augmenting price responsiveness and as a direct effect of media coverage on electricity demand, independent of prices. I also address the endogeneity of the choice of electricity contract. The parameters in the model are estimated using unique and detailed Swedish panel data on monthly household-level electricity consumption. I find that price elasticities range between −0.025 and −0.07 at the mean level of media coverage, depending on contract choice, and that households with monthly variation in electricity prices respond more to prices when there is extensive media coverage of electricity prices. When media coverage is high, for example 840 news articles per month (which corresponds to the mean plus two standard deviations), the price elasticity is −0.12, or 1.7 times the elasticity at the mean media coverage. Similarly, media coverage is also found to have a direct effect on electricity demand. Paper [IV] I explore how households switch between fixed-price and variable-price electricity contracts in response to variations in price and temperature, conditional on previous contract choice. Using panel data with roughly 54000 Swedish households, a dynamic probit model is estimated. The results suggest that the choice of contract exhibits substantial state dependence, with an estimated marginal effect of previous contractchoiceof0.96, andthattheeffectofvariationinpricesandtemperatureonthechoice of electricity contract is small. Further, the state dependence and price responsiveness are similar across housing types, income levels and other dimensions. A plausible explanation of these results is that transaction costs are larger than the relatively small cost savings from switching between contracts.

INTERNATIONAL SALES DISPUTE RESOLUTION ABSTRACT This dissertation deals with judicial resolution of disputes arising from cross-border commercial relationships, more precisely from international sales contract as their common representative. The introduction defines the term of international sales contract (chapter one) and the process of its formation (chapter two) under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"). It addresses inter alia the gap filling of the CISG, uniform interpretation or commercial usages. Some comparative notes are also provided. Further, it examines a phenomenon called "battle of forms" that often occurs in practice when dealing with standard terms and conditions. The focal point of the thesis is the rules of jurisdiction set out in the Brussels I Regulation Recast ("Regulation") which are analysed from the perspective of an international commercial relationship. The emphasis is on the prorogation of jurisdiction under the Regulation. The third chapter deals with the territorial, temporal and material scope of application of the Regulation, as well as with its autonomous interpretation. It also discusses the role of the Regulation in arbitration. Chapter four reviews the rules of jurisdiction applicable when there is no valid choice of...

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This dissertation seeks to contribute to the policy discussion on how to design efficient and sustainable energy policies. In three self-contained chapters, it applies microeconomic theory and empirical analysis to identify three market failures in European energy markets and to evaluate specific policy measures that strive to overcome these failures in order to increase market efficiency and to enhance environmental or societal sustainability. Chapter 1 and 2 study European electricity markets, which play an important role in the transition towards a carbon-neutral energy future. Overcoming barriers to efficient electricity markets is a crucial step to keep the costs of this transition as low as possible to society. Both chapters focus on obstacles to electricity market efficiency that have recently been highlighted by the European Commission. On the supply side, subsidies for renewable electricity may distort production incentives and competition in wholesale electricity markets. Chapter 1 applies a theoretical model to study the effect of different subsidies on producer strategies and competition in wholesale electricity markets. On the demand side, the European Commission seeks to overcome the reluctance of residential electricity consumers to switch electricity supplier in order to ensure effective competition in the retail electricity market. Chapter 2 empirically quantifies different reasons for switching inertia using a structural discrete choice model and performs counterfactual analysis to study the effect of different policy measures that seek to overcome switching inertia. Chapter 3 looks at the building sector, which accounts for 40% of final energy consumption in Europe and is a major emitter of carbon emissions. In the residential housing market information asymmetries hamper incentives to invest in energy efficiency improvements of rental property. This chapter empirically analyzes the effect of a European policy that mandates the use of energy performance certificates aiming at establishing an efficient market for energy efficient dwellings. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished