I examine the market reaction to merger announcements and the long-term post-merger stock price performance of newly merged firms. For a sample of 484 acquiring firms completing mergers between 1993 and 2000, the average value-weighted abnormal announcement date return (market-adjusted) is a statistically significant -1.02%. On average, this reaction is more negative for firms with "good governance." Specifically, a governance index comprised of three governance variables is significantly negative in a multivariate regression of announcement date abnormal returns. Comp is the percentage of CEO salary consisting of equity incentives (including stock options and restricted stock grants), InsideOwn is the percentage of the firm owned by officers and directors, and InstOwn is the percentage of the firm owned by large outside block shareholders. Value-weighted calendar-time portfolios consisting of the full sample of acquirers exhibit significant abnormal returns of 9.12%, 33.84% and 55.8% for the 12, 36 and 60 months following the merger, respectively. This overperformance is limited to the value-weighted portfolios. There is calendar-time evidence of abnormal performance for some subsamples on a risk adjusted basis. However, when compared to a control group, abnormal performance is limited to large glamour acquirers on a 12-month horizon, large cash acquirers on a 36 and 60-month horizon, and small focusing acquirers on a 60-month horizon. Multivariate analysis of long-run returns reveals that use of equity and corporate diversification are associated with lower post-merger performance. With regard to governance and long-run stock returns, there is also evidence that suggests higher levels of incentive compensation for CEOs is associated with more successful merger transactions for long-term investors.

This paper tests the relationship between corporate governance and corporate value and the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. A ¡§Governance Index¡¨ is built based on three aspects of the company governance structure: 1. the performance of the broad of directors, 2. ownership structure 3. involvement of capital markets. This index is used as a proxy measure of the effectiveness of the governance mechanism. We propose the firms under good governance should outperform those under poor governance. This paper finds a striking relationship between Governance Index and firm performance. The results imply that the Governance Index built in this paper is successful in evaluating the effectiveness of the governance mechanism of firms in Taiwan.

Banks in the economy plays a role in funding will be available to those who need funds for expansion of production equipment, or increase the spending power. In the relations between the enterprises, in pursuit of synergy of the whole group can often see the relationship between the companies will consider the bank's diversification into the program, to facilitate the group planning for funds. However, in recent years, a series of financial scandals continue to occur, from Chung-Hsing commercial banks and the Tai Feng Group loans to the most recent scandals of the Chung-Hwa Commercial Bank and the Wan-Tai Commercial Bank show that many of the bank to carry out unlawful acts of the lenders, government agencies only after the incident, call the public have the confidence and clean up the whole mess, to avoid the loss of public confidence in the financial system. In this regard, this study tried to analyze the financial statements of public information of banks, to investigate the bank's asset quality and financial ratios, see the possibility of bank credit to the law and conduct business with the group. Then, further from the point of view of corporate governance, banking organizations and the business management behavior, whether or not to provide space for corrupt operators to commit crime. The study found that when the banks non-performing loan ratio, the storage ratio, the ratio of unsecured loans and short-term (long-term) lending and savings (regular ) the proportion of deposits in the high four figures, such as financial statements, the interested person transactions breakdown of issues and interpretation of abnormal lenders, together with the case of bank corporate governance are not implemented, such as board structure, independent directors, professional managers, information and internal audit system are not good , the banks should have the drawbacks of the existence of credit business. Therefore, this study was to use these projects to establish a set of early warning indicators for the operation. When detection of any signs of impropriety raise, the competent authority can engage in immediate financial checks.

In the modern enterprises, the capital structures are made up by the specific or the non-specific populace sources. In the separation of management rights and ownership, their common interests may not be the same, so the agency problems are arising. In recent years, the public has serious doubts about unreasonable compensation of directors with higher ranks. The study samples are companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2007, but excluding banks and insurance companies. This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The corporate governance variables include director stock ownership, the pledged share ratio of directors, chairman of the board as general manager, percent of independent directors on the board, the average compensation of directors, foreign investors¡¦ ownership, and institutional ownership in the firm. The empirical results show that chairman of the board as general manager who has significant influence on earnings management in the whole industry, electronic industry, and non-electronic industry; the average compensation of directors with higher ranks have significant influence on earnings management in the whole industry and non-electronic industry. In different industries, some empirical results support the hypotheses while other hypotheses do not hold. Thus, this research study has believed that the interconnection between the corporate governance variables and earning management will be affected by characteristics of certain industries. In addition, this research study has also found that there are no direct relationships between corporate governance and earnings management. Hence, the corporate governance in Taiwan is still considered not long enough and can not become an independent factor to affect earnings management inhibition of behavior. Therefore, certain parts of hypotheses will not establish.

2004--Zugl.: Diss., 2004.

Zugl.: Darmstadt, Techn. University, Diss., 2009.

Zugl.: Augsburg, Univ., Diss., 2008

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-99). Also available in print.

Zugl.: Diss.

Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2008. / "Submitted to the Department of Accountancy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 24-26)