This paper investigates the formation of the ownership structure and the corporate governance system of the Ukraine as a country in transition. Numerous studies consider that privatization results in the establishment of a proprietors’ motivation mechanism. On the other hand it causes ownership concentration in the hands of a few shareholders and managers. The goal of economic reform in transition and, largely, its pace, is measured by the degree to which shareholders participate in short- and long-term corporate value creation. Shareholder access to such created value depends on the ability of corporate “insiders”, especially executives and management, to claim a disproportionate share of corporate value (the “insider effect”). An econometric analysis of the correlation between privatization and macroeconomic factors studies the degree of effectiveness of economic reforming in Ukrainian regions.

Under de senaste åren har frågor kring bolagsstyrning blivit allt mer aktuella, vilket har förorsakats av olika redovisningsskandaler. Som en konsekvens av detta har det i många länder införts s.k. bolagskoder. Hittills har bara ett fåtal studier undersökt bolagskodernas tillämpning och den institutionella miljö i vilken de har införts. För att undersöka hur bolagskoderna tillämpas och hur den institutionella miljön inverkar på kodernas tillämpning har två länder valts, Sverige och Tjeckien. Det kan förväntas att ländernas skilda institutionella uppsättningar kommer att påverka bolagskodernas tillämpning. Vidare är det av intresse att studera vilka faktorer som kan förklara bolagens val att följa bolagskoden. För att uppfylla uppsatsens syfte har ett positivistiskt synsätt med en deduktiv ansats antagits. Utifrån två befintliga teorier, agentteorin och den institutionella teorin, har att antal förklarande variabler tagits fram. Våra data insamlades i en kvantitativ dokumentundersökning, i vilken 100 svenska och 39 tjeckiska bolag ingick. Slutsatsen blev att bolagskoden tillämpas i en högre utsträckning bland de svenska bolagen än de tjeckiska bolagen, i synnerhet vad det gäller de svenska bolag som åläggs att tillämpa bolagskoden. Storlek, hemlandets påverkan, antal styrelseledamöter, korsnotering samt lönsamhet var de förklarande variablerna vars statistiska samband med följsamhet gentemot koden inte kunde förkastas.

This study investigates the relationships among corporate governance mechanism, firm performance, and executive compensation within Chinese publicly listed firms. The corporate governance structure in China is a unique combination of the Anglo-American model and the German system by including a board of director and a supervisory board simultaneously, and has two monitoring organs, independent directors and supervisory board, co-existing. One of the special features of the Chinese publicly listed firms is their close relationship with the government because most of them were converted from state-owned enterprises at the beginning of the market-oriented economic reform in China. Therefore, we attempt to explore the effects of political connections of their ultimate controllers on corporate governance mechanism, on firm performance, and on executive compensation in China. Our findings indicate a dysfunctional corporate governance system in China, which cannot bring improved firm performance but grant executives high compensations. While we take into consideration the political connections, our results show that they deteriorate corporate governance mechanism, but do not result in inferior firm performance. Robustness tests demonstrate a non-linear effect of corporate governance on executive compensation, jointly depending on the status of a firms political connection and its ownership structure.

We examine whether corporate governance affects the level of information asymmetry in the capital market. We hypothesize that firms with stronger corporate gov-ernance would be more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate information using public rather than selective methods, and that this would be associated with lower levels of in-formation asymmetry. We carefully establish the path through which corporate govern-ance affects a firms voluntary disclosure method based on previous literature. Surpris-ingly, in full sample analysis we find that firms with stronger corporate governance (as measured by Gompers et al.s, 2003, G index) are associated with higher levels of infor-mation asymmetry (as measured by Easley et al.s, 1996, PIN). In subsample analysis, we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, for the most weakly governed firms, stronger corporate governance is associated with lower information asymmetry, and the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry is more pronounced than that of firms with moderate and strong corporate governance. <p> To further test our hypothesis, we consider the external effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the disclosure method to examine the corporate governance-information asymmetry relationship. Consistent with our hypothesis, our evidence suggests that by forbidding the practice of selective disclosure, the regulation significantly decreases the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry level.

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We examine whether corporate governance affects the level of information asymmetry in the capital market. We hypothesize that firms with stronger corporate gov-ernance would be more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate information using public rather than selective methods, and that this would be associated with lower levels of in-formation asymmetry. We carefully establish the path through which corporate govern-ance affects a firms voluntary disclosure method based on previous literature. Surpris-ingly, in full sample analysis we find that firms with stronger corporate governance (as measured by Gompers et al.s, 2003, G index) are associated with higher levels of infor-mation asymmetry (as measured by Easley et al.s, 1996, PIN). In subsample analysis, we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, for the most weakly governed firms, stronger corporate governance is associated with lower information asymmetry, and the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry is more pronounced than that of firms with moderate and strong corporate governance. <p> To further test our hypothesis, we consider the external effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the disclosure method to examine the corporate governance-information asymmetry relationship. Consistent with our hypothesis, our evidence suggests that by forbidding the practice of selective disclosure, the regulation significantly decreases the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry level.

This study investigates the relationships among corporate governance mechanism, firm performance, and executive compensation within Chinese publicly listed firms. The corporate governance structure in China is a unique combination of the Anglo-American model and the German system by including a board of director and a supervisory board simultaneously, and has two monitoring organs, independent directors and supervisory board, co-existing. One of the special features of the Chinese publicly listed firms is their close relationship with the government because most of them were converted from state-owned enterprises at the beginning of the market-oriented economic reform in China. Therefore, we attempt to explore the effects of political connections of their ultimate controllers on corporate governance mechanism, on firm performance, and on executive compensation in China. Our findings indicate a dysfunctional corporate governance system in China, which cannot bring improved firm performance but grant executives high compensations. While we take into consideration the political connections, our results show that they deteriorate corporate governance mechanism, but do not result in inferior firm performance. Robustness tests demonstrate a non-linear effect of corporate governance on executive compensation, jointly depending on the status of a firms political connection and its ownership structure.

This paper examines the relationship between firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, and board diversity. Board diversity is measured by age differentials, gender diversity, board size, number of board members with higher education, and number of nationali-ties included in the board. The data were collected from firms on the OMX Stockholm 30, for the years 2006-2010. Because data were collected from 5 years, a panel type re-gression is used. Furthermore the regression of this paper corrects for time specific ef-fects. This paper contributes to the field of research by investigating the Swedish market in a quantitative manner and using these specific five explanatory variables as a measure of board diversity. The result of this paper shows a clear overall relationship between board diversity and firm performance. More specifically, the education and nationality variables are not significant. The size variable is significant and negatively correlated to firm performance, while the gender and age variables show a significant and positive re-lationship to firm performance.

Styrelsen i ett företag är tänkt att utgöra en funktion för övervakning och rådgivning till den högsta ledningen. Det är styrelsens ansvar att förvaltningen av företaget sköts på bästa möjliga sätt. En faktor som påverkar hur bra styrelsens arbete blir är styrelsens sammansättning. Företagets framgång kan sägas hänga samman med styrelsens sammansättning och kompetens. Det är viktigt att styrelsen kan kommunicera och utbyta erfarenheter. Då en styrelse arbetar som en grupp och ansvarar för företagets organisation och förvaltning krävs det att denna grupp kan samarbeta och på ett aktivt och effektivt sätt arbeta, för att utveckla och förbättra företagets framtid. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka och få en förståelse för hur en styrelse sätts samman. Vad det är som ligger bakom valet av styrelseledamöter samt vad styrelsens sammansättning har för betydelse för styrelsearbetet. Vi har avgränsat oss till att undersöka hur en styrelse sätts samman och vad denna sammansättning har för betydelse. Vi har därmed inte tittat på företaget som respektive styrelse arbetar för. Vi har heller inte undersökt hur styrelsearbetet har påverkat företagets verksamhet. Vår forskning har bedrivits explorativt och uppsatsen är skriven med en kvalitativ ansats. Vi har använt ett induktivt arbetssätt. Vårt arbete har följt den traditionella forskningsprocessen som består av olika steg som tar sin början i en frågeställning och slutligen mynnar ut i ett resultat som grundar sig på tolkningar. Befintliga teorier och en teoretisk referensram har används för att analysera det empiriska material som har samlats in genom intervjuer. Vi har kommit fram till att en styrelse sätts samman med hjälp av en valberedning eller utan valberedning då ägarna själva väljer ut styrelsemedlemmar. Det är bolagsstämman som tar det slutliga beslutet om vilka som ska sitta med i styrelsen. Vår uppfattning är att tillsättningen av styrelsen är mer formell i större bolag med fler ägare än i mindre och familjeägda bolag. Styrelseledamöterna väljs dels på grund av deras kompetens och dels för att de har god branschkännedom. De personliga egenskaperna väger tungt vid valet av ledamöter. Eftersom styrelsen arbetar tillsammans som en grupp är det viktigt att de olika medlemmarna fungerar tillsammans och kan samarbeta.

.Taiwan is the island country, the exportation value occupies GDP 70%. Taiwan exports many products to the mainland , then these products exports to each place in the world, in which mostly is the European,American and other advanced countries. US is especially important nation to the product demand .Its demand degree is affecting the Taiwan economy deeply. Therefore, when these countries's demand weaken, it will affect Taiwan's exportation situation.And this means global environment and Taiwan's economical growth will be closely linked.However, while the overall environment changes, the enterprises does not just let their companies to go out of business or to rally. Under better mangerment, many enterprises still might passed the crisis safely.This paper discusses if the overall environmental factor changes , under certain governing condition, the occurance of financial crisis will be affected or not. This paper uses Logit and the Probit model.Moreover, we know many traditional papers researched the relationship between financial variables and the financial crisis , and this paper also want to discuss if the financial factor changes , under certain governing condition, the occurance of financial crisis will be affected or not.The related result is as follows: 1. American overall variables, the financial variables and the company govern variables separately affect the occurance of finance crisis . 2.Regarding the research about ¡§If the overall environmental factor changes , under certain governing condition, the occurance of financial crisis will be affected ,¡¨the result shows interactive effects between overall variables and company govern variables do not very remarkable.And Regarding the research about ¡§If the financial factor changes , under certain governing condition, the occurance of financial crisis will be affected ,¡¨the result shows interactive effects between financial variables and company govern variables are more remarkable. 3.Under better corporate governance , besides the financial fluidity, the financial condition is also better.