Owners wishing to sell their business have a number of alternative exit routes. In a UK context, they may opt for a public sale of their shares either through the London International Stock Exchange, main market or on the AIM. Alternatively, they may choose a private sale route i.e. MBO or trade sale. This study aims to investigate the connection between the financial characteristics of firms and their choice of exit route. In particular company capital structure and valuation measures are used to discriminate between alternative exit routes and explain the rationale and factors for such segmentation in the market for corporate control. This research uses a discriminatory model to classify the preferred type of realisation route for a firm based on its financial characteristics. A classificatory accuracy better than that obtained by chance provides evidence of some segmentation of alternative disposal routes. A further aim is to consider the role of the large corporate finance advisory industry, which obtains large fees for their proficiency in disposal in the correct market. An attempt has therefore been made to see whether particular types of companies are suited to particular markets on the basis of their financial characteristics and whether this corresponds to actual outcome. We also investigate and evaluate the opportunity cost of misclassification both by the models and by the advisors. The results, in general, suggest that size and capital structure emerge as important discriminators. However, growth and working capital management were also found to contribute in discriminating between the suitability of particular companies for given exit routes. Our investigation demonstrates that discriminant (and logistic regression) models can assign cases to particular markets on the basis of financial attributes at above chance frequency and substantial valuation differences between the various markets are evident. Attention is also given to the opportunity costs involved in differences between indicated and chosen exit route. The results show that out-performing as well as under-performing misclassification errors occur and that the status of advisor seems to play a discussible role.

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

published_or_final_version / abstract / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis seeks to analyse the development and determinants of the corporate governance framework in China. With a focus on the emerging corporate governance framework, the relation between regulation, firms and the single-party state is examined. Corporate governance failures have not been a significant area of study in the governance literature. The analysis of recent high-level corruption cases in the oil industry provides evidence for the persisting influence of the Party-state on governance through personal networks and family ties at the nexus of state and economy. The findings suggest that there are significant underlying constraints which limit the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework. State shareholding, agency chains and a subservient legal system with a parallel legal sphere all impair the new corporate governance system. While a basic system is in place, improving governance remains difficult. An overhaul of the current constellation and second wave of SOE reforms is deemed necessary. / published_or_final_version / China Development Studies / Master / Master of Arts in China Development Studies

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

This study examines marathon successions, which I define as instances where a permanent successor is not chosen at the time of a CEO departure. Marathons have become increasingly prevalent over the last ten years and represent the majority of succession decisions surrounding forced turnovers from 1995-2005. Firms implementing marathon successions around forced turnovers have strong internal governance structures, as measured by board size, director ownership, percentage of outside directors, and dual Chairman/CEO appointments. In addition, I find little evidence supporting the argument that extending the succession process through the use of a marathon leads to increases in uncertainty and/or agency costs in the form of horizon problems. Lastly, I find positive and significant announcement returns for forced marathon successions. These results provide insight into the succession process and the role of strong internal corporate governance in evaluating and implementing succession decisions.

No description available.

No description available.