No description available.

No description available.

The cultural significance of effigy pipes among southeastern groups during the Mississippian period (A.D. 1000-1600) has yet to be fully understood. Recent studies, however, have provided new archaeological contexts for framing explanations of their possible use and distribution among such groups. Apart from conjectures about their use as ceremonial objects, selection for effigy pipes in the Mississippian Southeast was directly related to fluctuating environmental and demographic conditions under which such objects were manufactured and distributed. These conditions provided the appropriate context for their emergence as costly signaling devices through which elite or special interest groups advertised fitness levels, typically expressed in displays of power and prestige. As signaling devices, effigy pipes attained their widest distribution in the Southeast during a time of environmental and demographic stability. Their decline was primarily the result of increasing climatic instability and widespread demographic upheaval--events that precipitated major disruptions in commercial and economic relations.

L'objet de cette thèse est d’explorer les mécanismes évolutionnaires à l'origine de la punition coûteuse chez les humains. Dans le chapitre 1, nous montrons que les comportements punitifs observés en laboratoire sont plus en adéquation avec des processus de sélection individuelle plutôt que de sélection de groupe. Dans le chapitre 2, nous fournissons des preuves empiriques que la décision de punir relève principalement de raisonnements intuitifs causés par une forte exposition à des environnements à réciprocité directe. Enfin, dans le chapitre 3, nous émettons quelques doutes quant à l'hypothèse (plutôt récente) que des stratégies de changement de partenaires pourraient se substituer à la punition coûteuse dans la nature. En somme, nos résultats soulignent le caractère maladaptatif du sentiment punitif tel qu'il se manifeste dans les jeux expérimentaux à un coup. / The aim of this thesis is to investigate the evolutionary roots of costly punishment in humans. In chapter 1, we show that available experimental data are more compatible with behavioral patterns sculpted by individual selective pressures than higher-population processes. In chapter 2, we provide experimental evidence that punishing decisions mostly rely on intuitive reasonings originally adapted to direct reciprocity environments. Finally, in chapter 3, we cast doubt on the (recent) claim that cheap partner switching opportunities make costly punishment anecdotal in the wild. In sum, our results emphasize the maladaptive nature of punitive behaviors observed in anonymous, one-shot laboratory settings.

abstract: Social scientists from many disciplines have examined trust, including trust between those with different religious affiliations, emotional antecedents of trust, and physiological correlates of trust. However, little is known about how all of these factors intersect to shape trust behaviors. The current study aimed to examine physiological responses while individuals engaged in a trust game with a religious in-group or out-group member. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in which they were presented with the target’s profile before playing the game. In each of the conditions the target was described as either Catholic or Muslim and as someone who engaged in either costly signaling or anti-costly signaling behavior. In addition to assessing the amount of money invested as a behavioral measure of trust, physiological responses, specifically cardiac interbeat interval (IBI) and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), were measured. I hypothesized that when playing the trust game with a Catholic target as opposed to a Muslim target, Christian participants would (1) report being more similar to the target, (2) trust the target more, (3) invest more money in the target, (4) have a more positive outlook on the amount invested, and (5) show greater cardiorespiratory down-regulation, reflected by increases in IBI and RSA. Findings revealed that Christian participants reported greater similarity and showed a non-significant trend toward reporting a more positive outlook on (greater confidence in/satisfaction with) their investment decision when playing a Catholic versus Muslim target. Additionally, Christian participants who played an anti-costly signaling Catholic target showed greater cardiorespiratory down-regulation (increases from baseline for IBI, reflecting slower heart rate, and increases in RSA) than Christian participants who played an anti-costly signaling Muslim target. Results from this study echo previous findings suggesting that perceived similarity may facilitate trust. Findings also are consistent with previous research suggesting that religious ingroup or outgroup membership may not be as influential in shaping trust decisions if the trustee is costly signaling; for anti-signaling, however, cardiorespiratory down-regulation to a religious ingroup member may be apparent. These physiological signals may provide interoceptive information about a peer’s trustworthiness. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Psychology 2019

This thesis explores the use of generous behaviour as a costly signal to convey information about an unobservable social characteristic to other individuals in one's social environment. Building on recent contributions in this spirit, I develop a theoretical framework that contrasts signaling activities without social benefits with activities that benefit the observers in situations in which individuals compete for access to a scarce social good. The objective of the first part of the thesis is to characterize the possible separating equilibria in each case. While one obtains a multiplicity of equilibria when the agents employ neutral signals to convey information, one can make a unique prediction with respect to the individuals' equilibrium behaviour if they use beneficial signaling activities, the agents are of two discrete types, behave symmetrically within their respective types, and the observers of the signals adopt non-decreasing beliefs vis-à-vis the signalers' relative quality. In view of their sharp divergence, the second part of the thesis investigates experimentally the precision of these predictions. The results provide support for many elements of the theory. Among others, the behaviour of individuals in the treatments with beneficent signals is much more closely in line with the theoretical predictions than expected given the complexity of their behavioural implications, especially when it comes to the similarity of the participants' behaviour within them. Behaviour in the treatment with neutral signals, in turn, is consistent with multiple equilibria. The final part of the thesis explores what kind of signaling activity individuals trying to communicate their intentions to potential interaction partners will use in various social settings if given a choice. To this end, the framework developed in the first part is extended to allow the signalers to choose endogenously a signal from a “menu” of signaling activities rather than exogenously prescribing a messaging tool. Besides revealing that the uniqueness result of the framework without choice no longer obtains, the results indicate that the players may, under some conditions, opt for inefficient signals.

Background: Since the early 1990s, the market for luxury goods has been growing at an unprecedented pace (Granot et al., 2013). Formerly exclusively targeting the richest of the rich, nowadays luxury products are aiming at a broader and considerably younger customer base, the Generation Y (Truong, 2010). Current studies suggest that luxury goods consumption is driven by a need to signal prestige (Grotts & Widner-Johnson, 2013; Nelissen & Meijers, 2011). However, this need can only be fulfilled when a signal is interpreted in the intended way. Nelissen & Meijers (2011) among others believe that a reliable signal can yield “fitness benefits”. Although researchers agree on the outcome of the signaling game, there appears to be no consensus on “what” a product should look like in order to serve as a reliable signal. Purpose: This thesis investigates the impact of brand prominence on perceived “fitness benefits” among Generation Y consumers in the context of luxury fashion clothing. Method: To meet the purpose of this thesis a quantitative study was conducted. The data was collected through a social experiment among students at Högskolan i Jönköping. The participants were randomly presented with one of three visual cues, capturing Brand Prominence by a person wearing t-shirts with differently sized brand logos. An oral survey was then conducted by which the attributed social "fitness" of the depicted person was assessed. Conclusion: The overall results of this study suggest that Brand Prominence has not as much impact on Generation Y consumers than suggested by previous research. Empirical evidence is provided that the signaling process is not as straight forward as proposed by Nelissen & Meijers (2011) or Veblen (1899). The signaling process among Generation Y consumers is (a) influenced by the recipient’s characteristics and (b) by the subtlety of the signal. Furthermore, current studies suggest in accordance with the obtained results a shift form Luxury Consumption to the phenomenon of Luxury Experience. This implies the necessity for luxury manufacturers to adapt to new levels of complexity created by a demographically and geographically heterogeneous consumer landscape, characterized by a new way of Costly Signaling.

Thesis advisor: Jennifer Erickson / Policymakers are faced with filtering, understanding, and assessing an overwhelming, and often conflicting, amount of information on a constant basis. States signal resolve over issues, such as during a crisis, or to demonstrate intentions by sending reassurance signals of benign or defensive intentions. But states also have incentives to keep some information private or manipulate the information it sends. Whether or not policymakers believe an adversary’s signals influences, and often determines, the prospect of cooperation or competition. This dissertation examines how policymakers believe the reassurance signals of an adversary. Costly signaling theory argues states can cut through these issues by attaching costs to their signals. Only a sincere state would attach and accept these costs, thus demonstrating the sender is sincere and credible. I argue costly signaling theory is unable to explain variation in why policymakers believe signals in certain situations and not others, despite having costs attached. In this dissertation, I argue policymakers look to see whether sender policymakers risk their own political position to send signals. To risk political vulnerability, sender policymakers must demonstrate they have reduced their control over domestic political processes to send reassurance signals. This is done by sending signals which go against the interests of important domestic constituencies, such as the military or members of the elite. In doing so, sender policymakers demonstrate they are committed to the success of the signal, and will not deflect the costs imposed by signaling failure onto the population or state itself. When sender policymakers demonstrate political vulnerability, target policymakers will believe the signal is genuine. If sender policymakers do not demonstrate political vulnerability, target policymakers will not believe the signal is genuine. I test the domestic political vulnerability thesis by examining how U.S. policymakers believed Soviet reassurance signals during the Cold War. Studying cases of reassurance signaling also allows me to examine for the ability, or inability, of U.S. policymakers to update assessments of Soviet intentions. I select nine cases of Soviet reassurance signaling across three signaling strategies identified by costly signaling theory: strategic arms control (tying hands); conventional troop reductions (sinking costs); and de-escalation signaling. The cases were chosen to test the explanatory power of my theory against the alternative explanations. I use extensive archival research and process tracing to study these cases and find support for the theory of domestic political vulnerability. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

No description available.

Costly ‘altruistic’ punishment, where an individual intervenes to punish someone for behaving unfairly towards another or for violating a social norm, seems to be vital for large-scale cooperation. However, due to the costs involved, the evolution of this behaviour has remained a puzzle. The thesis initially describes why punishment is costly and explains why current theories do not sufficiently explain its evolution in the context of these costs. The thesis then offers a solution to this puzzle in the form of a dominance-based theory of the evolution of punishment. The theoretical underpinnings of this theory are discussed in reference to the previous literature, specifically how a dominant position provides sufficient heterogeneity in the cost and benefits of punishment to allow the behaviour to evolve at the individual-level of selection. Across 10 studies, the thesis empirically investigates the role dominance is theorised to play in costly punishment behaviour. First, the judgements observers make about punishers are investigated. It is demonstrated that punishers are perceived as dominant but, unlike individuals who engage in other aggressive behaviours, punishers are also well liked. While successful punishers are judged to be of the highest rank in a social group, the wider social judgements of punishers are dependent on the attempt at punishment only; successful and unsuccessful punishers are seen as equally dominant and well liked, suggesting that the willingness to attempt punishment can honestly signal both dominance and ones pro-sociality. However, additional studies show that observers a) perceive subordinate punishers will face a great deal of retaliation, b) show surprise when subordinates attempt to punish, and c) expect that dominants will punish and be successful, whereas subordinates are expected to never punish. Thus, while there are reputational benefits from punishment, only dominant individuals can actually access them. Second, the effect of a dominant position on punishment behaviour is investigated. Two studies sought to simulate the greater access to resources that dominants enjoy, and demonstrate that individuals who receive more resources from group-level cooperation will punish free-riding more frequently and more severely than those who receive less resources. Moreover, individuals who are in a stable dominant position, i.e. who can continually benefit to a greater degree than others from group cooperation, punish even more frequently and severely than when individuals receive additional resources alone. The results show that individuals only punish when it is cheap for them to do so and when investment in the public good (by punishing) can produce higher future returns for them. A dominant position provides the opportunity for both of these. Further studies demonstrate that individuals at the centre of a social network, an example of a ‘real life’ informal dominant position, are more sensitive to unfairness when making punishment decisions compared to those at the periphery of a group. However, when punishment decisions are public, and there are no economic incentives to punish, individuals behave in a similar manner regardless of social position. Taken together, the results of the empirical studies support the proposed dominance-theory of costly punishment. The theoretical implications of the dominance-theory of punishment are discussed in reference to both the proximate occurrence of punishment and its evolutionary origins in dominance and dominant behaviours. The practical implications of this theory will also be discussed, specifically in regard to when and why individuals will act in defence of the public good. While further investigation is necessary, a dominance-theory of punishment explains both results of this thesis and the findings of the wider literature, and as such provides a coherent and compelling explanation for the evolution of costly punishment and its associated emotions.