The cultural significance of effigy pipes among southeastern groups during the Mississippian period (A.D. 1000-1600) has yet to be fully understood. Recent studies, however, have provided new archaeological contexts for framing explanations of their possible use and distribution among such groups. Apart from conjectures about their use as ceremonial objects, selection for effigy pipes in the Mississippian Southeast was directly related to fluctuating environmental and demographic conditions under which such objects were manufactured and distributed. These conditions provided the appropriate context for their emergence as costly signaling devices through which elite or special interest groups advertised fitness levels, typically expressed in displays of power and prestige. As signaling devices, effigy pipes attained their widest distribution in the Southeast during a time of environmental and demographic stability. Their decline was primarily the result of increasing climatic instability and widespread demographic upheaval--events that precipitated major disruptions in commercial and economic relations.

abstract: Social scientists from many disciplines have examined trust, including trust between those with different religious affiliations, emotional antecedents of trust, and physiological correlates of trust. However, little is known about how all of these factors intersect to shape trust behaviors. The current study aimed to examine physiological responses while individuals engaged in a trust game with a religious in-group or out-group member. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in which they were presented with the target’s profile before playing the game. In each of the conditions the target was described as either Catholic or Muslim and as someone who engaged in either costly signaling or anti-costly signaling behavior. In addition to assessing the amount of money invested as a behavioral measure of trust, physiological responses, specifically cardiac interbeat interval (IBI) and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), were measured. I hypothesized that when playing the trust game with a Catholic target as opposed to a Muslim target, Christian participants would (1) report being more similar to the target, (2) trust the target more, (3) invest more money in the target, (4) have a more positive outlook on the amount invested, and (5) show greater cardiorespiratory down-regulation, reflected by increases in IBI and RSA. Findings revealed that Christian participants reported greater similarity and showed a non-significant trend toward reporting a more positive outlook on (greater confidence in/satisfaction with) their investment decision when playing a Catholic versus Muslim target. Additionally, Christian participants who played an anti-costly signaling Catholic target showed greater cardiorespiratory down-regulation (increases from baseline for IBI, reflecting slower heart rate, and increases in RSA) than Christian participants who played an anti-costly signaling Muslim target. Results from this study echo previous findings suggesting that perceived similarity may facilitate trust. Findings also are consistent with previous research suggesting that religious ingroup or outgroup membership may not be as influential in shaping trust decisions if the trustee is costly signaling; for anti-signaling, however, cardiorespiratory down-regulation to a religious ingroup member may be apparent. These physiological signals may provide interoceptive information about a peer’s trustworthiness. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Psychology 2019

This thesis explores the use of generous behaviour as a costly signal to convey information about an unobservable social characteristic to other individuals in one's social environment. Building on recent contributions in this spirit, I develop a theoretical framework that contrasts signaling activities without social benefits with activities that benefit the observers in situations in which individuals compete for access to a scarce social good. The objective of the first part of the thesis is to characterize the possible separating equilibria in each case. While one obtains a multiplicity of equilibria when the agents employ neutral signals to convey information, one can make a unique prediction with respect to the individuals' equilibrium behaviour if they use beneficial signaling activities, the agents are of two discrete types, behave symmetrically within their respective types, and the observers of the signals adopt non-decreasing beliefs vis-à-vis the signalers' relative quality. In view of their sharp divergence, the second part of the thesis investigates experimentally the precision of these predictions. The results provide support for many elements of the theory. Among others, the behaviour of individuals in the treatments with beneficent signals is much more closely in line with the theoretical predictions than expected given the complexity of their behavioural implications, especially when it comes to the similarity of the participants' behaviour within them. Behaviour in the treatment with neutral signals, in turn, is consistent with multiple equilibria. The final part of the thesis explores what kind of signaling activity individuals trying to communicate their intentions to potential interaction partners will use in various social settings if given a choice. To this end, the framework developed in the first part is extended to allow the signalers to choose endogenously a signal from a “menu” of signaling activities rather than exogenously prescribing a messaging tool. Besides revealing that the uniqueness result of the framework without choice no longer obtains, the results indicate that the players may, under some conditions, opt for inefficient signals.

Background: Since the early 1990s, the market for luxury goods has been growing at an unprecedented pace (Granot et al., 2013). Formerly exclusively targeting the richest of the rich, nowadays luxury products are aiming at a broader and considerably younger customer base, the Generation Y (Truong, 2010). Current studies suggest that luxury goods consumption is driven by a need to signal prestige (Grotts & Widner-Johnson, 2013; Nelissen & Meijers, 2011). However, this need can only be fulfilled when a signal is interpreted in the intended way. Nelissen & Meijers (2011) among others believe that a reliable signal can yield “fitness benefits”. Although researchers agree on the outcome of the signaling game, there appears to be no consensus on “what” a product should look like in order to serve as a reliable signal. Purpose: This thesis investigates the impact of brand prominence on perceived “fitness benefits” among Generation Y consumers in the context of luxury fashion clothing. Method: To meet the purpose of this thesis a quantitative study was conducted. The data was collected through a social experiment among students at Högskolan i Jönköping. The participants were randomly presented with one of three visual cues, capturing Brand Prominence by a person wearing t-shirts with differently sized brand logos. An oral survey was then conducted by which the attributed social "fitness" of the depicted person was assessed. Conclusion: The overall results of this study suggest that Brand Prominence has not as much impact on Generation Y consumers than suggested by previous research. Empirical evidence is provided that the signaling process is not as straight forward as proposed by Nelissen & Meijers (2011) or Veblen (1899). The signaling process among Generation Y consumers is (a) influenced by the recipient’s characteristics and (b) by the subtlety of the signal. Furthermore, current studies suggest in accordance with the obtained results a shift form Luxury Consumption to the phenomenon of Luxury Experience. This implies the necessity for luxury manufacturers to adapt to new levels of complexity created by a demographically and geographically heterogeneous consumer landscape, characterized by a new way of Costly Signaling.

Thesis advisor: Jennifer Erickson / Policymakers are faced with filtering, understanding, and assessing an overwhelming, and often conflicting, amount of information on a constant basis. States signal resolve over issues, such as during a crisis, or to demonstrate intentions by sending reassurance signals of benign or defensive intentions. But states also have incentives to keep some information private or manipulate the information it sends. Whether or not policymakers believe an adversary’s signals influences, and often determines, the prospect of cooperation or competition. This dissertation examines how policymakers believe the reassurance signals of an adversary. Costly signaling theory argues states can cut through these issues by attaching costs to their signals. Only a sincere state would attach and accept these costs, thus demonstrating the sender is sincere and credible. I argue costly signaling theory is unable to explain variation in why policymakers believe signals in certain situations and not others, despite having costs attached. In this dissertation, I argue policymakers look to see whether sender policymakers risk their own political position to send signals. To risk political vulnerability, sender policymakers must demonstrate they have reduced their control over domestic political processes to send reassurance signals. This is done by sending signals which go against the interests of important domestic constituencies, such as the military or members of the elite. In doing so, sender policymakers demonstrate they are committed to the success of the signal, and will not deflect the costs imposed by signaling failure onto the population or state itself. When sender policymakers demonstrate political vulnerability, target policymakers will believe the signal is genuine. If sender policymakers do not demonstrate political vulnerability, target policymakers will not believe the signal is genuine. I test the domestic political vulnerability thesis by examining how U.S. policymakers believed Soviet reassurance signals during the Cold War. Studying cases of reassurance signaling also allows me to examine for the ability, or inability, of U.S. policymakers to update assessments of Soviet intentions. I select nine cases of Soviet reassurance signaling across three signaling strategies identified by costly signaling theory: strategic arms control (tying hands); conventional troop reductions (sinking costs); and de-escalation signaling. The cases were chosen to test the explanatory power of my theory against the alternative explanations. I use extensive archival research and process tracing to study these cases and find support for the theory of domestic political vulnerability. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

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abstract: For most of human history hunting has been the primary economic activity of men. Hunted animals are valued for their food energy and nutrients, however, hunting is associated with a high risk of failure. Additionally, large animals cannot be consumed entirely by the nuclear family, so much of the harvest may be shared to others. This has led some researchers to ask why men hunt large and difficult game. The “costly signaling” and “show-off” hypotheses propose that large prey are hunted because the difficulty of finding and killing them is a reliable costly signal of the phenotypic quality of the hunter. These hypotheses were tested using original interview data from Aché (hunter gatherer; n=52, age range 50-76, 46% female) and Tsimané (horticulturalist; n=40, age range 15-77, 45% female) informants. Ranking tasks and paired comparison tasks were used to determine the association between the costs of killing an animal and its value as a signal of hunter phenotypic quality for attracting mates and allies. Additional tasks compared individual large animals to groups of smaller animals to determine whether assessments of hunters’ phenotypes and preferred status were more impacted by the signal value of the species or by the weight and number of animals killed. Aché informants perceived hunters who killed larger or harder to kill animals as having greater provisioning ability, strength, fighting ability, and disease susceptibility, and preferred them as mates and allies. Tsimané informants held a similar preference for hunters who killed large game, but not for hunters targeting hard to kill species. When total biomass harvested was controlled, both populations considered harvesting more animals in a given time period to be a better signal of preferred phenotypes than killing a single large and impressive species. Male and female informants both preferred hunters who consistently brought back small game over hunters who sometimes killed large animals and sometimes killed nothing. No evidence was found that hunters should forgo overall food return rates in order to signal phenotypic qualities by specializing on large game. Nutrient provisioning rather than costly phenotypic signaling was the strategy preferred by potential mates and allies. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Anthropology 2019

The negotiation process of a peace agreement is an uncertain period where adversaries can have a difficult time credibly guaranteeing their commitment to an approaching agreement. However, violence is often ceased before a peace agreement is signed, demonstrating their importance for understanding non-violent and violent behavior by warring actors. Furthermore, research finds that rebels at times comply with laws of war during conflict and negotiations. Hence, the purpose of this study is to derive a better understanding of rebel groups’ non-violent behavior, and whether it relates to the commitment problem and the negotiation process. This paper argues that by complying with international law, rebels can convey a signal with a peace-making objective, increasing the likelihood of a successful negotiation. Through a qualitative, structured and focused comparative case analysis of the FMLN in El Salvador and the NPFL in Liberia, the study finds that rebel’s compliance with IHL may serve as a costly signal that mitigates the credible commitment problem and leads to the signing of a successful peace agreement. However, further research is needed to support this hypothesis.

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