Despite being outnumbered, underfunded, and militarily weaker than the state-backed armed forces they challenge, insurgents have continually mounted long-term challenges. To that end, the puzzle on which many conflict scholars have focused their efforts is that of insurgent war duration. The theory posited in this dissertation claims the capacity of insurgents to survive wartime is a function of choices made before large-scale dyadic conflict erupted––or during a time period I call incubation. Using qualitative case studies of Latin American insurgencies such as Sendero Luminoso and the FMLN, I demonstrate the capacity to endure conflict long-term was a direct correlate of both type and length of their prewar preparation. Incubation was used to set up processes for recruitment, procuring resources from durable networks, and coordinating personnel. After controlling for standard explanations, I also offer statistical evidence that insurgent incubation duration is statistically significant and positively related to conflict duration. The theory and empirical evidence presented here provides a new approach for explaining insurgent war duration. / Political Science

This research focuses on the provision of intrastate security and on the question how states in the global South do or do not provide security for their citizens and do or do not protect them from physical violence. This thesis argues that while institutional conditions are an important aspect of security provision in the global South, more attention needs to be paid to policy processes. Institution building as set out in the literature about Security Sector Reform and statebuilding assumes that it is possible to provide security to all citizens of a state by building democratic state security institutions. However, this is only possible if the state is the predominant force of controlling violence. Research showed that this is rarely the case in countries of the global South. This thesis contends that statehood in the global South is contested due to power struggles between multiple state and non-state elites. It argues that the analysis of security policy processes allows for an analysis of security provision in societies where no centralised control over violence exists. It contributes to a better understanding of the shortcomings of security provision in the global South because it shows the impact of societal and state actors on security policy making. Using the case of security policy making under the first FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation) government in El Salvador (2009-2014), the thesis shows that, in a contested state policy making does not result from a pact between the state and society or from a social consensus as envisaged by parts of the FMLN and other forces of the New Left in Latin America. Instead, policy making results from elite pacts and elite struggles. This is illustrated in the domination of an ad hoc decision-making mode which describes short-term decisions which are insufficiently implemented and easily reversed or replaced. Thus, security provision as a policy field remains focused on elite interests and does not include the interests of the broader population.

This research focuses on the provision of intrastate security and on the question how states in the global South do or do not provide security for their citizens and do or do not protect them from physical violence. This thesis argues that while institutional conditions are an important aspect of security provision in the global South, more attention needs to be paid to policy processes. Institution building as set out in the literature about Security Sector Reform and statebuilding assumes that it is possible to provide security to all citizens of a state by building democratic state security institutions. However, this is only possible if the state is the predominant force of controlling violence. Research showed that this is rarely the case in countries of the global South. This thesis contends that statehood in the global South is contested due to power struggles between multiple state and non-state elites. It argues that the analysis of security policy processes allows for an analysis of security provision in societies where no centralised control over violence exists. It contributes to a better understanding of the shortcomings of security provision in the global South because it shows the impact of societal and state actors on security policy making. Using the case of security policy making under the first FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation) government in El Salvador (2009-2014), the thesis shows that, in a contested state policy making does not result from a pact between the state and society or from a social consensus as envisaged by parts of the FMLN and other forces of the New Left in Latin America. Instead, policy making results from elite pacts and elite struggles. This is illustrated in the domination of an ad hoc decision-making mode which describes short-term decisions which are insufficiently implemented and easily reversed or replaced. Thus, security provision as a policy field remains focused on elite interests and does not include the interests of the broader population.

The negotiation process of a peace agreement is an uncertain period where adversaries can have a difficult time credibly guaranteeing their commitment to an approaching agreement. However, violence is often ceased before a peace agreement is signed, demonstrating their importance for understanding non-violent and violent behavior by warring actors. Furthermore, research finds that rebels at times comply with laws of war during conflict and negotiations. Hence, the purpose of this study is to derive a better understanding of rebel groups’ non-violent behavior, and whether it relates to the commitment problem and the negotiation process. This paper argues that by complying with international law, rebels can convey a signal with a peace-making objective, increasing the likelihood of a successful negotiation. Through a qualitative, structured and focused comparative case analysis of the FMLN in El Salvador and the NPFL in Liberia, the study finds that rebel’s compliance with IHL may serve as a costly signal that mitigates the credible commitment problem and leads to the signing of a successful peace agreement. However, further research is needed to support this hypothesis.

At the start of the George H.W. Bush administration, American involvement in El Salvador‘s civil war, one of the last Cold War battlegrounds, had disappeared from the foreign policy agenda. However, two events in November 1989 shattered the bipartisan consensus on US policy toward El Salvador: the failure of the FMLN‘s largest military offensive of the war and the murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter by the Salvadoran military, the FAES. Despite more than one billion dollars in US military assistance, the war had stalemated, promoting both sides to seek a negotiated political settlement mediated by the United Nations. The Jesuit murders demonstrated the failure of the policy of promoting respect for democracy and human rights and revived the debate in Congress over US aid to El Salvador. This thesis argues that the Bush administration sought to remove the burden of El Salvador from its foreign policy agenda by actively pushing for the investigation and prosecution of the Jesuit case and fully supporting the UN-mediated peace process. Using recently declassified government documents from the George Bush Presidential Library, this thesis will examine how the Bush administration fundamentally changed US policy toward El Salvador. Administration officials carried out an unprecedented campaign to pressure the FAES to investigate the Jesuit murders and bring the killers to justice while simultaneously attempting to prevent Congress from cutting American military assistance. The Bush administration changed the objective of its El Salvador policy from military victory over the guerrillas to a negotiated political settlement. The US facilitated the peace process by pressuring the Salvadoran government and the FMLN to negotiate in good faith and accept compromises. When both sides signed a comprehensive peace agreement on January 16, 1992, the burden of El Salvador was lifted.