有關在台階形的公共物品兩難(step-level public good dilemma)中集體失敗的心理影響的研究一直很少。本研究探討在集體失敗後反事實思維 (counterfactual thinking) 對群體成員情緒和隨後合作行為的影響。研究1確定了兩種會顯著增加失敗後合作行為的反事實思維：關注(1)個人的成果 或 (2) 群體的成果，並以自我為中心的向上反事實思維 (self-focused upward counterfactual thinking)。此外，內疚 (guilt)中介了反事實思維對合作行為的影響。我們在研究2中發現以自我為中心的向上反事實思維是否會增加或減少，取決於反事實思維中的結果導向(outcome orientation) 及其結構是否為加法式 (additive)，還是減法式(subtractive)。另外，內疚，不行動引起的後悔 (regret of inaction)和行動引起的後悔 (regret of action) 中介了這些反事實思維對合作行為的影響。我們的研究結果指出反事實思維和個別情緒在研究社會困境的重要性。 / Research on the psychological consequences of collective failure in step-level public good dilemmas has remained scant. The present research addressed how counterfactual thinking influenced group members’ emotions and subsequent cooperation after collective failure. In study 1, we identified two types of counterfactuals which significantly increased post-failure cooperation: self-focused upward counterfactuals that concerned about (1) personal outcome and (2) group outcome. Furthermore, guilt mediated the effects of counterfactual thinking on cooperation. In study 2, we demonstrated that self-focused counterfactuals predicted increase or decrease in cooperation, depending on its outcome orientation and structure (additive vs. subtractive). Guilt, regret of inaction and regret of action mediated these effects. Our findings pointed to the need of studying counterfactual thinking and specific emotions in social dilemma. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Yam, Pak Chun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 41-49). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.4 / Chinese Abstract (摘要) --- p.5 / Introduction --- p.6 / Counterfactual thinking in social dilemma --- p.9 / Counterfactual thinking and emotion --- p.11 / “Feeling-is-for-doing“ approach of emotions in social dilemma --- p.13 / Counterfactual thinking, emotions and cooperation --- p.14 / Overview --- p.17 / Study 1 --- p.17 / Method --- p.18 / Results --- p.21 / Discussion --- p.25 / Study 2 --- p.26 / Method --- p.29 / Results --- p.30 / Discussion --- p.34 / Chapter General Discussion --- p.35 / Implications and Contributions --- p.37 / Limitations and future directions --- p.39 / Conclusion --- p.40 / References --- p.41 / Appendix1 --- p.50 / Measure of regret --- p.50 / Measure of guilt --- p.50 / Measure of anger --- p.50 / Appendix 2 --- p.51 / Counterfactual manipulations used in Study 2 --- p.51

After a negative consumption experience, consumers often like to muse about how their consumption might have turned out better. For example, a traveler who missed a flight may imagine that "if I had taken another transport to the airport, I might have caught the flight," or "I would have been enjoying my vacation if I had caught the flight." These imaginations, called counterfactual thoughts, have been documented to pose two effects on responses to negative consumptions. On one hand, they are functional because they provide corrective information that helps consumers solve problems associated with the consumption (Markman et al. 1993; Roese 1994). On the other hand, they are painful because they accentuate negative feelings about the consumption when they highlight the possibility that the consumption might have turned out better (Gleicher et al. 1990; Markman et al. 1993). Existing understanding on these two effects suggests that while people may learn a good lesson from their counterfactual thoughts, they have to contain the negative feelings induced by these thoughts. / In addition, this research also identifies the situational factors that promote the generation of process- and outcome-focused counterfactuals. Consumers are more likely to generate process-focused (versus outcome-focused) counterfactuals when they expect that the consumption is more likely to repeat. They are more likely to generate outcome-focused (versus process-focused) counterfactuals the closer they had missed a better-off consumption outcome. / In summary, this research contributes to the counterfactual literature by proposing thought focus as a new dimension to classify counterfactuals into process- and outcome-focused counterfactuals. It also advances existing understanding on the two effects of counterfactual generation and demonstrates that consumers may enjoy the problem-solving function of counterfactual generation without paying a psychological cost. Finally, this research provides managers insights into when promoting counterfactual generation is beneficial and when it is undesirable. / This research is motivated to tease out the problem-solving and affect accentuation effects of counterfactual generation, such that people may learn a lesson from counterfactual generation without paying incremental psychological cost. To start with, this research proposes thought focus as a new dimension to classify counterfactual thoughts into process- and outcome-focused counterfactuals. This classification is then used as a means to tease out the two effects of counterfactual generation. Specifically, it is argued that process- and outcome-focused counterfactuals pose differential consequences to consumers who experienced negative consumptions. Process-focused counterfactuals, which focus on the process leading to a better-off imagined outcome (e.g., taking another transport to airport), promote corrective behaviors in subsequent consumptions and reduce the chance of having negative experiences in the future. Outcome-focused counterfactuals, which focus on the benefits brought by a better-off outcome (e.g., enjoying the vacation), intensify the negative feelings (such as disappointment and unhappiness) about the current consumption. / Ho, Ka Yan. / Adviser: Jessica Y. Y. Kwong. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-11, Section: A, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-73). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

Dissertation (Ph.D.)--University of Toledo, 2009. / Typescript. "Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology." Bibliography: leaves 58-66.

Rectificatory justice for colonialism has been, in recent years, included in the discussion of global justice. The idea is that former colonial powers acknowledge, apologise and make reparations for the harms caused during colonialism. However, there are some objections to rectificatory justice for colonialism. This paper examines one of the main objections, the counterfactual argument. This objection has been found to have some plausibility due to the difficulty in estimating the effect of past injustice on present conditions, as well as the claim that African countries did indeed benefit from colonialism. However, due to the exploitative nature of colonialism, it is reasonable to argue for rectificatory justice based solely on the harm caused, without having to conceptualise a world without the occurrence of colonialism. The aim of this paper is to claim that the harms of colonialism are partly to blame for the current global inequality and that rectificatory justice will go a long way in decreasing this inequality.

Counterfactual thinking is the tendency to view events that can easily be imagined otherwise as events that ought not to have been (Miller & Turnbull, 1990). Thirty-six male and sixty-five female subjects from introductory psychology courses completed a counterfactual thinking questionnaire and two personality measures assessing locus of control (Rotter Locus of Control Scale) and self-esteem (Texas Social Behavior Inventory). Results supported the hypothesis that people are more likely to generate counterfactual thoughts when their actions are perceived as easily mutable or when an event is easily imagined otherwise. Results also indicated that women were more likely to mutate events than were men. Finally, participants with high self-esteem were more likely to mutate events than were participants with low self-esteem. Results provided no evidence for a relationship between counterfactual thinking and locus of control. Factors that might have reduced the impact of the individual difference variables are considered. / Department of Psychological Science

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Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 43-45).

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Alberta, 2009. / Title from PDF file main screen (viewed on Oct. 20, 2009). "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, Department of Computing Science, University of Alberta." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, September 2009.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2006. / Advisor: Alfred Mele, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Philosophy. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Sept. 20, 2006). Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 166 pages. Includes bibliographical references.