The objective of this study is to investigate and analyse covert action as an option in national security policy. To achieve this aim, the study focused on aspects such as changes in the current international security environment; new challenges that exist; and a conceptual framework of covert action as an element of intelligence. An analysis of the conduct of covert action by the United States of America (US) during the Cold War era as well as the post-Cold War era was also done with the specific intention of identifying problem areas, reasons for success, as well as legislative control measures instituted to regulate the activity. A similar study referring to the situation in South Africa, with the focus on the pre- and post-1994 eras, is also presented. The nature of covert action and especially negative perceptions within society, have led to the questioning of the use of covert action as a legitimate option within security policy. However, as shown in the analysis of case studies, reality indicates that governments continue to conduct covert action. The importance of the study lies in its clarification of the concept of covert action, not only for policy-makers but also for intelligence functionaries. It indicates the measures that should be in place for covert action to be an effective element of national security options; its advantages and disadvantages; the circumstances in which it should be conducted; and the fact that it is still a viable option in the current security milieu. / Dissertation (MSS (Political Science))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

The dissertation conducts a comparative analysis of the roles of the Inspectors-General of Intelligence with specific reference to South Africa. The analysis assessed the roles, functions and structures of the office of the Inspectors-General in the following countries: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America, South Africa and equivalent institutions in the United Kingdom. The study was based on a review of existing literature and interviews and written responses with some of the members of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence, the former Minister for Intelligence Services, LN Sisulu, the head of the intelligence division of the South African National Defence Force, the former deputy Director-General of the South African Secret Service, judge Gordon who is responsible for interception of communications and the current Inspector-General of Intelligence, Mr ZT Ngcakani. The performance of the office of the Inspector General of Intelligence since 1995 indicates that: (a) there were ambiguities in the legal framework for the office of the Inspector-General which led to various interpretations by stakeholders on the functioning of the office; (b) there is still a need to test the impact of the office of the Inspector General on the Services and the public; and (c) the Inspector-General's office requires other oversight mechanisms to complement its functions. / Dissertation (MSS)--University of Pretoria, 2008. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

This study analyses parliamentary intelligence oversight in South Africa by assessing the understanding of members of the JSCI of its core business, its mission and vision and powers and functions as are stipulated by law. The study locates the JSCI within an international intelligence oversight milieu through a review and evaluation of selected countries’ intelligence oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, international best practice is sought and applicable lessons are drawn for South Africa. The study is bases on a literature review and interviews with members of the JSCI to gather information and draw insights to evaluate and test the propositions in the context of international and national best practice. The propositions, which are supported by the research, are that: · Intelligence oversight in South Africa under the JSCI has hitherto been relatively effective although there is room for improvement. · The JSCI has good relations with the other arms of the state that are responsible for the oversight of Intelligence in South Africa – making parliamentary intelligence oversight, overall, quite effective. · Despite this effectiveness there are legislative gaps and problems pertaining to the modus operandi of the JSCI that need the attention of both the Executive and Legislature and which could be part of a package of legislative reform. The research supported these propositions whilst pointing out that new initiatives need attention if the culture of oversight is to find root. These are the need to widen the scope of accountability to build a culture of accountability among middle and senior management members of the Intelligence structures and secondly the way Parliament resources the JSCI. / Dissertation (M (Political Sciences))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

No description available.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.