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1	Only Persons Grow Moral: Student Personhood, Moral Growth, and the Purpose of School Casas Pardo, Juan Antonio January 2024 (has links) The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the formative import of the relationships between adults and the young in their corresponding roles as teachers and students between the first year of kindergarten and the last grade of high school (K-12 education). My approach to this issue is twofold: First, I argue that it is imperative that educators effectively recognize the personhood of students within K-12 schools. Second, I define schools as formative communities organized for the purpose of furthering the moral growth of students. These arguments will be supported by a theoretical framework articulated around the concepts of the personhood of students, the interpersonal stance in education, moral growth, and schools as formative communities. I propose a characterization of these four interrelated concepts based on an analysis of Stephen Darwall’s philosophical work on respect, dignity, and the second-person standpoint; Aristotelian virtue ethics and character education; and John Dewey’s philosophy of education, especially in his conceptions of growth, community, participation, and the moral nature and aims of education. I conclude by theorizing schools as communities organized towards the fundamental purpose of fostering the moral growth of students, and argue that this purpose requires engaging students to fully participate of school life as persons. In studying some of the most basic questions about K-12 schooling from the perspective of philosophy of education, it is my intent to produce a framework that is conceptually well-grounded and clear enough to provide practical guidance for school teachers and leaders. Ethics--Study and teaching Moral education Darwall, Stephen L., 1946- Dewey, John, 1859-1952 Aristotle
2	Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism Saunders, Josiah Paul January 2007 (has links) This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism. Philosophy Kant (Immanuel) Hume (David) naturalism science ethics morals morality normativity agency freedom desire reason rationality autonomy heteronomy sympathy justice ends means ideal happiness duty right wrong inclination motive metaphysics of morals moral epistemology kingdom of ends Blackburn (Simon) Korsgaard (Christine) Allison (Henry) Darwall (Stephen) Förster (Eckart) Kuehn (Manfred)

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Only Persons Grow Moral: Student Personhood, Moral Growth, and the Purpose of School

Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism