Thesis (S.T.M.)--Yale Divinity School, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-136).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2003. / "May 1, 2003." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-118).

Psychologists have long appreciated that many real-world decisions require a balance of expediency and accuracy in gathering evidence. Often the best decisions are made when there is some lingering uncertainty. But how much? Depending on the situation, choosing the right amount of evidence can often be a fine line between making a rash decision and being indecisive. Psychologists have been reluctant to pursue studying peoples' abilities to judge the correct "threshold" for probabilistic decisions. There are two reasons for this: First, the question of a decision threshold, or "when should I stop gathering evidence?" is confounded by the larger issue of how subjects choose and integrate that evidence. Subjects may have a decision threshold that is consistently sub-optimal with respect to a model that does not consider cognitive constraints. However, subjects may actually be choosing the right amount of information given their own cognitive limitations. Second, it has been shown that people often use specific heuristics in making probabilistic decisions. In this case, defining a decision threshold would be largely dependent on the heuristic and task, thus preventing a study of decision thresholds that is widely applicable. The research presented here addresses both of these concerns. I defined a task where the ideal decision threshold is clearly defined, requiring some evidence, but not an exhaustive search. Furthermore, this threshold can be precisely manipulated by changes in the reward structure. Although it is possible to use a "sufficing" or sub-optimal heuristic, subjects are given a significant financial incentive to fully integrate as much evidence as possible. Lastly, and most importantly, a general model of people's cognitive limitations is applied to the traditional normative model. This enhancement allows a more refined study of humans' ability to place their decision threshold according to environmental conditions. / text

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The problem of model choice in multiobjective decision making, that is, the selection of the appropriate multiobjective solution technique to solve an arbitrary multiobjective decision problem, is considered. Classifications of the available techniques are discussed, leading to the development of a set of 27 model choice criteria and an algorithm for model choice. This algorithm divides the criteria into four groups, only one of which must be reevaluated for each decision problem encountered. Through the evaluation of the available multiobjective techniques with respect to each of the model choice criteria, the model choice problem is modeled as a multiobjective decision problem. Compromise programming is then used to select the appropriate technique for implementation. Two case studies are presented to demonstrate the use of this algorithm. The first is a river basin planning problem where a pre-defined set of alternatives is to be ranked with respect to a set of criteria, some of which cannot be quantified. The second is a coal blending problem modeled as a mathematical programming problem with two linear objective functions and a set of linear constraints. An appropriate multiobjective solution technique is selected for each of these case studies. In addition, an approach for the solution of dynamic multiobjective problems, one area where solution techniques are not available, is presented. This approach, known as dynamic compromise programming, essentially transforms a multiobjective dynamic programming problem into a classical dynamic programming problem of higher dimension. A dynamic programming problem, modeled in terms of three objectives, is used to demonstrate an application of this technique.

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This dissertation is concerned with the role of regret aversion in decision making. Specifically, it examines how regret aversion influences decision process, choice, and post-decisional behaviors and feelings. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the past empirical findings and theorizing on regret aversion. Chapter 2 examines whether regret aversion leads to a stronger or weaker preference for so-called reason-based choices (cf., Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993), or options that are more easily justifiable. Specifically, four experiments test whether four well-known reason-based choice effects are amplified or attenuated when regret is made salient. These effects are the asymmetric dominance effect, the compromise effect, the select/reject effect, and the most important attribute effect. Chapter 3 reports on five experiments that examine whether regret aversion leads decision makers to engage in more careful decision processing as suggested by Janis and Mann (1977). It extends the study of regret aversion from choice behavior to decision processing. Chapter 4 studies the effects of regret aversion in repeated decisions. Specifically, it examines experimentally how decision makers handle the trade off between seeking feedback on foregone options that may facilitate learning and better decision making in future decisions, and avoiding feedback on foregone options as such feedback may cause feelings of regret. Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions of this dissertation and concludes.

The majority of the research conducted on consumer choice phenomena focuses on how choices are made and the processes that lead up to those choices. While these are essential aspects within the breadth of choice knowledge that exists today, little research has been conducted on the options that are rejected during this process. Thus, the overarching goal of this dissertation is gain an understanding of consumer choice processes and outcomes through the lens of a nearly chosen alternative. Specifically, this dissertation investigates how the decision process can cause a close second option to be rejected when the chosen option is found to be unavailable.As a means of achieving these goals, I first demonstrate the phenomenon that consumers do not always select a close second option when the first choice option is unavailable, contrary to the prediction of economic rationality. Next, I propose that the decision process itself, specifically the use of a tie-breaking attribute to differentiate between close options, triggers a choice outcome that does not include the original second choice option, but rather an alternative that possesses this tie-breaking attribute. Finally, I examine the implications that the preference reversal phenomenon described above has for retailers and manufacturers.My original interest in this phenomenon stems from anecdotal evidence provided by a variety of informants. Although this evidence helped me to recognize the prevalence of rejected second choice options, experimental design is used to investigate this phenomenon and the boundary conditions that confine this effect. Consequently, my dissertation consists of 6 experiments. Experiment 1 and a pilot study establish the effect and investigate the theoretical process that account for my findings. Experiments 2 through 4 rule out alternative explanations and add support towards the existence and prevalence of the effect. Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 explore the impact of these results for improving the performance of marketing managers. It is my belief that incorporating the dynamic effects of the second-most preferred option may ultimately lead to more accurate and sophisticated prediction of buyer choices, more effective retailing and personal selling strategies, and more profitable management of product line portfolios.

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