A recent debate has identified a description– experience gap, where the non-linear weighting function identified in prospect theory reverses when probabilities are discovered through experience rather than by description (probabilities). This thesis will explore the role of experience and probabilities theoretically and empirically. It is argued that both behaviors are compatible on a theoretical basis given a preference for the status quo, but produce opposing decision weights due to different cognitive and motivational factors. Probabilities focus a decision on the potential for rare events creating a preference for certain outcomes and reduced risk taking consistent with loss aversion. Experience overweighs customary outcomes consistent with sensitivity to a reference point or the status quo. Experience in the form of loss, however, moderates the effect of probabilities on risk taking. An experimental game of dice supports this hypothesis, suggesting ambiguity seeking in the face of loss and raising the possibility that the use of probabilities may not be always be maximizing behavior.

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Esta tesis incluye tres capítulos que exploran diferentes aspectos de la distinción entre decisiones desde la descripción y decisiones desde la experiencia. El capítulo 1 estudia escenarios de decisión cuando las personas cuentan con información tanto desde la descripción como desde la experiencia. Los resultados sugieren que la experiencia es desatendida ante una descripción.También se explora el impacto sobre las decisiones de diferencias individales con respecto a la habilidad racional.Las personas con habilidad racional más alta obtienen muestras de mayor tamaño que los participantes con menor habilidad racional.El capítulo 2 examina situaciones en las que la información obtenida desde la experiencia resulta una mejor fuente que una descripción.La complejidad y las demoras favorecen a la experiencia sobre la descripción como fuente de información. No se evidencian diferencias individuales con respecto a habilidades numéricas o racionales. Sin embargo, se evidencia una relación entre mayor habilidad racional y mayor tamaño muestral. Por último, el capítulo 3 explora, para una tarea de lotería,la interacción entre la ilusión de control y la fuente de información. / This thesis includes three chapters that study different aspects of the distinction between decisions from description and decisions from experience. Chapter 1 studies choice when decision makers have both information from description and information from experience. Results suggest that experience is disregarded in the face of description. Individual differences with respect to rational ability are also explored. Participants with higher rational ability draw larger samples than participants with lower rational ability. Chapter 2 examines situations in which information from experience is a better source of information than information from description. Complex scenarios and delayed judgmental tasks favor experience over description as source of information. Moreover, there were no individual differences due to numerical/rational abilities. Additional evidence was found that relates higher rational ability to larger samples.Finally,chapter 3 explores how illusion of control interacts with the source of information in a lottery task.