Thesis.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1929. / Vita. Published also without thesis note. Bibliography: p. [223]-229.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1929. / Vita. Published also without thesis note. Bibliography: p. [223]-229.

Inaug.-Diss.--Berlin. / "Dissertatio inauguralis quam ad summos in philosophia honores impetrandos consensu et auctoritate amplissimi philosophorum ordinis in Alma Litterarum Universitate Friderica Guilelma Berolinensi." "Promotio sollemnis habebiter: 23 Juli 1904." Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Zugl.: Lille, Univ., Diss., 1970

The Enlightenment was funded by a utopian hope that increased knowledge of nature as a mechanism could create the conditions for lasting peace and widespread happiness. The twentieth century, however, has been marked by catastrophes hitherto beyond imagination. This thesis examines two critiques of enlightenment that suggest this development is not accidental either to the concept of enlightenment or to the course it has taken in modern Western societies. The development in question follows from tendencies within enlightenment itself. I provide an exegetical account of Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis, in their collaborative work Dialectic of Enlightenment, of the regressive moment in enlightenment, which, for them, is owed to the entanglement of rationality and domination. Next, I examine Peter Sloterdijk's analysis, in Critique of Cynical Reason, of the ambivalent social reception of enlightenment that results in the phenomenon of modern cynicism, which must be contrasted with its ancient namesake that I render, following the translation of Sloterdijk, as "kynicism". In each of these works the way forward for enlightenment hinges upon cultivating a relationship between nature and the subject that is not based on dominating opposition: nature as a mechanism for human purposes or as the suppressed inner nature of the subject. Horkheimer and Adorno's solution is the recovery of reflection on nature within the subject. I show that this is insufficient to meet the challenges posed by modern cynicism that Sloterdijk reveals to be a late development of enlightenment. It is for this reason that Sloterdijk asks us to recall the legacy of Diogenes of Sinope. Sloterdijk finds in Diogenes a critical consciousness that resists the "melancholic stagnation" of cynical society and retains the utopian spirit of enlightenment.

The aim of the present study is to examine how Hellenism and Greek philosophy were received and used in arguments in the writings of John Chrysostom. The thesis is divided into five chapters of varying lengths, with the fifth chapter being the conclusion of the thesis. Chapter 1 is divided into two major parts. Part A is the story of certain major scholarly works on the topic of Hellenism and Christianity, particularly in late antiquity. Part B turns to previous scholarship on John Chrysostom and Hellenism specifically. We discuss three particular aspects of John’s reception, rhetoric, philosophy, and religious identity while also looking in interpretations from modern scholarship. This part and the chapter conclude with a general overview of the argument and an identification of research gaps. Chapter 2 is divided into five parts. After a discussion of the identity of those called Greeks in John’s corpus we proceed to analyse his extensive criticism of several aspects of Hellenism: philosophy, religion, public attitudes, and the binding power of tradition. The third part goes into the opposite direction and examines instances of John’s positive references to Hellenes and Greek history. In part four we see the reception moving on from the binary of praise and criticism and we discuss examples of both praise and criticism combined, along with indifferent references to Hellenes and John’s practical suggestions on how the Christians should treat the Greeks. In Chapter 3 we examine John’s embodiments of Hellenism and Christianity respectively through his comparisons of individuals. The first three parts consist of major comparisons, which are the most frequent ones in terms of the individuals compared, and minor comparisons, which are smaller treatments and usually group individuals together instead of treating them separately. The fourth part is a close analysis of Chrysostom’s Discourse on Babylas, a treatise that includes a major comparison between Babylas and Diogenes but also provides an opportunity for John to launch a full-scale attack against Hellenism. Finally, in Chapter 4 we will be looking into John’s reception of a specific philosophical school: the Cynics. After situating John’s own texts within previous Christian tradition and assessing differences and similarities, we complete the chapter by a comparison between John and the Cynics and their respective conception of a specific philosophical concept, that of autarkeia.

This composition is arranged for string ensemble (first and second violin, viola and cello), flute, oboe, piano, electric guitar, electric bass guitar, drum set and auxiliary percussion. Overall, the work follows a standard four-section format in a fast-slow-fastfast order. However, the individual sections experiment with the nested repeats form and with bifurcation of the Fibonacci Sequence to determine the length of the cells which make up the form. The individual sections display various styles including a Webern-like pointillism and Latin rhythms. The concept of non-narrative performance instructions is also experimented with in the work. Throughout the piece, projected (or otherwise displayed) words are to shown to the audience. These words along with the music are intended to comment upon the nature of the search for knowledge. The accompanying narrative details each of the four sections in regards to form, instrumentation, harmonic material and melodic content. The discussion at the end of the narrative covers the composer's impressions about the success of this musical experiment. / School of Music

Thesis--Munich. / Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 234-236).

This thesis examines Epictetus' view on Cynic philosophy, as it is being expressed in chapter 22 of the third book of Diatribai ("The Discourses"). The chapter has traditionally been seen as an idealized and deceitful portrait of the Cynic, and has been questioned as an intended justification of stoics and Cynics in the overall view on the history of philosophy. This thesis, however, attempts a different approach on the matter, based upon a thorough discussion regarding the field of research, as well as on different ways to read and understand the text at hand, in order to seek out a view that goes beyond the traditional distinction between practice and theory. The thesis thus challenges the view where the philosophy of Epictetus is seen as an instrumental practice of stoic theory, isolated to the field of ethics.   The reading of the chapter focuses mainly on the philosophical purpose of the text and its intended practice, and finds that much of the stoic ascetic practice is not only taught through instructions, but also performed in the lecture and Epictetus' way of speaking. Epictetus' portrait of the philosophical Cynic is thus understood, not only as an extreme end that serves as an ascetic role-model, but also as a basic archetype of what it actually means to practice a philosophical way of thinking, that is of central importance to Epictetus philosophy. This sheds a new light on both the traditional distinction between stoic theory and practice, and on much of the research performed on the field of stoicism this far, as well as on that of Cynicism.