This project explores the impact of international and domestic institutions on the decisions of political leaders. A theory of two-level institutional incentives is developed that seeks to explain how institutional context at the domestic and international levels affects the incentives, and thus the behavior of political leaders when making decisions related to trade policy. This theory argues that the institutional context in which political leaders make policy decisions has a significant effect on their decision-making. Further, the institutional context must include both domestic and international institutions. Building on previous work on the impact of institutions at both the domestic and international levels, this project seeks to test the theory of institutional incentives in the context of trade disputes under the GATT and WTO.A series of empirical tests are conducted using a dataset of GATT disputes combined with a new dataset of disputes under the WTO. These tests demonstrate strong support for the theories set forth in this project that domestic and international institutions combine to affect the behavior of political leaders. Domestic institutions affect the impact of international institutions and vice versa. This project extends previous work in two-level institutional incentives by demonstrating that institutional change at both levels has significant effects on the behavior of political leaders.

<p>The participation of African countries in the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the Worlt Trade Organisation ( WTO) is insignificant. This research seeks to find a suitable model/mechanism which meets the particular needs of developing countries. The practical aim of this reseach was to enhance active participation of various stakeholders in developing countries who may be adversely affected or who face potential damage by unfair trade pracices of other players in the brutal and complex battleground of world trade. Thus the research seeks to suggest a suitable legal framework which can be utilised by stakeholders in African countries as part of the process of trade dispute initiation when their interests are threatened or adversely affected.</p>

<p>The participation of African countries in the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the Worlt Trade Organisation ( WTO) is insignificant. This research seeks to find a suitable model/mechanism which meets the particular needs of developing countries. The practical aim of this reseach was to enhance active participation of various stakeholders in developing countries who may be adversely affected or who face potential damage by unfair trade pracices of other players in the brutal and complex battleground of world trade. Thus the research seeks to suggest a suitable legal framework which can be utilised by stakeholders in African countries as part of the process of trade dispute initiation when their interests are threatened or adversely affected.</p>

Magister Legum - LLM / The participation of African countries in the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the Worlt Trade Organisation ( WTO) is insignificant. This research seeks to find a suitable model/mechanism which meets the particular needs of developing countries. The practical aim of this reseach was to enhance active participation of various stakeholders in developing countries who may be adversely affected or who face potential damage by unfair trade pracices of other players in the brutal and complex battleground of world trade. Thus the research seeks to suggest a suitable legal framework which can be utilised by stakeholders in African countries as part of the process of trade dispute initiation when their interests are threatened or adversely affected. / South Africa

The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system is facing unprecedented challenges, following the United States (US) decision to block the appointment of all Appellate Body members. The US has justified its blocking tactic, already implemented since 2017 by raising several procedural and substantive concerns with the Appellate Body's failure to follow WTO rules. On 10 December 2019, the Appellate Body was forced to suspend its activities after the second terms of two of the remaining three members expired. While the WTO dispute settlement system continues to function at the panel stage, the Appellate Body is currently unable to review appeals because it lacks the minimum number of three members required to establish a division. In addition, the collapse of the Appellate Body means that any party to a dispute can block the adoption of a panel report by filing a notice to appeal which is likely to remain in limbo for an indefinite period. Numerous studies have discussed the Appellate Body crisis and its implications for the WTO dispute settlement system. Few, however, have critically analysed the validity of the concerns that the US has raised about the Appellate Body's work over the past few years. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to discuss and critically analyse these concerns to determine whether the Appellate Body has indeed strayed from its limited mandate. In addition, the research will provide recommendations on how to save the appellate stage and ensure that appeals are resolved while WTO members attempt to find permanent solutions to this unprecedented crisis.

No description available.

The World Trade Organization has its own binding dispute settlement system. To ensure compliance with the outcome of the dispute settlement procedures, the claimant Member is authorized to retaliate in case the respondent Member fails to comply within a certain period of time. However, the rules and procedures regarding retaliation and determination of compliance are ambiguous and have caused an interpretational problem called the sequencing problem. To address the problem, the parties to any dispute generally conclude bilateral ad hoc procedural agreements. However, by examining the procedural agreements concluded to date and by analyzing the potential problems of these agreements, this thesis concludes that due to the dependence on the will of the parties and the uncertain legal status of the agreements, the procedural agreements do not constitute a satisfactory method for addressing the sequencing problem. Alternatives such as amendments to the dispute settlement rules, an authoritative interpretation of them or ― if consensus cannot be reached soon ― clarification by means of a precedent from the Appellate Body, should be considered and attempted.

Os órgãos que compõem o Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC possuem competência para analisar reclamações fundadas nos denominados acordos abrangidos e formular conclusões e recomendações sobre a conformidade das medidas impugnadas com os referidos acordos. Para interpretar as disposições destes acordos, estes órgãos podem recorrer às regras costumeiras de interpretação previstas na Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados de 1969. Estas regras de interpretação, por sua vez, permitem àqueles órgãos recorrer a espécies normativas produzidas fora do contexto da OMC como subsídios para esclarecer o sentido dos termos das disposições dos acordos abrangidos. Ao se valer destas espécies normativas, os referidos órgãos estarão também, inevitavelmente, interpretando as disposições destes. Nesse contexto, esta pesquisa teve por objetivo analisar de que forma as espécies normativas tradicionais de Direito Internacional do Meio Ambiente (convenções, costumes e princípios gerais de direito) foram interpretadas pelos órgãos do OSC em três casos escolhidos para representar o problema. Os resultados da análise dos casos demonstraram que espécies normativas do Direito Internacional do Meio Ambiente são efetivamente admitidas no processo interpretativo dos acordos abrangidos, o que pode se dar de forma vinculante ou não, bem como podem influenciar efetivamente na interpretação destes acordos, confirmando-lhes o significado ou lhes atribuindo um significado não explícito, embora as conclusões desta interpretação nem sempre resultem em posicionamentos totalmente favoráveis às medidas unilaterais adotadas pelos Membros da OMC a título de preocupação ambiental. / The organs that make up the dispute settlement system of the WTO have power to examine complaints founded in so-called covered agreements and formulate conclusions and recommendations on the compliance of the contested measures with the agreements. To interpret the provisions of these agreements, these organs may make use of interpretation customary rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. These rules of interpretation, in turn, allow those organs resort to normative species produced outside the context of WTO as subsidies to clarify the meaning of the terms of the provisions of the covered agreements. By borrowing these normative species, those bodies will also inevitably interpreting the provisions of these. In this context, this study aimed to examine how traditional normative species of International Law of the Environment (conventions, customs and general principles of law) were interpreted by the DSB organs in three cases chosen to represent the problem. The case analysis results showed that normative species of International Law of the Environment are effectively admitted in the interpretive process of the covered agreements, which can occur in binding or not, and can effectively influence the interpretation of these agreements, confirming them the meaning or assigning them a no explicit meaning, although the conclusions of this interpretation does not always result in favorable positions to fully unilateral measures adopted by WTO Members in respect of environmental concern.

Os órgãos que compõem o Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC possuem competência para analisar reclamações fundadas nos denominados acordos abrangidos e formular conclusões e recomendações sobre a conformidade das medidas impugnadas com os referidos acordos. Para interpretar as disposições destes acordos, estes órgãos podem recorrer às regras costumeiras de interpretação previstas na Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados de 1969. Estas regras de interpretação, por sua vez, permitem àqueles órgãos recorrer a espécies normativas produzidas fora do contexto da OMC como subsídios para esclarecer o sentido dos termos das disposições dos acordos abrangidos. Ao se valer destas espécies normativas, os referidos órgãos estarão também, inevitavelmente, interpretando as disposições destes. Nesse contexto, esta pesquisa teve por objetivo analisar de que forma as espécies normativas tradicionais de Direito Internacional do Meio Ambiente (convenções, costumes e princípios gerais de direito) foram interpretadas pelos órgãos do OSC em três casos escolhidos para representar o problema. Os resultados da análise dos casos demonstraram que espécies normativas do Direito Internacional do Meio Ambiente são efetivamente admitidas no processo interpretativo dos acordos abrangidos, o que pode se dar de forma vinculante ou não, bem como podem influenciar efetivamente na interpretação destes acordos, confirmando-lhes o significado ou lhes atribuindo um significado não explícito, embora as conclusões desta interpretação nem sempre resultem em posicionamentos totalmente favoráveis às medidas unilaterais adotadas pelos Membros da OMC a título de preocupação ambiental. / The organs that make up the dispute settlement system of the WTO have power to examine complaints founded in so-called covered agreements and formulate conclusions and recommendations on the compliance of the contested measures with the agreements. To interpret the provisions of these agreements, these organs may make use of interpretation customary rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. These rules of interpretation, in turn, allow those organs resort to normative species produced outside the context of WTO as subsidies to clarify the meaning of the terms of the provisions of the covered agreements. By borrowing these normative species, those bodies will also inevitably interpreting the provisions of these. In this context, this study aimed to examine how traditional normative species of International Law of the Environment (conventions, customs and general principles of law) were interpreted by the DSB organs in three cases chosen to represent the problem. The case analysis results showed that normative species of International Law of the Environment are effectively admitted in the interpretive process of the covered agreements, which can occur in binding or not, and can effectively influence the interpretation of these agreements, confirming them the meaning or assigning them a no explicit meaning, although the conclusions of this interpretation does not always result in favorable positions to fully unilateral measures adopted by WTO Members in respect of environmental concern.

No description available.