This study examines the effect that divided or unified government, in the United States of America, has on the delegation of trade authority to the President. Using a qualitative analysis approach, I examine competing views and formulate an independent opinion based on the peoples’ preferences and evaluation of the principles of America’s Constitutionalism. I conclude that overemphasis on the impact of divided government is misleading because trade issues provide the primary mechanism which determines the implementation of America’s trade policies, and the principles of Constitutionalism are valuable guidelines. Blended with the discussion is the awareness of an American ethos which challenges formulation of trade agreements in an era of increased globalization.

Zugl.: Köln, Univ., Diss., 2007

This thesis will focus on split ticket voting. Split ticket voting refers to an aspect of voting behavior where the individual will cast votes for different political parties for different offices. Through the development of countless theories and utilizing data, political scientists have managed to shed some light as to why an individual may engage in split-ticket voting. However, many of these studies have been too narrow in their focus, for instance, relying on a specific election without taking into account some major variables that provide the foundation for voting behavior. The purpose of this study is to provide scholars with an idea of what characteristics exist most commonly among split-ticket voters compared with straight-ticket voters. What variables work together to cause an individual to engage in split ticket voting? Specifically, this thesis will examine the contribution of variables in explaining ticket splitting. Despite studies of the causes of split-ticket voting, the field is still unclear as to what causes an individual to engage in split-ticket voting. What individual variables cause an individual to engage in ticket splitting?

Since 1996, the president of Taiwan's implementation of universal suffrage since 2010 in 14 years, There have been twice to replace the regime of peace, Taiwan's policy toward mainland China in the political division of the two major political parties - the KMT and DDP and also so the identity of the ruling and opposition parties quickly converted twice. Taiwan's political environment has undergone an unprecedented rapid changes. This article by David Easton's system theory as a general theory and approaches, Looks forward to further establishing a political party as the core of the local theory, Analysis of Taiwan's political parties since 1996 in the "internal and external environment ¡÷ demand and input ¡÷ feedback and output ¡÷ re-enter to the internal and external environment" and what role in the political process? As well as how the policies of mainland China affected? ¡@This article has found, political parties in the system theory are not only pressure groups for Political authority, And active in the political system's internal, external and boundary, And can be further repression of political authority, the completion of its own expectations of mainland policy. Political parties, both ruling party or opposition parties or unified government or divided government, the political parties can control congress, congressional paralysis, cooperation with other political system, increased support by social mobilization, the creation of political controversy and use other methods to pressure on the political authority. Finally, this article believes that with the cooperation of the KMT and the China Communist Party platform, the KMT has similar status of political authority in Taiwan's policy toward mainland China.

To understand the dynamics of legislative gridlock, as well as account for the mixed and often conflicting findings in the divided government literature, this paper posits that the previous unidimensional approach of using divided government as an explanatory variable of interest fails to accurately reflect the changing realities of American politics since WWII. Two new and interlocking conceptual approaches are introduced that expand the dimensionality of legislative gridlock: ideological polarization explained through the temporal shift of political parties from a party system of moderation and universalistic policy outputs, to one where particularistic goals became much more common. As studies of divided government center on temporally-bound concepts, they ignore most of the inter- and intra-party variation evident throughout the latter 20th century. / text

鑑於我國分裂投票研究多數著重於縣市層級的地方首長與民意代表選舉，本文探討台灣首次於同日舉行的2012年總統暨立法委員選舉，援引「政治矛盾」（political ambivalence）做為研究架構，分析選民的一致與分裂投票。作者假設，選民的政治矛盾程度愈高，愈可能進行分裂投票；反之，民眾的政治矛盾態度愈低，愈可能採取一致投票。作者擷取「2009年至2012年『選舉與民主化調查』三年期研究規劃（3/3）：2012年總統與立法委員選舉面訪案」調查資料，運用「勝算對數模型」（Binary Logit）與「多項勝算對數模型」（Multinomial Logit）進行檢證。資料顯示，在總統與區域立法委員選舉，以及總統與不分區立委選舉的分裂投票實證模型中，在控制其他變數的效應之下，選民的政治矛盾態度對於分裂與一致投票，確實具有顯著影響。此外，選民的省籍、制衡觀與政策平衡等因素，也與一致與分裂投票有關。在結論中，本文摘述分析要點，並提出政治矛盾態度的研究意涵。 / In light of many election studies on straight and split ticket voting for the head of local government and councilors in Taiwan, I focus on people's ticket splitting of the 2012 presidential and legislative campaign which is the first election holding on one day. This article introduces political "ambivalence" to explain why people vote split or not. I assume the voters who have more ambivalent about KMT and DPP, more ticket splitting; and the straight ticket voters should be less ambivalence. My dates are based on "Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2012: Presidential and Legislative Election," and analyzed with Binary Logit and Multinomial Logit. When controlling other variables, party ambivalence intensively affects voters' straight and split ticket voting not only for president and constituency legislators but for president and party block legislators, and nearly all coefficients are statistically significant. By the way, provincial origin, cognitive Madisonianism, and policy balancing on independence issue or social welfare correlate to straight and split ticket voting in models. I conclude the major findings and research limitations at the end.

本研究旨在探討2000年我國中央政府政黨輪替前後，不同的政府型態對於重大法案審議的影響。我們運用統計、內容分析（content analysis）、深度訪談等方法，檢視第2屆至第6屆立法院（1993年2月至2007年1月）期間，行政院提出的249個重大法案在立法院審議的情形，屬於「貫時性分析」（longitudinal analysis）。 就分立政府（divided government）與一致政府（unified government）的比較而言，研究結果發現：台灣的分立政府之重大法案審議結果，與一致政府的確有所差異，但差異並不大。值得強調的是，吾人企圖跳脫「分立vs.一致」的二元思考，嘗試作更細膩的觀察──本研究以二元對數勝算比模型（binary logit model）檢視影響重大法案通過與否的因素，藉由兩個模型的比較，最重要的發現在於：本研究提出的「四個階段」（一致政府前期、一致政府後期、分立政府前期、分立政府後期）之分析方式，較傳統「一致政府vs.分立政府」二元對立的分類，更具意義。分析結果顯示：「分立政府後期」的重大法案通過情形，明顯較「一致政府前期」好，分立政府的重大法案生產力未必不如一致政府。而且，分立政府本身有顯著差異，一致政府後期與前期的差異則更為顯著。易言之，本研究發現：分立政府的情形不能一概而論，分立初期行政部門的重大法案在國會常遭擱置延宕，頗符合Sundquist等傳統派學者的看法，但分立後期，重大法案通過率大幅回升甚至略高於一致政府的平均數，此階段的情況大致符合修正派學者Mayhew的觀點（分立政府無損於重大法案之制定），惟國會對於法案主導權的爭奪明顯較一致政府時期嚴重。另一方面，一致政府的情形亦不能一概而論，一致政府前期的重大法案推動情形並不順暢，頗值得2008年重回一致政府「完全執政」的新政府借鏡。

The purpose of this research is to analyze the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of American federal government, during periods within which these two branches are led by different political parties, to discover whether the legislative branch attempts to independently legislate and enact foreign policy by using “the power of the purse” to either appropriate in support of or refuse to appropriate in opposition to military engagement abroad. The methodology for this research includes the analysis and comparison of certain variables, including public opinion, budgetary constraints, and the relative majority of the party that holds power in one or both chambers, and the ways these variables may impact the behavior of the legislative branch in this regard. It also includes the analysis of appropriations requests made by the legislative branch for funding military engagement in rejection of requests from the executive branch for all military engagements that occurred during periods of divided government from 1946 through 2009

本篇論文的研究目的在探討美國選民的分裂投票行為, 以一九九二年的選舉為研究對象. 資料來源是1992年ＮＥＳ的資料. 本文所指的--分裂投票, 是指選民在該年的總統與眾議員選舉中, 分別投給不同政黨的候選人. 茲分成以下章節一一探討. 第一章包含研究動機, 文獻檢閱, 與研究方法. 在本章中, 我們將美國有關分 裂投票的研究, 做了全面性的探討, 並配合一九九二年特殊的選舉環境, 建構屬於本文的假設. 第二章是在探討分裂投票選民的特質. 第三章則是探討政黨認同對選民分裂投票行為的影響. 當選民的政黨認同越弱時, 選民越傾向分裂投票,合乎我們的假設. 在政黨認同的方向上, 在一九九二年民主黨的認同者比較傾向一致 投票. 第四章在探討候選人因素對分裂投票的影響. 在1980年代的文獻中,相當強調候選人因素的影響, 特別是國會的現任者, 常常是造成選民分裂投票的誘因. 但是在1992年的選舉中, 無論是總統或眾議員候選人都不強. 因此我們認為1992年選民分裂投票的誘因, 應該是議題因素. 在第五章中,我們藉由經濟性投票模式及政策中和模式, 來解釋1992年選民的分裂投票行為.