This study examines the markets reaction to announcements of dividend increases. In particular, it considers the factors that affect the magnitude of abnormal returns during the days that surround announcements of dividend increases. The objective is to find whether the market reaction to dividend increases has weakened with the passage of time and whether market conditions affect the reaction. Eventually, this study is expected to reveal whether dividends continue to be important to investors. <p>This research is motivated by the findings of Fama and French (2001). They suggest that since 1978 firms have had a declining propensity to pay dividends. They propose that dividends are declining as a result of the ease by which investors can make homemade dividends through selling small portions of their holdings. They argue that recent market developments, particularly the introduction of negotiated commissions and discount brokers, have made homemade dividends easier and less costly. Their results may suggest that investors are now less interested to receive dividends than in the past. One objective of this study is to examine whether investors preferences regarding dividend payments have changed over time. This is accomplished by measuring the abnormal returns following announcements of dividend increases. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) suggest that the reaction of the market to dividend increases is an acceptable method of determining the value of dividends to investors. <p>In addition, this study explores the theoretical factors that may affect dividend valuation. Previous studies, such as Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000), suggest that the existence of debt holders and institutional investors reduce the potential for agency costs as these stakeholders monitor managers. In contrast, Jensen (1986) suggests that high cash flows make it easier for managers to spend on perquisites and empire building. Thus, the potential for agency costs increases. Therefore, paying dividends when cash flows are high reduces the likelihood of agency costs. At the same time, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) suggest that increasing dividends following higher cash flows signals managements expectation that future performance warrants a dividend increase. Consequently, the agency and signaling theories suggest that investors may react positively to dividend increases when cash flows are high. <p>Several observations are obtained from this study. First, investor reaction to dividend increases seems to have weakened over time. Second, the reaction is different when the increase is announced in a bear market rather than in a bull market. Third, the market reaction to dividend increases is less in firms that are more liquid. This finding may be interpreted as evidence that dividends are valued less in more liquid firms because it is easier for the investors of these firms to make homemade dividends. Fourth, the magnitude of the reaction is directly related to the increase in trading volume following the announcement. <p>Surprisingly, the evidence disputes the predictions of the agency cost theory of dividends. This theory states that dividends are valued because they decrease the amount of cash available to management, which in turn decreases the potential for waste. Given this theory, it is expected that firms with high debt loads already have agency costs decreased so the market reaction to their dividend increases would be less than other firms while firms with high free cash flows would have a greater market reaction to their dividend increases because of the large potential for waste on managements part. Instead, the results suggest that firms with high debt loads experience positive market reaction following dividend increases while firms with large free cash flows experience negative reactions. It seems that the signaling theory of dividends is contributing heavily to this result.<p>Future research should be directed to investigate the possibility that share repurchases may be replacing dividends as a way to redistribute surplus cash to shareholders. In addition, future studies may focus on the signaling theory of dividends as useful tool to explain the dividend policies of corporations.

This study examines the markets reaction to announcements of dividend increases. In particular, it considers the factors that affect the magnitude of abnormal returns during the days that surround announcements of dividend increases. The objective is to find whether the market reaction to dividend increases has weakened with the passage of time and whether market conditions affect the reaction. Eventually, this study is expected to reveal whether dividends continue to be important to investors. <p>This research is motivated by the findings of Fama and French (2001). They suggest that since 1978 firms have had a declining propensity to pay dividends. They propose that dividends are declining as a result of the ease by which investors can make homemade dividends through selling small portions of their holdings. They argue that recent market developments, particularly the introduction of negotiated commissions and discount brokers, have made homemade dividends easier and less costly. Their results may suggest that investors are now less interested to receive dividends than in the past. One objective of this study is to examine whether investors preferences regarding dividend payments have changed over time. This is accomplished by measuring the abnormal returns following announcements of dividend increases. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) suggest that the reaction of the market to dividend increases is an acceptable method of determining the value of dividends to investors. <p>In addition, this study explores the theoretical factors that may affect dividend valuation. Previous studies, such as Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000), suggest that the existence of debt holders and institutional investors reduce the potential for agency costs as these stakeholders monitor managers. In contrast, Jensen (1986) suggests that high cash flows make it easier for managers to spend on perquisites and empire building. Thus, the potential for agency costs increases. Therefore, paying dividends when cash flows are high reduces the likelihood of agency costs. At the same time, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) suggest that increasing dividends following higher cash flows signals managements expectation that future performance warrants a dividend increase. Consequently, the agency and signaling theories suggest that investors may react positively to dividend increases when cash flows are high. <p>Several observations are obtained from this study. First, investor reaction to dividend increases seems to have weakened over time. Second, the reaction is different when the increase is announced in a bear market rather than in a bull market. Third, the market reaction to dividend increases is less in firms that are more liquid. This finding may be interpreted as evidence that dividends are valued less in more liquid firms because it is easier for the investors of these firms to make homemade dividends. Fourth, the magnitude of the reaction is directly related to the increase in trading volume following the announcement. <p>Surprisingly, the evidence disputes the predictions of the agency cost theory of dividends. This theory states that dividends are valued because they decrease the amount of cash available to management, which in turn decreases the potential for waste. Given this theory, it is expected that firms with high debt loads already have agency costs decreased so the market reaction to their dividend increases would be less than other firms while firms with high free cash flows would have a greater market reaction to their dividend increases because of the large potential for waste on managements part. Instead, the results suggest that firms with high debt loads experience positive market reaction following dividend increases while firms with large free cash flows experience negative reactions. It seems that the signaling theory of dividends is contributing heavily to this result.<p>Future research should be directed to investigate the possibility that share repurchases may be replacing dividends as a way to redistribute surplus cash to shareholders. In addition, future studies may focus on the signaling theory of dividends as useful tool to explain the dividend policies of corporations.

The relevance or irrelevance of dividend payments has been the topic of much discussion for the past eight decades. The primary objective of this study was to determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the (JSE). Dividend Policy and the Agency Theory underpinned the study. Secondary data of sampled listed financial companies for the period 2005-2016 was sourced from IRESS database. Data was analysed using EViews version 9. The results revealed that the presence of institutional ownership resolves the asymmetry information problems, and, reduces the need to pay dividends. The results also revealed that 54.69% of JSE listed companies under the financials’ services sector practise dividend decisions. The results further revealed that the dividend payout ratio is positively correlated with ROE and LEV, and negatively correlated INST, DIRS and FOREIGN variables. The results confirmed the existence of agency problems on listed financial services companies. / Ukubaluleka okanye ukungabaluleki kokuhlawula izahlulo bekusoloko kusisihloko sengxoxo kumashumi asibhozo eminyaka edluleyo. Injongo ephambili yesi sifundo yayikukufumanisa ulwalamano phakathi komgaqo nkqubo wezahlulelo neengxaki zobumeli (ubuarhente) beenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho nezidweliswe kwiJohannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Izisekelo zesi sifundo nguMgaqo Nkqubo Wezahlulo (Dividend Policy) neNgcingane Yobumeli (Agency Theory). Iqela lesibini ledatha yeenkampani ezidwelisiweyo kwiminyaka ye-2005– 2016 yafunyanwa kwiqula leedatha elaziwa ngokuba yi-IRESS database. Idatha yahlalutywa ngokusebenzisa isixhobo sohlalutyo iEViews version 9. Iziphumo zadiza ukuba ubukho babanini kwiziko loshishino buyazisombulula iingxaki zonxibelelwano olungalingani kakuhle kwaye kuyasicutha isidingo sokuhlawula izahlulo. Kwakhona, iziphumo zadiza ukuba ama-54.69% eenkampani ezidweliswe kwiJSE, phantsi kodidi lweenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho, enza izigqibo zezahlulo. Iziphumo zaphinda zadiza ukuba intlawulo yezahlulo ihambelana kakuhle neenqobo zeROE neLEV, kanti azihambelani neenqobo zeINST, ezeDIRS kunye nekuthiwa ziFOREIGN. Ezi ziphumo zangqina ukuba kukho iingxaki zobumeli/ubuarhente kwiinkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho / Bonnete le go se be bonnete ga ditefelo tša letseno e bile hlogo ya ditherišano tše dintši mo mo dingwagasome tše seswai tša go feta. Nepo ya motheo ya thuto ye ke go ela kamano gare ga pholisi le mathata a dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša Matlotlo tšeo di lego lenaneong la Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Pholisi ya Ditseno le Teori ya Etšensi ke motheo wa thuto ye. Datha ya magareng ya dikhamphani tša mašeleng tšeo di lego lenaneong la paka ya 2005–2016 e be e hwetšagala go tšwa go lenaneo la datha la IRESS. Datha e sekasekilwe go šomišwa EViews version 9. Dipoelo di utullotše gore go ba gona ga bong ka gare ga sehlongwa go rarolla mathata a tshedimošo ya go se lekalekane, le go fokotša nyakego ya go lefa mašokotšo. Dipoelo le tšona di tšweleditše go re diperesente tše 54.69 tša dikhamphani tšeo di lego lenaneong la JSE ka fase ga ditirelo tša sekgao sa go phethagatša diphetho tša mašokotšo. Dipoelo di tšwetša pele go utulla go re ditekanyetšo tša ditefelo tša mašokotšo du sepelelana gabotse le ROE le LEV, le go sepelelana gannyane le INST, DIRS le FOREIGN. Dipoelo di netefatša go ba gona ga mathata a Etšensi ao a ngwadilwego lenaneong la dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša mašeleng / Abstracts in English, Zulu, Sepedi / Business Management / M. Com. (Business Management)