This study looked at 7194 completed listing from eBay Motors. Each observation contained a make, model, year, mileage, seller feedback rating, selling price, time of day ended, day of the week auction ended, auction duration, number of bidders, and number of bids for a car that had been sold on eBay Motors between March 16th and April 5th. Using this information this study looked at how timing affected the selling price of each vehicle, while holding the other variables constant. The observations are split up into four different time periods of the day (times are in Pacific Standard Time): morning (3am-8:59pm), midday (9am-2:59pm), evening (3pm-8:59pm), and night (9pm-2:59am). The regression results show that the midday time period increases the selling price of the vehicle by an average of $1445.41 for this data set. This is likely because the demand and supply side of the eBay Motors market are most equivalent during this time period compared to the other time periods.

Reverse auctions for ecological goods and services are an alternative to current agri-environmental government programs to provide incentives for farmers. This thesis reports on a testbed of laboratory auction experiments to assess efficiency and cost effectiveness of different design treatments. These were developed using estimated costs of wetland restoration in southern Manitoba. The testbed included a comparison of payment type (discriminatory versus uniform payments), and ranking rule for both budget based and target based auctions over repeated auction rounds and reserve prices for the target based auctions. It was found that 1) uniform payments outperformed discriminatory payments under a budget constraint, 2) discriminatory payments were superior to uniform payments under a target constraint, 3) where there is no budget constraint a reserve price can greatly increase efficiency and cost effectiveness. These findings highlight the complexity of auction design and may be used as an aid to guide policy decisions and agri-environmental program design. / Agricultural and Resource Economics

abstract: This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Economics 2011

The diploma thesis presents a proposal for improving the field of marketing of the internet auction system Aukce-Auction.cz, especially with focus on electronic marketing.

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Research on auctions that involve more than one identical item for sale was,almost non-existing in the 90’s, but has since then been getting increasing attention. External incentives for this research have come from the US spectrum, sales, the European 3G mobile-phone auctions,  and Internet auctions. The policy relevance and the huge amount of money involved in many of them have helped the theory and experimental research advance. But in auctions where values are equal across bidders, common value auctions, that is, when the value depends on some outside parameter, equal to all bidders, the research is still embryonic. This thesis contributes to the topic with three studies. The first uses a Bayesian game to model a simple multi-unit common value auction, the task being to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue from three auction formats; the discriminatory, the uniform and the Vickrey auction. The second study conducts an economic laboratory experiment on basis of the first study. The third study comprises an experiment on the multi-unit common value uniform auction and compares the dynamic and the static environments of this format. The most salient result in both experiments is that subjects overbid. They are victims of the winner’s curse and bid above the expected value, thus earning a negative profit. There is some learning, but most bidders continue to earn a negative profit also in later rounds. The competitive effect when participating in an auction seems to be stronger than the rationality concerns. In the first experiment, subjects in the Vickrey auction do somewhat better in small groups than subjects in the other auction types and, in the second experiment, subjects in the dynamic auction format perform much better than subjects in the static auction format; but still, they overbid. Due to this overbidding, the theoretical (but not the behavioral) prediction that the dynamic auction should render more revenue than the static fails inthe second experiment. Nonetheless, the higher revenue of the static auction comes at a cost; half of the auctions yield negative profits to the bidders, and the winner’s curse is more severely widespread in this format. Besides, only a minority of the bidders use the equilibrium bidding strategy.The bottom line is that the choice between the open and sealed-bid formats may be more important than the choice of price mechanism, especially in common value settings.

Nós comparamos o leilão aberto e o leilão selado utilizados para compras públicas na Bolsa Eletrônica de Compras (BEC) do Estado de São Paulo usando dados das transações de açúcar refinado entre 2008 e 2011. O leilão selado gera uma economia para o Estado de aproximadamente 3% em relação ao leilão aberto. Sob a ótica do paradigma de valores privados independentes, nós adotamos um modelo com licitantes assimétricos e aversão ao risco. Ao recuperar a propensão a pagar dos participantes com econometria estrutural, descobrimos que estas hipóteses se encaixam razoavelmente bem aos leilões, ainda que não possamos descartar conluio ou comportamentos gerados por leilões online / We compared the open and the sealed bid auctions used for procurement transaction at the electronic platform Bolsa Eletrônica de Compras (BEC) of São Paulo state using data from refined sugar purchases between 2008 and 2011. The sealed bid generates lower prices in about 3% compared to the open auction. Under the independent private values paradigm, we adopted asymmetric bidders and risk aversion. We recover with structural econometrics the cumulative distribution functions of cost of potential bidders and we found evidence we can fit reasonably well our data, although we cannot reject collusion or behaviors generated by online auctions.

The bison industry has limited resources for increasing market share. Exploring how consumers react to information about bison and discovering what people know about bison is important to determine the most efficient way to increase market share and ensure the sustainability of the bison industry. <p> This thesis examines the impact of three different information treatments on willingness-to-pay for bison. The three treatments are a nutritional comparison chart of negatively-perceived nutrients, a bison taste testimonial from a chef and a statement concerning the absence of growth hormones and antibiotics in the processed bison product used in the research. The hypothesis tested is that nutritional information about bison would elicit the greatest increase in willingness-to-pay for the processed bison product. <p> A random nth-price auction was conducted in December 2002 in Guelph, Ontario with 57 participants to elicit willingness-to-pay values for the processed bison product. Participants initial bids for the processed bison product were elicited without being given any information and a second round of bidding was conducted once participants had reviewed an information treatment. The mean difference in the bids between round two and round one are $0.221 for the nutritional comparison treatment, $0.210 for the taste testimonial treatment and $0.185 for the natural aspects treatment. ANOVA results indicate no statistically significant difference between the mean difference in bids between the three treatments. Further analysis with a regression model using the difference in bids as the dependent variable, dummy variables representing treatment types and survey data for the other relevant independent variables, shows that the coefficient for the nutritional comparison treatment is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, the hypothesis that nutritional information about bison would elicit the greatest increase in willingness-to-pay for the processed bison product has been rejected. The other independent variables examined in the regression are not significant. <p> This thesis does not clearly indicate which information treatment would be the most effective for the bison industry to utilize in a bison information campaign. However, each information treatment did increase the group mean willingness-to-pay so any information relevant to consumers about bison may be beneficial in increasing market share for bison products. Industry participants may need to work together to simultaneously increase awareness, distribution and consumption of bison products to ensure the sustainability of the bison industry.

The bison industry has limited resources for increasing market share. Exploring how consumers react to information about bison and discovering what people know about bison is important to determine the most efficient way to increase market share and ensure the sustainability of the bison industry. <p> This thesis examines the impact of three different information treatments on willingness-to-pay for bison. The three treatments are a nutritional comparison chart of negatively-perceived nutrients, a bison taste testimonial from a chef and a statement concerning the absence of growth hormones and antibiotics in the processed bison product used in the research. The hypothesis tested is that nutritional information about bison would elicit the greatest increase in willingness-to-pay for the processed bison product. <p> A random nth-price auction was conducted in December 2002 in Guelph, Ontario with 57 participants to elicit willingness-to-pay values for the processed bison product. Participants initial bids for the processed bison product were elicited without being given any information and a second round of bidding was conducted once participants had reviewed an information treatment. The mean difference in the bids between round two and round one are $0.221 for the nutritional comparison treatment, $0.210 for the taste testimonial treatment and $0.185 for the natural aspects treatment. ANOVA results indicate no statistically significant difference between the mean difference in bids between the three treatments. Further analysis with a regression model using the difference in bids as the dependent variable, dummy variables representing treatment types and survey data for the other relevant independent variables, shows that the coefficient for the nutritional comparison treatment is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, the hypothesis that nutritional information about bison would elicit the greatest increase in willingness-to-pay for the processed bison product has been rejected. The other independent variables examined in the regression are not significant. <p> This thesis does not clearly indicate which information treatment would be the most effective for the bison industry to utilize in a bison information campaign. However, each information treatment did increase the group mean willingness-to-pay so any information relevant to consumers about bison may be beneficial in increasing market share for bison products. Industry participants may need to work together to simultaneously increase awareness, distribution and consumption of bison products to ensure the sustainability of the bison industry.

The first chapter of this thesis gives a detailed picture of commonly used structural estimation techniques for several types of auction models. Next chapters consist of essays in which these techniques are utilized for empirical analysis of auction environments. In the second chapter we discuss the identification and estimation of the distribution of private signals in a common value auction model with an asymmetric information environment. We argue that the private information of the informed bidders are identifiable due to the asymmetric information structure. Then, we propose a two stage estimation method, which follows the identification strategy. We show, with Monte-Carlo experiments, that the estimator performs well. Third chapter studies Outer Continental Shelf drainage auctions, where oil and gas extraction leases are sold. Informational asymmetry across bidders and collusive behavior of informed firms make this environment very unique. We apply the technique proposed in the second chapter to data from the OCS drainage auctions. We estimate the parameters of a structural model and then run counterfactual simulations to see the effects of the informational asymmetry on the government's auction revenue. We find that the probability that information symmetry brings higher revenue to the government increases with the value of the auctioned tract. In the fourth chapter, we make use of the results in the multi-unit auction literature to study the Balancing Energy Services auctions (electricity spot market auctions) in Texas. We estimate the marginal costs of bidders implied by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the multi-unit auction model of the market. We then compare the estimates to the actual marginal cost data. We find that, for the BES auction we study, the three largest bidders, Luminant, NRG and Calpine, have marked-down their bids more than the optimal amount implied by the model for the quantities where they were short of their contractual obligations, while they have put a mark-up larger than the optimal level implied by the model for quantities in excess of their contract obligations. Among the three bidders we studied, Calpine has come closest to bidding its optimal implied by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the multi-unit auction model of the BES market.